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Abstract!
Introduction 
This thesis describes a program of research showing that team 
formation, individuals’ team behaviours and overall team performance are all improved 
when an appropriately designed cognitive aid is provided to health professionals dealing 
with clinical emergencies. The purpose of the research was to examine how both 
education and cognitive aids could affect team behaviours and processes. Much has been 
written on the effects of education on team functioning, but apparently little on the effects 
of cognitive aids on teams.  
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is in the format of a thesis including publications. There are five main 
sections to the thesis: 
a) A review of how team training is currently undertaken and the problems that may 
occur by using education alone to improve teams 
b) An exploration of the evidence to support cognitive aids being used to improve 
teams and to discover how and when they might fail 
c) Investigations around how cognitive aids may aid calling for help and early team 
formation 
d) How cognitive aids affect individuals’ team behaviours 
e) How cognitive aids affect the overall team processes such as leadership, 
communication and coordination and whether the design of the cognitive aid affects 
these processes. 
First, existing approaches to team training are reviewed within the context of 
emergency medicine. Many types of team training were identified and several meta-
analyses in health and other domains have shown that team training does improve team 
behaviours. Many different types of team training are available, and health uses only a few 
of the types used in other industries. 
Second, a review of cognitive aids in anaesthesia emergencies discovered 22 
cognitive aids that had been evaluated in 23 studies. The review demonstrated that in 
most cases a cognitive aid improved technical performance. The effect of cognitive aids on 
team performance was less clear with only two studies having investigated team function. 
Cognitive aids might not be used because of a lack of familiarity or a lack of education in 
their use, a lack of cultural support for their use or because they are perceived to impair 
rather than assist with the work to be done. Cognitive aid design is often not given as 
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much consideration as the content. The cognitive aids that were not used or that induced 
errors had arguably not been designed with the context of an anaesthetic emergency in 
mind. Designs must be simple, easy to use and should support both the individuals and 
the team. When implementing cognitive aids, testing must be performed to ensure the 
cognitive aids do not induce errors, and education is required on how to most effectively 
use the cognitive aids. 
Third, the effect of cognitive aids on team formation was examined in a parallel 
research program and has been included as supplemental material. The context of the 
emergency in this instance was the Medical Emergency Team (MET) also termed Rapid 
Response System (RRS). When patients deteriorate on the wards of a hospital there might 
not be senior help immediately available and junior staff are expected to activate the RRS 
to send for senior assistance. The research program identified sociocultural barriers to 
RRS activation. One of the solutions to prompt calling for help was the provision of a 
cognitive aid that detailed the expected actions by the junior clinicians and allowed them to 
attempt treatment within defined boundaries. These interventions improved clinical 
outcomes without increasing the number of RRS calls. 
Fourth, a simulation-based randomised study was designed and run to determine 
the effect of cognitive aids on individuals’ team behaviours during an airway emergency. 
The study found that individuals scored higher on a non-technical skills rating system 
when they were provided with a cognitive aid. Furthermore, the number of times 
the cognitive aid was used was positively correlated with the non-technical skills scores. 
Fifth, a simulation-based repeated measures study was performed to determine the 
effect of cognitive aids on team processes. In this study, two types of cognitive aid or no 
cognitive aid were presented to each of 24 teams during simulated 
intraoperative anaphylaxis emergencies. This study demonstrated that the design of the 
aid has an effect on the team functioning, with both aids leading to improved performance 
than when no aid was available. 
In conclusion, the research performed for the thesis demonstrates the importance of 
other methods of improving team behaviour beyond education alone. Cognitive aids can 
improve the ability of junior clinicians to call for help, can enhance the team behaviours 
of individuals and lead to more effective team processes. However, cognitive aids should 
be carefully designed and tested before introduction, as there is now evidence that the 
design of cognitive aids can affect the way teams perform in emergency situations. 
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A Introduction!
A1. Structure of the thesis 
A2. Motivation for the thesis 
A3. Aims 
A4. Overview of the research program and its challenges 
A5. Ethical approvals 
A.1 Structure!of!the!thesis!
The idea for this thesis was generated as a result of observations of health 
education in simulation scenarios. Teams that used cognitive aids (CAs) appeared, at 
least superficially, to manage emergency situations more effectively by communicating 
and coordinating their actions. While the context in this thesis relates to critical care 
emergencies in hospitals, many of the findings may be extrapolated to teams in other 
settings. 
The thesis is presented as a “thesis including publications”. The information about 
the research is included in the four peer reviewed journal papers after this introductory 
narrative. Three of these papers have already been published and the final paper is 
currently under review for publication. This introductory narrative serves the purpose of 
drawing the four papers together to describe the trajectory of the overall thesis and 
explaining where additional work by the author integrates with the thesis. This introduction 
will outline the structure of the thesis the motivation for undertaking it and the challenges 
faced. 
The second section of the introductory narrative following this introduction (section 
A) is the body of the thesis (section B). The numbered subsections in the body correspond 
to the research aim and outcome given in Figure 1 and at the start of the subsection. The 
final section (section C) restates the outcomes of the thesis, raises several unanswered 
questions about CAs and provides a final conclusion. The first subsection (B1) describes 
the complex, team-based nature of contemporary health delivery and how this affects 
patient safety. This section describes current philosophies for training teams more 
effectively in health settings and how these efforts can be further supported. 
The next section explores the background of CAs and their use in health. Factors 
that may affect the successful application of CAs are discussed. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth sections of the introductory narrative investigate how CAs 
affect tam formation, team behaviours (or ‘non-technical skills’) of individuals in emergency 
situations, and the behaviours of the overall team respectively. 
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The final section submits conclusions and considers the accomplishments and 
limitations of the research and suggests areas where future research may be necessary. 
A.2 Motivation!for!the!thesis!
Effective teamwork and communication are cornerstones of safe patient care. Team 
performance measures appear to have close associations with clinical outcomes in acute 
and subacute, routine and emergency settings (deLeval, Carthey, Wright, Farewell, & 
Reason, 2000; Mishra, Catchpole, Dale, & McCilloch, 2008; Strasser et al., 2005). In 
particular, during clinical emergencies, there may be limited time to undertake life-saving 
tasks and consequently an increased stress on team members (Kuhlmann, Piel, & Wolf, 
2005). Team functioning in these time-pressured situations is particularly important as 
miscommunications and lack of coordination can lead to adverse outcomes (Lingard et al., 
2004). If highly effective teams can be formed consistently, the morbidity and mortality 
associated with medical emergencies can be reduced (Risser et al., 1999). 
Teamwork has traditionally been improved through education (Baker, Gustafson, 
Beaubien, Salas, & Barach, 2005). Implementing team training programs was one of the 
key recommendations of the landmark white paper from the Institute of Medicine, ‘To Err is 
Human’ (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). Teamwork training commonly occurs in 
simulation settings where the features of the clinical situation can be reproduced. Such 
training is an expensive, limited resource with difficulties in access. Other solutions to 
improving teamwork must be sought, such as by the use of cards, posters or electronic 
devices to help clinicians recall required tasks and to help them structure their team 
effectively.  
During my work as a simulation educator over the last eight years, I have observed 
hundreds of teams attempt to manage simulated crises. In particular, I noticed that teams 
that were struggling to manage simple emergencies seemed to be transformed into an 
effective team when a set of cards was available to prompt them to perform actions and 
structure the team in a specified way (Marshall & Flanagan, 2007). For my Masters thesis I 
had the privilege of observing video data from the resuscitations of severely injured trauma 
patients to examine the teamwork behaviours. I noticed that the team structure and 
communication changed when decision prompts were displayed to the team from a 
computer-based algorithm (Marshall, 2007). Posters displaying checklists, flowcharts and 
other CAs are now a ubiquitous feature of the walls of any health delivery setting. 
Furthermore, with the rise of smartphones in the last few years there has been a rapid 
increase in the volume of information immediately available to health professionals. Many 
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individuals and organisations have developed CAs with varying levels of design input, 
testing and ongoing support. I wondered what evidence there was that CAs help the 
teams’ performance and whether some aspects might adversely affect team performance 
instead by distracting them from the tasks at hand. 
A.3 Aims!
From the overarching goal of determining how CAs affect team performance, a 
context had to be established. Complex critical care emergencies seemed to be the ideal 
setting to observe team performance for five main reasons (Runciman & Merry, 2005): (a) 
there are commonly a large number of team members with different backgrounds involved 
in the emergency who need to act in a coordinated fashion, (b) during the emergency 
there are many actions that need to be remembered, often in a specified order, (c) 
emergencies are typically rare and as a result the required actions are often forgotten and 
there is little opportunity to practice, (d) there is usually an associated time pressure that 
increases the levels of stress on the team members making it more likely that they will omit 
an action, perform an incorrect action or fail to coordinate with others, and (e) there is an 
emerging body of literature regarding team performance in critical care emergencies. In 
addition, my experience in anaesthesia and simulation training for critical care 
emergencies made this the ideal setting. 
The aims of the research program were fivefold: 
1. To explore how critical care teams are currently being trained and assessed. 
This would inform how the individuals and teams would be trained and assessed 
in later stages 
2. To discover if there is evidence in the literature to support the use of CAs in 
critical care emergencies. It was hypothesised that critical care emergencies 
would be ideal settings for CAs but there had been no systematic review of their 
use in this area. 
3. To determine the features of CAs that are likely to improve their ability to support 
teams during emergencies. If CAs were to be designed and tested it was 
important to have a robust model of how this should be performed. 
4. To ascertain if CAs affect the team behaviours of individuals during crises. 
These non-technical skills may be impaired by the stressful situation that the CA 
might, in part, alleviate. 
5. Investigate the effects of CAs on team structure and performance. CA might 
improve coordination by creating a shared mental model and series of 
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expectations from the members. Conversely, the aid might distract the team 
members from their tasks or inhibit communication between team members.  
A.4 Overview!of!the!research!program!and!its!challenges!
The structure of the research program was developed from Salas and colleagues’ 
integrated model of team performance (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 
1998). The model describes the characteristics and emergent properties of teams and how 
they may be modified.  
 
Figure 1 Research program outlining the five aims based on a modified version of 
Salas et al.’s (1998) model of team performance 
Salas and colleagues’ model is one of several ‘input-process-output’ (IPO) models 
in the health teamwork literature (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Heinemann & Zeiss, 2002). This 
model was selected from the literature as it most plainly details the components of the 
team, its functions and the external factors that may affect performance. Salas et al.’s 
model also outlines the some of the resultant performance metrics for teams including 
outcome and process measures that may be used and has been applied in healthcare. 
Although the model does not specifically include CAs they could be considered as part of 
the environment or context. The context has not been included in the conceptual diagram 
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of the research (Figure 1) but the diagram has been annotated as to where CAs may act to 
affect the team. 
The first phase and second phases investigated the methods by which teams may 
be enhanced. Literature reviews were performed to determine the effects of team training 
and CA use in health and other industries. Particular attention was paid to critical care 
environments such as anaesthesia and emergency medicine and the resulting papers 
were published in these specialty journals. 
The experimental phases of the research program investigated two life-threatening 
emergencies that occur in critical care settings, those of failed airway management and 
anaphylaxis. The failed airway management study was designed to assess the individual 
team-working behaviours of critical care specialists, commonly termed ‘non-technical skills’ 
(NTS). The anaphylaxis study was constructed to examine both the effect of CAs on team 
functioning and also if the design of the aid affected performance or perceived ease of 
use.  
One of the initially planned studies was to determine how the presence of a CA 
affects the formation of a team. This study was to use junior clinicians (graduate nurses 
and interns) interacting with a screen-based simulation of a deteriorating patient. Three 
problems were found with the design of this study in pilot testing:  
1. The group was too heterogeneous, with some participants being overly cautious 
and some overly confident. This spread of behaviours may have been at least 
partly due to differing understandings of what was expected from them, even 
after careful, standardised instructions.  
2. The attempted study was conducted prior to existing teaching to capture how 
junior staff might form teams before any recent educational intervention. In 
practical terms this meant that the explanation, consent and activities of the 
research had to be compressed into 30 minutes. Despite attempting contact with 
the participants prior to the session, the rate of recruitment remained extremely 
slow and impractical.  
3. The simulation conditions did not sufficiently represent the actual clinical 
conditions in which they would normally be expected to perform. This could have 
been partially rectified by changing the screen-based simulation to an 
immersive, mannequin-based scenario.  
However, the main deficiency of this research was demonstrated in a concurrent 
sister study examining the reasons for failures to call for assistance (Shearer et al., 2012). 
In the concurrent study the cognitive and sociological barriers to asking for help were 
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investigated. Shearer et al. discovered that the main barrier to requesting help was the 
perceived interpersonal judgement of their competence. The planned screen-based study 
would not have been valid, as it did not sufficiently replicate the social conditions of the 
clinical setting. This phenomenon has been termed the ‘sociological fidelity’ of a simulation 
(Sharma, Boet, Kitto, & Reeves, 2011).  
Ultimately the team formation study was abandoned; however, I have retained a 
section in this thesis explaining the results of the concurrent study in detail. Another 
clinically based research program examined why junior medical and nursing staff do not 
call for help when it is needed. The material is not part of the thesis but included as 
appendices (D, E, F and G) as some of this work is currently unpublished (Marshall et al., 
2011)(Buist, Marshall, Shearer, Finnigan, & Wilson, 2014; Kitto et al., 2014; Shearer et al., 
2012).Section 4 on team formation explains how CAs may play a role in team formation 
and draws on this work.  
The choice of anaphylaxis for the final study was fortuitous. The Australian and New 
Zealand Anaesthetic Allergy Group (ANZAAG) is a body consisting of anaesthetists, 
immunologists and clinical scientists with an interest in anaesthetic related allergic 
reactions. In late 2011 the group had completed a review of anaphylaxis management and 
generated guidelines. However, these guidelines were not formatted in a way that was 
accessible to clinicians at the point of care. ANZAAG generously allowed a small group to 
modify these guidelines and supported the research. The Australian and New Zealand 
College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA) have continued this support and plans to create a 
smartphone application are ongoing. 
A.5 Ethical!approvals!
The simulation-based studies were undertaken across three centres located in 
Melbourne and Newcastle. Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval was 
obtained from each of the hospitals where the centres were located (Alfred Health, 
Monash Health, Hunter New England Health) and the University of Queensland Ethics 
Committee. Video data were securely stored by the investigators and exchanged in 
person. One of the participants in the airway emergency study gave written consent for the 
video data of his scenario to be presented at a conference. This video release form is held 
separately to the other written consents. 
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B2. Cognitive aids in critical care emergencies 
B3. Team formation with cognitive aids 
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B.1.1 Theoretical models of team performance 
The contemporary health system delivers care using team-based approaches. It is 
now unusual to see a single practitioner involved in an episode of care. Groups of health 
professionals tend to the needs of patients at all levels and acuity of care, from birth in the 
hospital labour ward with obstetricians and midwives present, to death in the community 
with the help of social workers, allied health professionals, palliative care nurses and 
doctors. In many cases the teams include health workers with very different skill sets and 
experience. Increasingly these individuals are experienced in more specialised, narrow 
areas as the rapid rate of knowledge growth in health has made it difficult to maintain an 
up to date knowledge in anything but a narrow field of specialisation.  
In order to understand how teams perform and why they may fail, the theories of 
team performance and models in other areas such as military, business and transport 
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domains must be investigated. There are at least 150 frameworks of team performance 
that have been suggested with no clear way to integrate them (Salas, Cooke, & Gorman, 
2010), and so to choose one on which to base this research program was difficult. Most 
team performance models follow an input-process-outcome  (IPO) model. Cohen and 
Bailey (1997), working from a management perspective, developed a ‘team effectiveness 
framework’. In this framework, the effectiveness of the team was hypothesised to be a 
function of 1) environmental factors, 2) design factors, 3) group processes, and 4) group 
psychosocial traits. The environmental factors in this model include factors external to the 
organisation such as regulatory frameworks. The design factors include the type of task 
and the composition of the team. The group processes described conflict and 
communication within the team. Finally, the group psychosocial factors comprised of the 
norms or the team and the level of shared mental model of the problem and goals. The 
problems with Cohen and Bailey’s model are that the elements are not well defined, the 
interactions among them are simplistic and do not take into account the dynamic nature of 
the teams and processes. The model does outline how the design of the work may affect 
outcomes and indeed what these outcomes may be in terms of job satisfaction and 
productivity, so can be seen as a useful starting point for a model of team performance. 
Heinemann and Zeiss (2002) defined the elements of a team performance model in 
more detail, describing 86 elements of teams’ structures, contexts, processes and 
productivity. Although this list is extensive it does not suggest how the domains inter-
relate. The domains in Heinemann and Zeiss’s model are similar to Salas’ and colleagues 
model (Salas et al., 1998), in which the relationships among all of the elements are more 
clearly displayed. 
The structure of the team is identified as a component of a team’s performance in 
all of the models. One aspect that is occasionally noted is that teams do not work in a 
vacuum but rather in a broader organisational context. Ginnett (1993) refers to this as the 
‘organisational shell’ that determines the team’s resources, composition and underlying 
culture. The presence of an organisation shell suggests that changing one aspect of how a 
team performs may not succeed without addressing broader organisational factors. 
Other features of teams in addition to their composition are also important to 
understand how they may be improved. Three emergent features have been suggested to 
determine how teams make decisions: 1) skill differentiation, 2) authority differentiation 
and 3) temporal stability of the team (Hollenbeck, Beersma, & Schouten, 2012). Skill 
differentiation refers to the extent to which each individual within the team has specialist 
knowledge and skill. Health care teams often have a large skill differentiation making it 
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challenging to address all members of a team with a single intervention to improve 
performance. Authority differentiation is the degree to which all members of the team are 
equally able to make decisions. The hierarchy of decision-making in health teams is 
variable. Some multidisciplinary teams such as rehabilitation teams have a more 
democratic style than military or surgical settings where the leader makes all the decisions 
for management. The stability of health teams is also variable with some teams having 
rapidly rotating changes of role and personnel. This lack of stability may make it difficult for 
the team to perform to a high standard as mental models may not be shared and 
communication and coordination may be sub-optimal.  
The method by which teams coordinate their activities is also an important 
component of effective teamwork. In emergency teams where there may be multiple goals 
and parallel task completion, priorities need to be set and interdependencies managed 
even when the situation and team composition are dynamic (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 
2001; Tschan et al., 2006). This coordination of activities is usually managed by 
communication between the team members but in some circumstances such as with well-
rehearsed tasks or familiarity of team members other forms of coordination may be used 
that do not require communication termed implicit coordination. Teams may adapt their 
coordination patterns in response to changes in requirements such as changes in 
leadership or experience of team members (Kolbe, Kunzle, Zala-Meza, Wacker, & Grote, 
2009). How team members coordinate their activities should be central to any intervention 
to improve team performance.  
 
B.1.2 Potential problems with teams in health care 
Although the most up to date and highest quality of care in an area is likely to be 
delivered by teams, there are several problems with this increasingly fragmented approach 
caused by specialisation. Skill differentiation between members of a specialist team may 
be narrower when all members have specialised in a specific area. When members of a 
team have very different backgrounds there may be less common ground to agree on, 
potentially leading to conflict (Klein, Feltovich, Bradshaw, & Woods, 2005). It has been 
recognised for many years that nursing and medical staff in particular communicate in very 
different ways (Cadogan, Franzi, Osterweil, & Hill, 1999). Language in health settings is 
often imprecise and commonly includes colloquialisms and acronyms that are specific to 
the clinical area or professional group. For example, even within the specialty of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology, the acronym IUD may be interpreted in two ways: intrauterine 
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(contraceptive) device in gynaecology or intrauterine death (stillbirth) in obstetrics. It is little 
wonder that professionals who have been trained overseas struggle with the informal 
language and abbreviations used in clinical settings. The type of team and context can 
completely change the nature of how teams function and communicate. 
Commonly the team members in health teams are distributed and may only come 
together when there is an emergency. The team dynamics such as hierarchy, leadership 
and followership in these situations are often developed in an ad-hoc manner in the initial 
stages in contrast to when teams are already co-located (Tschan et al., 2006). For 
instance, a cardiac arrest team commonly consists of an intensive care doctor and nurse, 
an anaesthetic doctor and nurse, nurses and doctors from the clinical area and even 
security staff. These workers rarely come together prior to an emergency to plan or get to 
know each other. However, they are expected to function as a well-organised team as 
soon as they meet. An appropriate analogy would perhaps be a Formula One pit crew 
consisting of team members with specific roles and requiring a high degree of coordination 
(Catchpole et al., 2007). In the pit crew’s case they rehearse as a team in the roles they 
expect to perform during the event. In health, the team members are distributed without 
the opportunity to rehearse and often without knowing who may be in the other roles until 
the event occurs. 
Another complicating factor is the lack of temporal stability. The team members 
occupying the roles of a health team may change at regular intervals. Shift changes may 
mean that cardiac arrests in the morning, afternoon, evening and night may have different 
team members. Furthermore, the roles that are required by the team also change, such 
that a junior doctor may be required to perform cardiac massage in one cardiac arrest, 
take blood tests in another event, or even act as the leader in a different case. 
Consequently, teams in health care have been said to be ‘unstable’ (Andreatta, 2009). 
This must be taken into account when lessons from other industries are considered that 
train whole teams that are expected to work together for days, weeks or even months at a 
time. 
The variability and ubiquity of teams in health has led some to even question its 
usefulness as a concept in some instances. West and Lyubovnikova describe the majority 
of teams in health as ‘pseudo teams’. The distinction between ‘real teams’ and ‘pseudo 
teams’ is dependent on the extents to which they need to communicate and coordinate 
their activities, they have shared goals and they review their performance (or ‘reflexivity’) 
(West & Lyubovnikova, 2013). When researching teams in health, West and Lyubovnikova 
assert that great care needs to be taken in defining the characteristics that make it a team 
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as the expectations and attitudes towards ‘real teams’ and ‘pseudo teams’ are very 
different in practice. 
B.1.3 How is teamwork improved at present? 
Ideally, team training would be employed before the individuals are involved in 
clinical team situations. Unfortunately, however, inter-professional training and team 
training are rare in undergraduate settings and when they do occur they are one-off 
sessions with little ongoing reinforcement. Superficially, at least, access to simulation 
training specifically for team training appears to be patchy and is known to be expensive to 
run. At present there seems to be no alternative to simulation training to train clinical 
teams. 
A literature review was undertaken (Paper 1) to identify the features of effective 
clinical teams and investigate methods of team training in other industries. The context 
was that of emergency medicine: a high risk critical care specialty that would, in principle, 
benefit from improved team performance in crises. The paper discusses the methods and 
strategies for team training in emergency medicine and suggests recommendations from 
the literature about how to design training interventions. However, there is a note of 
caution regarding the application of methods of team training from other industries to 
health (Marshall & Flanagan, 2010, p. 362): 
Given the absence of stable teams in all but a handful of medical 
settings, it would seem futile to train individuals to work as though they 
were part of a specific group. Team training in healthcare should 
therefore focus on training individuals to work in team contexts rather 
than training the team as a unit.  
Since the publication of this thesis’ Paper 1, another assessment of the 
effectiveness of simulation training in anaesthesia has been published. Lorello et al. 
reviewed the literature on simulation training for skills, knowledge and behaviours and 
patient effects of simulation training (Lorello, Cook, Johnson, & Brydges, 2014). Despite a 
limited number of papers included, they found a strong effect of simulation-based team 
(CRM) training over other methods (one study) or no intervention (five studies) to improve 
team behaviours. Schmutz and Manser (2013) also performed a systematic literature 
review of the effect of team process measures on performance measures in health. They 
found that all of the 28 studies reviewed reported at least one significant relationship 
between team processes and improved team performance. This positive finding is 
encouraging; however, Schmutz and Manser also noted many deficiencies in the literature 
such as poor definitions of terms and a lack of theoretical frameworks in many papers. The 
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training interventions described in the studies are generally expensive and difficult to 
implement on a large scale. 
A more recent review updated the methods used in team training for health and 
agreed with the conclusions of Paper 1 (Weaver, Dy, & Rosen, 2014). This review also 
emphasised the need for metrics to be integrated into the curricula of health professionals 
to monitor team training programs and professional development. 
B.1.4 Potential for other methods to improve teamwork 
Other methods of guiding how individuals interact in emergency situations may help 
to either replace or reinforce training in team behaviours in stressful, emergency 
conditions. One of these strategies is to use CAs to help team members recall required 
actions and to direct team members to adopt roles. CAs may assist by putting the 
information ‘in the world’ and ensuring all of the team members have the same common 
understanding of the problem. To some extent this method is used in the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) ‘Safer Surgery Checklist’ (Haynes et al., 2009). One of the tasks 
that must be undertaken prior to the commencement of surgery is that team members 
must introduce themselves and state their role. This simple act has been suggested to 
make it easier and more acceptable for junior members of the team to speak up in a crisis. 
A more detailed examination of what CAs are and how they work is found in the next 
section (B2 – ‘Cognitive aids in critical care emergencies’). 
A further model of team performance describes three facets of 1) team procedures 
and structures, 2) team skills and competencies and 3) team support technologies 
(MacMillan et al., 2001). This final component distinguishes between the general design of 
the work and design of supporting material that may be considered as computer 
technology, CAs or other tools. In adding the CA component we can consider two 
alternative views of their function; that they act as extensions of our processing abilities or 
that they compensate for a technical system that is too complex (Reason, 1987). Reason 
refers to these as the ‘cognitive tool’ or ‘cognitive crutch’ approaches and warns that the 
cognitive crutch view may limit rather than expand individuals’ and teams’ ability to solve 
problems. The distinction between these views suggests that CAs may help or hinder 
teams depending on factors that are unknown at present. This knowledge gap led me to 
examine the literature on CAs in medical emergencies (Paper 2) to determine the 
evidence to support each of these views. 
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B.1.5 How is teamwork assessed? 
Before testing how different interventions may affect team performance, the 
measures of team performance must be defined. As noted by Salas and colleagues’ model 
of team performance, team can be judged on its outcomes, or its processes (Salas et al., 
1998). Outcome measures include the team’s success in achieving goals and whether the 
team members felt the team performed to standard. In contrast, process measures are 
concerned with how the team members structured themselves, communicated, and 
assigned tasks (Figure 1). 
A further complexity occurs when the unit of measure is considered. Teams can be 
assessed by how each individual performs or how the overall team performs. A team may 
score very well on overall measures; however, they may need to compensate for an 
underperforming member of the team. The scoring system that is used must take into 
account the reason for the scoring. In the emergency airway study (Paper 3) the focus was 
on how the individuals’ Non-technical skills (NTS) were affected by the presence of a CA. 
In the anaphylaxis study (Paper 4) the performance of the whole team was the reason for 
the study. As a result, different measures were used. 
Process measures often include evidence of leadership, communication and 
followership, but they may also include detailed examination of coordination and its 
adaptation as a measure of team effectiveness. Examples of adaptive coordination 
measurement is described by Manser, Howard and Gaba in cardiac anaesthesia and 
anaesthetic emergency settings (Manser, Howard, & Gaba, 2009). This work into 
anaesthesia coordination was identified as one of the few studies that had been 
undertaken into the effects of CAs in anaesthetic emergencies in Paper 2 and so a 
different approach was taken in Paper 4 to avoid replication of this work. 
Team situation awareness (SA) has also been studied as a measure of team 
performance. Measurements of situational communication are also commonly included in 
NTS measures such as ANTS (Fletcher et al., 2003) and aggregate behavioural measures 
of team performance (Weller et al., 2011), that were used in Papers 3 and 4. 
Many investigators have recognised that team performance is a complex construct 
that cannot be measured with one metric (Xiao, Henrickson-Parker, & Manser, 2013). The 
design of studies included as Papers 3 and 4 used a combination of technical outcome 
measures and either individual team behaviours (NTS, Paper 3) or team behaviours 
(Paper 4).  
 15 
B.2 Cognitive!aids!in!critical!care!emergencies!
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B2. Cognitive aids in critical care emergencies 
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B4. Individuals’ team behaviours with cognitive aids 
B5. Team performance with cognitive aids 
 
 
B.2.1 What are cognitive aids and when might they be helpful? 
The terms ‘cognitive aid’, ‘algorithm’ and ‘guideline’ are often misunderstood and 
misused. One of the initial problems in investigating this area was to ensure that a search 
of the literature would capture all the instances of CA use hidden behind other terminology. 
Furthermore, many papers introduced guidelines without providing assistance in the form 
of a CA and these papers had to be omitted from any review. The first section and Table 1 
of Paper 2 relates to clearing up the confusion surrounding terminology in CA research 
(Marshall, 2013). 
With the many diverse clinical practice guidelines available, it was important to 
determine the context in which CAs might be useful and to restrict any literature review to 
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that area. As has already been stated in the introductory section, clinical emergencies 
seem ripe for the application of CAs as they pose challenges of time pressure, team 
resource management and limited working memory caused by stress responses. From my 
own observations in trauma resuscitations (Marshall et al., 2007) it was clear that CAs 
affected team processes such as communication and leadership. However, there 
appeared to be little other literature to support this. The literature in anaesthesia crises 
appeared to be more mature and was the reason that the literature review focused on this 
area.  
B.2.2 Why cognitive aids fail 
Despite the great potential and, in most cases, enthusiasm for CAs, the literature 
review carried out for Paper 2 suggested that CAs occasionally do not improve 
performance during a crisis. The most common reason was that the CA was not used. 
This seemed to be because the CA was not known about, was not designed with the 
context of the emergency in mind, or that the participants weren’t familiar with the CA or 
thought they would be seen as poor clinicians if they referred to it (Neily et al., 2007). The 
context of use is important to understand as the CA may distract from a cue or task that 
the clinician requires to manage the situation safely. An example of this was described in a 
letter (Appendix A) discussing how the routine ‘Time out’ checklist before surgery may 
distract an anaesthetist at a critical point following induction of anaesthesia (Keane & 
Marshall, 2010). 
In some cases it is possible that, despite the content of the CA being correct, it 
could induce rather than prevent an error or adverse event. This potential for harm may be 
directly related to a poorly designed CA. It is possible that the designs of the CAs 
discovered in Paper 2 that did not show an improvement or that showed a decrement in 
performance were deficient in some way. As noted in Paper 2, little attention is paid to the 
design of most CAs. In a response to a letter citing Paper 2 in the description of a 
successful paediatric resuscitation, I underscored the importance of design and simulation 
testing (Marshall, 2014): 
Immersive simulation studies using whole teams in actual or replicated 
clinical settings provide a potential solution and allow experimental 
control to test the appropriateness of design and method of use of 
cognitive aids. (p. 1388) 
Health care does not yet have a defined process for dealing with flawed CAs. A 
useful analogy put forward in Paper 2 was to consider CAs in the same way as a medical 
device. In essence, a CA provides a similar function to a medical device; it enables a user 
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to perform a task at the point of care. Design and testing of medical devices must occur to 
ensure—as far as can be reasonably established—that no harm will come to a patient 
from design flaws when the device is released onto the market. No such assurances are 
required for CAs because the CA does not directly contact the patient. Despite the lack of 
physical contact between the CA and the patient, there remains risk of harm if it is used 
incorrectly (Marshall, 2012). The treatment of CAs as devices may not be popular because 
it would place legal burdens on any person creating a CA for a clinical area and would be 
difficult to regulate. 
B.2.3 Effects of cognitive aids on technical and non-technical work 
The literature supports the proposition that well-designed CAs improve the 
performance of individuals and teams on outcome measures such as a reduction in errors, 
omissions and time to perform critical steps during a crisis. The evidence for positive 
effects of CAs on individuals’ non-technical skills and on team processes was scant. As 
described in Paper 2, only a handful of studies have examined this aspect of CAs, with 
most studies underpowered to detect a difference on a Behaviourally Anchored Ratings 
Scale (BARS) between groups. In addition, in the anaesthetic crisis literature there was 
limited evidence to indicate how teams form and structure themselves. The next three 
sections of the thesis will address these problems: 1) Can CAs help with team formation 
and structure? 2) Can CAs improve individuals’ non-technical skills? 3) Can CAs improve 
team processes? In addition, the final section will also address how the design of CAs may 
affect the method of use and the performance of the team. 
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B5. Team performance with cognitive aids 
 
B.3.1 Supporting team formation and calling for help 
Team formation is a function of the initial performance of teams that is rarely 
addressed in health settings. As previously noted, health teams are predominantly 
‘unstable teams’ (Andreatta, 2009) with different roles and with different members filling 
those roles at any time. This temporal instability means there is little opportunity for team 
rehearsal and therefore a reliance on training individuals to act as effective team members 
when the occasion arises. Unfortunately the situation that requires a team to form is 
usually an emergency. Team introductions, assessment of skill levels and allocation of 
tasks are often hampered by the context of a noisy, time-pressured situation. There is also 
the risk of incorrect information transfer and the risk of team members developing different 
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mental models of the emergency they are dealing with because of a lack of coordination 
and communication. 
Even before the team members arrive at an emergency there must be a plan to call 
for additional help from the clinician discovering the emergency. Junior clinicians, usually 
nurses and doctors on the wards, are commonly the first to realise there may be an 
emergency situation. To circumvent the hierarchical system that may prevent them from 
calling for help, the Rapid Response System (RRS), also termed the Medical Emergency 
Team (MET), has been implemented in many organisations. The RRS allows junior staff to 
call for help if the patient’s physiological values fall outside of a predefined ‘safe’ range, or 
if they are concerned about the patient and unable to obtain help by other means. There 
has been conflicting evidence about the effectiveness of the RRS. Small single hospital 
studies have found decreases in cardiac arrest rates and unplanned intensive care unit 
admissions of up to 50% (Buist et al., 2002), but a large multihospital study showed no 
benefit of introducing a RRS (Hillman et al., 2005). One suggestion for this discrepancy is 
the low utilisation rate of the RRS. When the benefit from actual calls is assessed, 
individual patients benefit from RRS activation; however, junior staff only ask for help in 
half of cases of patients that deteriorate on the wards.  
B.3.2 Improving RRS utilisation 
In parallel with this thesis, I was involved in the design and conduct of a study to 
determine why junior staff do not call for help when it is needed. This work is included for 
information as appendices (D, E, F and G) as some of the material is unpublished. One of 
the solutions to improve calling for help was the development of a CA. This CA helped 
align documentation on the observation chart and guided the actions of the junior nurses 
and doctors when the physiological parameters were abnormal or they were concerned 
about the patient. 
The paper included as Appendix D (Marshall et al., 2011) outlines the mixed 
methods used to determine the extent of failure to activate the RRS and to design 
methods to overcome this. Appendix E (Shearer et al., 2012) describes a point prevalence 
study that discovered that 4% of patients across 4 major hospital sites met the 
physiological criteria to activate the RRS, but that the RRS was activated in only 58% of 
these cases. This paper also notes that the majority of the patients who were 
physiologically unstable but for whom help was not called did not come to any harm. It was 
felt that the criteria were not specific enough and in many cases the junior clinical staff 
could manage the problem themselves. Problems arose when the measures junior staff 
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took did not have the desired effect and help was delayed, or they were inappropriately 
confident about their abilities. Focus groups of staff involved with RRS calls revealed that 
socio-cultural factors were also involved in preventing the staff from calling for help 
(Appendix F). Socio-cultural factors must also be considered when designing an 
intervention such as a CA to improve RRS activation rates.  
The final paper included as Appendix G (Buist et al., 2014) outlines the design and 
implementation of three interventions to improve the outcomes of deteriorating patients on 
the wards. The aim of most interventions in the recent literature has been to increase the 
number of RRS episodes by encouraging the staff to call for help more frequently. In 
contrast, our aim of introducing these interventions was not to increase the number of RRS 
activations, but to allow the junior staff to manage the problems themselves within defined 
limits and to give a pathway for appropriate escalation. These interventions were 1) the 
introduction of the National Observation Chart; 2) the development of a standardised 
process for paging clinical staff in emergencies and 3) importantly for this thesis, the 
provision of a CA along with the observation chart to guide decision-making when calling 
for additional team members to help. The main finding from this final study was that the 
combined effect of interventions reduced the rate of ‘missed MET calls’ by 70%; the 
situation where help was not sought and the patient suffered harm. The number of RRS 
activations did not significantly. 
B.3.3 The importance of this work 
The management of deteriorating patients is one of the ten Australian ‘National 
Safety and Quality Standards’ that all health services must be addressed for accreditation 
(ACSQHC, 2011). These three papers demonstrate that the effectiveness of the RRS can 
be improved by the method of its implementation and a supporting CA. In relation to this 
thesis, it is clear that even before a team is formed, a CA can help in the decisions to call 
for help and declare an emergency. As stated in the introduction, a paper on team 
formation was planned for this thesis, but design flaws in the study prevented it from being 
completed. Instead, this additional research program outside of the thesis but related to it 
addresses some of the complexities of team formation and outlines one of the ways that 
CAs can contribute to team formation. It shows that CAs can be used to clarify the 
expectations of junior staff members when faced with a critically unwell patient. 
This work links with other theories in the social construction of knowledge by teams 
(Nosek, 2001). These theories suggest that the team members may encounter ‘boundary 
objects’ that may be CAs or even facial expressions of other team members that guide 
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their actions. Each individual may respond to these actions differently depending on the 
perceived relevance. As a result the action guided by a CA is socialised and the content of 
a CA may necessarily contain redundant information for some members of the team. 
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B1. Current knowledge and training of clinical teams 
B2. Cognitive aids in critical care emergencies 
B3. Team formation with cognitive aids 
B4. Individuals’ team behaviours with cognitive aids 
B5. Team performance with cognitive aids 
 
B.4.1 Mechanisms by which CA may improve team performance  
From the theoretical standpoint outlined by Salas et al.’s framework from which 
Figure 1 is derived (Salas et al., 1998), CAs may affect team performance by both actions 
on the individual team members and the processes that the team adopts. This section will 
examine the effects of CAs on individuals’ team behaviours or ‘Non-Technical Skills’ 
(NTS).  
Flin, O’Conner, and Crichton (2008, p. 1) described NTS as being: 
“…cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement 
technical skills and contribute to safe and efficient task performance.” 
These NTS include qualities such as decision-making, communication and team 
working that each team member contributes to the team’s processes. If the NTS of 
 23 
individual team members and particularly the leader are satisfactory, there is a greater 
likelihood that the team’s processes will also be satisfactory to manage the event. 
If a team member used a CA to remind them of the key steps required during a 
crisis, it would remove some of the individual’s cognitive workload from remembering the 
sequence of the tasks. As a result, the team member may have more time to allocate to 
managing the team during the crisis (Runciman & Merry, 2005). In the case of a team 
leader this may translate into more effective resource allocation, prioritising and decision-
making. For other team members, an increase in time to consider team behaviours may 
improve the ability to communicate, contribute to discussion of the problem and identify 
when other team members require additional help.  
B.4.2 How are NTS affected by the use of a CA? 
Paper 3 (Marshall & Mehra, 2014) describes a randomised controlled study to 
determine if NTS improve with the use of a CA. The context was the anaesthetic 
emergency of ‘Can’t Intubate, Can’t Oxygenate’ (CICO), a situation requiring the rapid 
establishment of a surgical airway also termed an ‘infraglottic airway’ or 
‘cricothyroidotomy’. This scenario was chosen because of the recent emergence of an 
evidenced-based algorithm for management (Heard, Green, & Eakins, 2009). It was felt 
that the original branched CA may be too complex to use in an emergency and the aid was 
redesigned into a linear version (Figure 2).  
The participants in this study were experienced critical care specialists. This meant 
that opportunities to observe them prior to the testing scenarios were limited. This was a 
trade-off between accessing these senior clinicians and improving the reliability of the 
data. Little of the previous research into CAs found in Paper 2 had used experienced 
practitioners as participants in studies with most being undergraduate or junior medical 
staff. 
There are difficulties in conducting controlled studies into CAs as blinding of the 
investigators and participants are problematic. The participants cannot be blinded to the 
intervention, as they must be able to see and use the CA. The investigators must provide 
the CA and would be able to see if it was used during the event. Nevertheless, when the 
video data were recorded the CA was placed out of the field of view of the recording 
equipment and only visualised once it was moved in order for it to be used. By attempting 
to blind the observers the study looked at both the provision of the CA an performance on 
an ‘intention to treat’ basis. When the participants used the CA, the frequency of use was 
observed from the video recordings. Six of the participants in the CA group were not seen 
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to use the aid. This may mean that they failed to use the CA or that they did not obviously 
use the aid when it was out of view of the cameras. 
Another problem noted in the literature review was the expectation by the 
investigators that the CA would be used (Marshall, 2013). Most previous studies 
examining CA in emergencies found in Paper 2 did not introduce the participants to the 
CA. A lack of education of the participants may have been a factor in the low incidence of 
use and in this study, 10 minutes was taken to familiarise the participants to the room and 
the CA and to discuss the potential benefits of using the CA. Another reason for 
familiarising the participants to the CA and to give some initial information about the 
scenario was to ensure a minimum level of knowledge and therefore minimal technical skill 
variability to the study. The focus of this study was on the non-technical performance not 
the technical performance. A potential technical skill or knowledge failure may have 
distracted them from the use of the CA and the team skills. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Linear design of cognitive aid for a ‘Can’t Intubate Can’t Oxygenate’ 
emergency used in Paper 3 (Marshall & Mehra, 2014). 
 
The primary outcome measures in this study were the category scores of the 
Anaesthetist’s Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) scoring framework to assess the participants’ 
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team working skills in the emergency as individuals rather than scoring the whole team. 
The ANTS system was designed for use by specialist anaesthetists in assessing the NTS 
of other anaesthetists and consequently both observers were consultant anaesthetists. 
The observers also looked for instances when a participant exhibited disrespectful 
behaviours towards other members of the team or openly argued with them. These 
examples of conflict were secondary measures of poor NTS of the participants.  
When the CA was provided to the participants there were statistically significantly 
higher ANTS scores than in the control group. Further analysis demonstrated positive 
correlations between the number of times the CA was referred to and ANTS scores 
suggesting that the beneficial effects occurred when the CA was used rather than when it 
was merely available in the room. Occurrences of verbalisation from the CA were not 
recorded but it is unlikely to have affected the results, as most of the usage events were 
the participant reading silently to themselves. All five instances of conflict occurred when 
the CA was not provided, however this failed to reach statistical significance. The measure 
of technical performance showed a trend towards an increased proportion of participants 
providing oxygen within three minutes when the CA was provided. There were no 
significant correlations between the experience of the participants and the use of the CA 
(Pearson’s R=-0.113, p=0.331). The aid was used a maximum of 7 times when provided 
(Range = 0 to 7, Median = 1). 
B.4.3 Significance of this work and interpretation 
This study was the first prospective study to demonstrate that individuals’ NTS are 
improved when a CA is provided during a medical emergency, even when the CA does not 
explicitly refer to team management. There are several explanations for this that relate to 
the management of competing activities during the emergency. These relate to a) the time 
constraints during the crisis, b) the differing natures of the tasks and c) prospective 
memory requirements. 
The CA provides the clinician with a list and priority of tasks to be performed and 
may reduce the time required to synthesise all of the options and tasks needed for the 
situation. As noted earlier in this section, any additional time could be allocated by the 
clinician to help manage the team aspects of the emergency, including communication and 
monitoring the actions of other team members. Emergencies in health are commonly time-
pressured situations. Future studies may consider if similar effects of CAs on NTS occur 
during routine conditions when time is not pressured. 
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Requirements needed to complete the task work and team work aspects of crises 
are very different. In the testing scenario the participants were expected to undertake the 
task work functions of generating, selecting and prioritising options for action and to 
perform the technical skills of airway management. In addition they were required to 
undertake team work functions of role allocation, communication and monitoring of other 
team members. This ‘switching cost’ between task and team functions itself may account 
for a substantial proportion of the cognitive workload of the clinician (Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). A reduction of this switching cost may emerge if the clinician is able to minimise the 
amount of switching that occurs. By removing the requirement to remember the sequence 
and priority of actions this function may be disregarded and effectively remove one of 
several concurrent tasks and perhaps the number of switches between tasks. However, 
there may also be additional switching costs associated with accessing the CA (Drews, 
2013). These costs could be substantial if the design of the CA makes the information 
difficult to interpret, or the interface requires the user to perform an additional action.  
A further aspect of the switching cost is the ability to recall previously intended 
actions before the interrupting task was commenced. These pieces of information that are 
needed to reorientate the user are termed ‘prospective memory’ requirements. If a CA 
provides a reminder, such as where they were up to in a sequence of actions it would 
prepare them to return to the actions and minimise the switching cost. These cognitive 
aspects of emergency care would be very difficult to test in actual clinical conditions 
because of the dynamic nature of medical emergencies. 
Interestingly in this study there was no significant improvement in technical 
performance, measured as the speed of task completion. This may be due to the 
education about the aid and the emergency prior to the study scenario, or may be a lack of 
effect of the CA.  
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B.5 Team!performance!with!cognitive!aids!
B1. Current knowledge and training of clinical teams 
B2. Cognitive aids in critical care emergencies 
B3. Team formation with cognitive aids 
B4. Individuals’ team behaviours with cognitive aids 
B5. Team performance with cognitive aids 
 
B.5.1 How CAs may affect team processes 
In addition to the effects on individuals’ team behaviours, CAs may also affect team 
processes such as the method of coordination and communication between the team 
members. ‘Artifacts’ such as CAs have been shown to provide a shared understanding of 
the tasks and goals (Hutchins, 1995). By providing ‘mutual knowledge’ to all members of 
the team, CAs offer the same mental model and should support coordination. These 
coordination activities may be either explicit or implicit. Explicit coordination activities 
require verbal or non-verbal means to coordinate activities whereas implicit coordination 
describes the alignment of activities of team members without the need to communicate. 
Implicit coordination requires a detailed shared understanding of the situation and task 
requirements and is often seen when teams are familiar with one another or have a high 
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workload. The theoretical advantage of implicit coordination is the reduction of cognitive 
required cognitive resources to communicate with other team members (Serfaty, Entin, & 
Volpe, 1993). 
Measurement of team processes has until recently been limited by the lack of 
robust team assessment tools. Several models of team performance and accompanying 
scoring systems have been trialled, but few have had rigorous evaluation. Consequently, 
there have been few prior studies of the effects of CAs on the performance of the team as 
the unit of measure. Existing studies of CAs on whole team performance have been either 
retrospective analyses of data using different CAs (Manser, Harrison, Gaba, & Howard, 
2009), or limited in their ability to detect changes in team performance such as using 
number of communication events (Burden, Carr, Staman, Littman, & Torjman, 2012).  
In a retrospective study, Manser and colleagues observed the patterns of 
communication relating to specific functions of teams managing an anaesthetic 
emergency. The number of communication events related to information management 
increased in the higher performing crews, whereas task management such as planning 
and task allocation had a only a short initial increase in communication events (Manser, 
Harrison, et al., 2009). Manser et al. found that highly performing teams used a CA more 
and that team coordination patterns appeared to have changed, but they did not evaluate if 
the teams’ performance was improved or degraded by the presence of the CA. 
In Burden et al.’s study of local anaesthetic toxicity emergencies, teams scored 
higher on task measures when a ‘reader’ of the CA was assigned (Burden et al., 2012). 
Fewer instances of communication were noted, but this could be interpreted two ways: 
either that the understanding of the team of the situation was improved and less 
communication was required to perform well, or that the CA distracted the team from 
discussing options and role allocations between them. In light of the retrospective analysis 
by Manser et al., the type of communication may have been important, with the decrease 
in communication events probably due to a reduced need for task management 
information rather than to less information sharing. Nevertheless, the improved technical 
performance is compelling enough to recommend the use of a reader in all situations 
despite the effect on teams’ communication and coordination not being clear. 
B.5.2 The effect of cognitive aid design 
Paper 4 describes a simulation-based repeated measures study that was designed 
to determine if team performance measures were affected by the presence of a CA 
(Figures 3 and 4). The fine-grained communication and coordination measures were  
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Figure 3. The ‘Linear’ version of the cognitive aid for anaphylaxis used in Paper 4 (Marshall et 
al., 2014).
  
Figure 4. The ‘Branched’ version of the cognitive aid for anaphylaxis used in Paper 4 (Marshall 
et al., 2014) 
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not evaluated as in Manser et al.’s study, but the measures of team performance used 
included these are observable behaviours. The tool used was the Auckland team 
behaviour score, which is a metric that has been evaluated in this setting (Weller et al., 
2011). Other team metrics that were considered that had also been rigorously evaluated 
were the “Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery” (OTAS) the “Mayo High 
Performance Teamwork Score” (MHPTS). It was noticed that ANTS had been used in 
some studies to score behaviours of overall teams rather than individual non-technical 
skills. The use of the ANTS framework for this purpose was dismissed as it had not been 
validated for this purpose. The OTAS score was not used as it described three phases of 
the procedure, and only one phase was to be observed. The OTAS score also did not give 
detailed descriptors of the elements that would have guided the observers. During the 
video observation phase the MHPTS was used concurrently with the Auckland score both 
for training observations and for observation of the first three teams (nine scenarios). The 
MHTPS was found to have poor inter-rater reliability and was abandoned in favour of the 
Auckland team score that performed more reliably and was felt to have better face validity. 
The domains of the Auckland team behaviour score include Leadership and Team 
Coordination (LTC), Mutual Performance Monitoring (MPM), Verbalising Situational 
Information (VSI) and a global rating of Team Overall Behavioural Performance (TOBP). It 
was hypothesised that the use of a CA would improve the scores of all four domains with 
improvements in Leadership and Team Coordination and Verbalising Situational 
Information mirroring Manser et al.’s previous findings.  
The information on the CAs was derived from guidelines developed by the 
Australian and New Zealand Anaesthetic Allergy Group (ANZAAG) in late 2011 from a 
review of the literature of management of intraoperative anaphylaxis. I first put the linear 
design of the immediate management card together based on the ‘DRSABCD’ approach 
that is well known for cardiac arrest management (ARC, 2011) as it seemed to represent a 
familiar starting point for a new CA. ANZAAG had already decided the resource would 
consist of four separate cards (‘Immediate management’, ‘Refractory management’, ‘Post 
crisis management’ and ‘Diagnostic’) and with the help of Helen Kolawole and a graphic 
designer we created the remainder of the cards over the next six months. The refractory 
card was conceptualised as a checklist to be read out to the rest of the team by a ‘reader’ 
as described in Burden et al.’s paper on local anaesthetic systemic toxicity (Burden et al., 
2012). The branched versions of the immediate and refractory cards were then designed 
with the same colours and fonts as far as were possible. Great care was taken to ensure 
that the text of both versions was identical as far as was practical. The font size of the 
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branched algorithm was smaller by necessity, as the space required to include the arrows 
and lines linking the boxes mandated that the text boxes were smaller. 
B.5.3 Effects on team processes 
Improvements were seen in Leadership and Team Coordination, Verbalising 
Situational Information and the Team Overall Behavioural Performance scores; however, 
there was no observable improvement in Mutual Performance Monitoring scores when a 
CA was present.  
The lack of improvement in mutual performance monitoring is an interesting and 
important finding. It may be that these particular CAs do not support mutual performance 
monitoring. Alternatively, the context of this particular experiment may not be sensitive to 
changes in mutual performance monitoring due to the nature of the emergency. The 
knowledge and skills required by each team member may be too specialised to allow for 
mutual performance monitoring. Further work is needed to establish how mutual 
performance monitoring may be augmented by the use of CAs or team training. 
One drawback of explicitly measuring the verbalisation of situational information is 
that merely reading from the CA could improve this score. We did not count the instances 
of reading aloud from the CA but our impressions from the video analysis was that teams 
obtaining higher scores on this category also verbalised information that was not related to 
the CA, such as blood pressure or current adrenaline dose. A future study may examine 
what the mechanism of this improvement of the VSI may be. 
The design of the CA was also associated with differences in team performance. 
Paper 4 demonstrates that there is a statistically significant effect of the CA design on 
team performance, with the linear design being superior to the branched design in this 
instance. Informal feedback by participants on the ease of use of the CAs also favoured 
the linear design. As noted in the earlier literature review (Paper 2), design is not a 
property that is given much consideration when an aid is devised. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a proliferation of CAs for emergencies, particularly with the advent of 
inexpensive home office laminators and the ability of subject matter experts to create 
smartphone applications that threaten to cause ‘checklist fatigue’ (Grigg, 2014). At present 
there are no regulatory processes for the control of potentially dangerous CAs. 
Similarly to the previous study, there was no technical improvement in performance 
noted between the two CAs and minimal evidence of improvement against the no CA 
condition. There were trends towards the CAs prompting a call for help and an increased 
number of technical tasks but surprisingly there were no definitive results. As in Paper 3 
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the education and familiarisation with the CA and anaphylaxis guidelines immediately prior 
to the testing may have prevented poor technical performance in all groups. 
The observers in the study were both consultant anaesthetists with experience in 
observing teamwork in simulation. Although the rater training was short, the inter-rater 
reliability with the Auckland team score was very good. There is a risk in designing and 
analysing the results that bias may have been introduced but the independent 
observations by the raters would likely minimise this. 
B.5.4 The importance of these findings 
This paper is the first prospective study in health to establish that CAs have a 
positive role in modifying team processes and improving team performance. This work 
also indicates that the design of a CA must be carefully considered and tested to ensure 
there are no detrimental effects of introducing the aid and that the design is sensitive to the 
context and team situation that it is to be used in. 
One explanation for the improvement of team processes is the development of a 
shared mental model for all the teams’ members when a CA is provided. Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas and Converse (1993) described four types of shared mental models as 1) equipment 
model, 2) task model, 3) team model and 4) team interaction model. These models related 
to specific aspects that need to be understood about the current and projected (future) 
situations. A simplified version of these four models is now more often used, separating 
into the team and task-related mental models (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000). The two models describe the shared knowledge between team 
members of the characteristics and activities of team members and of the tasks that need 
to be performed to reach the goal. In terms of improving the shared mental model for both 
task and team related models the CA provides not only a list of required tasks but makes 
the goals, tasks and roles to achieve the goals explicit. The measurement of shared 
mental models is fraught with difficulty, particularly in complex, rapidly changing 
environments such as medical emergencies (Xiao et al., 2013). Future work into the 
development of shared mental models is warranted to investigate how team training and 
CAs can be employed synergistically. 
Teams must be able to adapt when confronted with a volatile and uncertain 
situation. One way that teams may change in response to the situation is by altering their 
method of coordination. Rather than needing to communicate each action explicitly, highly 
functioning teams may become more effective by coordinating implicitly during periods of 
high stress. This ‘adaptive coordination’ is dependent on the team having accurate and 
 33 
similar shared mental models of the situation (Entin & Serfaty, 1999). The role of a CA in 
this situation is to support the adaptive behaviour by providing the required information to 
develop similar and accurate mental models (Kontogiannis, 1999). Previous work on 
coordination patterns by anaesthetic teams by Manser and colleagues supports the idea of 
adaptive coordination, with fewer instances of task management communication noted 
during an emergency (Manser, Harrison, et al., 2009). Paper 4 did not measure either the 
types of coordination or the accuracy or similarity of the team members’ mental models but 
the findings support the assertion that CAs have a positive effect on these team 
processes.  
Team monitoring is an important component of team performance that arises out of 
a shared mental model and describes the ability of team members to monitor and respond 
to other team members’ actions (Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997). Team monitoring has been 
shown to improve coordination and consequently also team performance (Marks & 
Panzer, 2004). No improvement in mutual performance monitoring was seen in this study, 
and further work is required to determine how this may be rectified. The CA in Paper 4 did 
not provide any direction on team roles during the crisis and this may explain the lack of 
improvement of mutual performance monitoring. A redesign of the CA may improve mutual 
performance monitoring; alternatively, education about the potential roles during team 
training could be used to address this aspect. 
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C Conclusions!
C1. Outcomes of the thesis 
C2. Unresolved issues with cognitive aids 
C3. Conclusions 
 
C.1 Outcomes!of!this!thesis!
This thesis outlines the effects of CAs on health care teams dealing with clinical 
emergencies. Team training alone has traditionally been used to improve the performance 
of teams but this thesis shows that CAs can assist and can be used in conjunction with 
training to improve clinical outcomes. The intellectual contribution of this thesis is in 
examining how CAs may address each of the aspects of a team performance model. The 
five outcomes in Figure 1 and at the start of each section explain how this thesis advances 
the knowledge in this area. These outcomes are restated and elaborated below: 
C.1.1 Interventions to improve team performance are usually limited to team 
training. 
Team training interventions in health traditionally use a small subset of methods 
that have been used in other industries. Simulation-based team training interventions have 
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been shown to improve team performance in anaesthesia (Lorello et al., 2014) and team 
behaviours have been linked to improved performance (Schmutz & Manser, 2013). 
Simulation-based methods are generally costly (Ziv, Wolpe, Small, & Glick, 2003) and 
cost-effectiveness studies are rarely performed (Zendejas, Wang, Brydges, Hamstra, & 
Cook, 2013). The time and costs in undertaking team training often mean that access to 
the training is inequitable and limited to one-off training events.  
Team training interventions are also seldom supported by recurrent education or 
reinforcement of behaviours in the workplace. Ginnett (1993) identified that teams do not 
work in isolation but within an “organisational shell” that provides operating procedures, 
hierarchies and expectations. If the team training contradicts the organisational shell, it is 
unlikely to be adopted. The organisational shell in health is often highly complex with 
underlying ‘tribal’ and professional cultures that can make sustained change in team 
behaviours difficult (Hall, 2005). 
One limitation of the work presented here is that the scope was limited to critical 
care. Although the literature review (Paper 1) concentrated on emergency medicine there 
is some evidence to suggest that the same situation occurs in subacute settings. Team 
training is not often undertaken in primary care and subacute settings but the use of the 
SBAR communication mnemonic has been found to improve communication between 
health professionals and reduce falls risk in a rehabilitation setting (Velji et al., 2010). 
With the barriers and difficulties in using training alone to improve team 
performance, it seems self-evident that other ways to support team functioning would be 
beneficial. Additional strategies such as the use of CAs could be used instead of—or more 
probably in conjunction with—existing team training methods to improve team 
performance. 
C.1.2 Cognitive aids improve technical performance and design is rarely 
considered 
The widespread introduction of CAs and checklists have been suggested in order to 
improve patient outcomes during clinical emergencies. The literature review performed 
(Paper 2) supported the assertion by finding that improvements in technical performance 
occurred in most situations (10 out of 13 studies) into which a CA was introduced. In some 
instances, however, CAs impair technical performance. Impaired technical function has 
been seen before in other settings such as aviation (Mosier, Palmer, & Degani, 1992) and 
more recently in health (Nelson et al., 2007). There are many reasons that CAs may fail to 
support technical work; for example, the CA may have inaccurate content or a poor design 
that does not assist while the clinician is performing the task. 
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In the two experimental studies in this thesis (Papers 3 and 4) it was surprising that 
no technical improvement was seen in contrast to the majority of studies in the literature 
review (Paper 2). Unlike most of the studies in Paper 2, Papers 3 and 4 explicitly 
introduced the aid to the participants and discussed the technical management. This was 
undertaken to reduce the variability of the responses by the participants and to prevent the 
participants from focusing on technical and knowledge failures rather than team 
processes. It is likely that the education and familiarisation with the aid minimised any 
beneficial effect of the CA on technical performance. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
CA may not have helped the technical performance even without prior education and 
familiarisation. 
The design processes of CAs were inadequately described in most papers. If the 
potential for CAs to produce clinical errors is accepted, there should be some regulation or 
evaluation of the CAs before they are introduced. If CAs were to be regulated, the closest 
parallel would be the control of medical devices. The design processes required for 
medical devices and CAs were set out in Paper 2. Interestingly, the journal reviewers for 
Paper 2 were uncomfortable about drawing close parallels between the two because it 
would be a difficult area to regulate. Since the publication of this article there has been 
interest by the Therapeutics and Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia and the 
International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) in the risks of medical device 
software for smart device health applications (Swannell, 2014). It is unclear at this stage 
whether CAs produced for smart devices will be included in this regulatory review.  
There were too few studies examining the role of CAs in improving team 
performance for any overall conclusion to be drawn in Paper 2. It appeared that CAs were 
associated with improved technical performance and different coordination patterns in one 
retrospective study (Manser, Harrison, et al., 2009). Two other studies were under-
powered to detect differences in non-technical skills (Bould et al., 2009; Neal et al., 2012) 
and a final study showed a reduction in communication when a CA was present. There 
appeared to be a large knowledge gap in this area of CA and team performance research. 
The literature review in Paper 2 was limited to emergencies in anaesthesia because these 
are areas and circumstances for which CAs have been strongly recommended and are 
therefore the situations that were likely to have the most evidence to support their use. 
Evidence to support the use of CAs to improve team and technical performance were not 
investigated, as stated in the discussion section of the literature review. 
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C.1.3 Cognitive aids assist in team formation 
Team formation is often overlooked as part of team functioning. Health teams often 
need to form during emergencies and the team members might not know each other. 
Additional research that I have been involved in but does not form part of this thesis 
examined the effect of a CA to address clinical staff members’ failure to call rapid 
response teams. This research is outlined in appendices D, E, F and G. Prior to 
commencing this program, failure of emergency responses by clinical staff on the hospital 
wards was deemed an ‘extreme clinical risk’ by Monash Health’s insurers. The research 
produced surprising results: Rather than failing to understand the importance of the 
change in the patients’ conditions, junior staff were more concerned by how they may be 
perceived and were unsure what was expected of them. The introduction of a CA made 
the expectations explicit and allowed the clinicians involved to perform initial treatment of 
the patient but also to understand when to call for additional help. This underlines the 
sociological aspect of health care and the complex social nature of teams that may 
conspire to prevent calls for help by junior staff (Kitto et al., 2014). The effect of making the 
expectations clear to all clinical staff also suggests that boundary objects such as CAs 
may be used to modify these social responses; however teams with diverse membership 
may respond differently to these cues (Nosek, 2001). 
The introduction of a CA to the clinical observation chart, along with education and 
new paging system guidelines, reduced the number of missed rapid response system 
calls, unplanned intensive care unit admissions and organisational risk. A recent re-audit 
of the rapid response system shows that these improvements have been sustained three 
years after their introduction. 
Similar research into team formation has been undertaken in obstetric emergencies 
(Marzano et al., 2014). New clinical practice guidelines were introduced at the same time 
as team training and online education, and the accuracy and rapidity of pages to alert the 
team members was seen to improve. As with the Marzano et al. study this parallel 
research program outlined in appendices D,E, F and G used both education and 
guidelines to achieve the outcome and shows the potential synergistic effects of CAs and 
team training. 
The activation of the emergency response is of course only the first part of the 
formation of a team. There are usually accepted allocations of roles and tasks depending 
on each person’s position within the organisation. For example the anaesthetic trainee is 
usually tasked with managing the patient’s airway or the intensive care specialist with 
leading the resuscitation attempt, but these roles may be fluid if one or more roles is not 
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filled or if disagreements about management occur. Recent studies have shown that 
familiarity between clinicians can lead to improved patient outcomes (Kurmann et al., 
2014). More research is required on how training and CAs may help team members 
allocate roles and coordinate activities more effectively when the team members do not 
know one another. 
C.1.4 Cognitive aids improve individuals’ teamwork skills 
Two of the studies identified in the literature review into CAs (Paper 2) attempted to 
determine an effect of the CA on the non-technical skills of the clinicians but were 
inconclusive. Paper 3 was a randomised controlled trial that showed that participants’ non-
technical skills were improved when a CA was provided. The results of this study suggest 
that the CA may assist clinicians in three ways; 1) by minimising the time needed to spend 
on synthesising options; 2) by helping clinicians switch between technical and non-
technical management tasks and 3) by providing prompts or ‘placeholders’ to help the user 
with prospective memory requirements of the situation. It is currently unclear which of 
these mechanisms, or which combination, is responsible for improving the non-technical 
skills of the clinician. There were no differences between the technical performances of 
individuals with and without the CA and no explicit prompts about team management 
provided on the CA in Paper 3. This lack of improved technical performance may suggest 
a more complex explanation. Further research should determine which of these aspects 
are importance and how they can be supported by training and CAs. 
C.1.5 Cognitive aids and their designs improve team processes 
When the overall team is considered as the unit of measure, the processes within 
the team can be investigated. The final experiment in this thesis (Paper 4) demonstrated 
that a CA (a) improves team coordination and leadership, (b) promotes the verbalising of 
important situational information and (b) improves overall measures of team performance. 
However, mutual performance monitoring by team members did not improve when a CA 
was provided. The results of Paper 3 and Paper 4 together suggest that the CA helps both 
the team and the individual improve team performance. Routine checklists such as the 
WHO safer surgery checklist have been noted to improve communication, backup 
behaviour and to help clarify goals (Lingard et al., 2004) but the mechanism by which this 
is achieved is unknown. It may be that having a list of desired actions helps team 
members coordinate and assign roles and that each team member feels more able to 
verbalise these actions within the team context if they have been already stated. In 
comparison to Lingard and colleagues’ findings, the CA did not improve the mutual 
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performance monitoring within the team. This lack of improvement in performance 
monitoring may be because the CA did not prescribe the role that each member was to 
undertake, or that the roles were less clear in the emergency than in the routine situation. 
The linear and branched designs of the CA both improved the team performance 
but to differing degrees. Most algorithms and many other CAs in health consist of a 
flowchart style. These flowcharts may be difficult to navigate during an emergency and as 
a result, decision-making may be impaired. In this context (anaphylaxis) the reason for 
using the CA was, arguably, to ensure than none of the critical actions would be omitted. If 
the purpose is to provide a list of actions for the team to confirm, it is understandable that 
the additional complexity in a branched design is unnecessary. The superiority of a linear 
design may not be borne out in all circumstances, however, and may depend on the 
nature of the emergency. Further work should be undertaken to determine if a linear 
design leads to improved team performance in all cases. From this work, it is clear that 
design plays an important and under-recognised role in the support of teams with CAs 
C.2 Unresolved!issues!with!cognitive!aids!
Several questions remain about the appropriateness and design of CAs and how 
they are most effectively implemented into the workplace. 
C.2.1 Should a single cognitive aid or book of aids be used? 
Since the release of the Crisis Management in Anesthesiology text by Gaba, Fish 
and Howard (1994), there has been debate about whether a single CA, a book of CAs, or 
common management protocols for all emergencies should be introduced. There is still no 
clear answer to this question. The provision of a suite of CAs may lead to acceptance, 
easy identification and use during an emergency such as in aviation. Conversely, Paper 4 
suggests that the design of each CA must be tailored to the context of use and the 
emergency. Each individual CA may be difficult to find and identify in a book of CAs or a 
smart device application. Books of CAs have been available for the last 20 years but they 
are still only rarely used during emergencies (Gaba et al., 1994). 
C.2.2 Where should the cognitive aids be kept? 
Several approaches to the siting of CAs have been taken. Taking the example of 
the intraoperative anaphylaxis CA, different institutions have located the aids in different 
places; on the cardiac arrest trolley, on the wall of the operating theatre or in a separate 
box kept in an area with other resuscitation equipment such as the malignant hyperthermia 
trolley. There is perhaps no correct answer as long as the aid is present whenever and 
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wherever it may be required. The position of the CA may prompt its use, such as a 
malignant hyperthermia CA taped over the draw of the malignant hyperthermia trolley so 
that it must be removed to access the dantrolene antidote. In this way, the position of the 
CA prompts the use of the CA and supports the user’s prospective memory. Each 
organisation must make a decision about the appropriateness of the location of the aid and 
educate the staff as to where it is placed. 
C.2.3 Education with cognitive aids 
Goldhaber-Fiebert and Howard (2013) noted that one of the primary functions of 
CAs is for education. During routine, non-emergency times clinicians can use the CAs to 
revise their responses and plan how they would organise their team and adapt the 
recommendations to the resources and current context. The combination of team training 
that includes CAs is potentially more powerful than either method alone. Certainly the 
recent experience of Marzano and colleagues in obstetrics (Marzano et al., 2014) 
suggests that the combination of education and CAs works well in producing sustained 
improvements. Improvements are also likely to be supported at an organisational level and 
to be reinforced in the working environment as a result. 
Even in early versions of aviation team training (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988) and 
anaesthetic crisis resource management training (Gaba, Howard, Fish, Smith, & Sowb, 
2001), the use of CAs was suggested as a means of encouraging team members to use 
all available resources. Future studies should investigate the most effective methods of 
introducing CAs into team training. Future studies should also consider the sustainability 
and cost effectiveness of training.  
C.2.4 Addressing the culture of cognitive aid use 
The use of CAs is often more readily accepted in other industries such as aviation 
than in health. Relying on CAs may be seen as a weakness, appearing to indicate that a 
clinician cannot remember the complex stages of a task. The use of CAs has been 
referred to as ‘cookbook care’ where clinicians have little autonomy in the treatment of 
their patients with the suggestion that health professions are being undermined (Morris, 
2002). Excessive clinical autonomy and a ‘craftsman’s attitude’ have been listed as two 
barriers that are preventing healthcare from becoming an ‘ultrasafe’ industry (Amalberti, 
Auroy, Berwick, & Barach, 2005). Standardisation and the dissemination of processes 
using CAs may be one approach to addressing these barriers. CAs are a sociocultural 
challenge to clinicians and change is unlikely to be rapid (Kitto, 2010). It may be that a 
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combination of mobile technology and generational change will eventually see the 
acceptance of cognitive aids into clinical care. 
CAs must be introduced sensitively into the existing workplace. A prescriptive, top 
down approach is likely to fail, but familiarisation, training and experience with the CA will 
help produce a local culture of acceptance and improve the chances of sustained use 
(Goldhaber-Fiebert & Howard, 2013). 
C.3 Overall!conclusion!
Cognitive aids are beneficial in improving team formation, individuals’ non-technical 
skills and team processes. The designs of cognitive aids affect how they are used during 
an emergency and determine the extent to which the technical and team aspects of crisis 
management are supported by the aid. More attention should be given to the design of 
cognitive aids and to iterative testing before cognitive aids are implemented in the clinical 
setting. Further work is required to determine how non-technical skills and team processes 
are supported by cognitive aids and how these cognitive aids can be most effectively 
incorporated into team training. 
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training and experience before joining the team. Medical, nursing, 
and allied health workers generally undertake training in uni-
professional groups in order to learn the specialized skills and 
NQRZOHGJHQHHGHGWRIXOÀOOWKHLUUROHV7KHIRFXVRQNQRZOHGJH
and “technical skills” in undergraduate and early specialist 
training has until recently been to the exclusion of  the additional 
skills required to work in a team context.[11] These skills have 
been termed “non-technical”[12,13], “team”[14] or “crisis resource 
management”[15-17] VNLOOV$ FODVVLÀFDWLRQRI  WKH FRPSHWHQFLHV
(knowledge, skills, and attitudes) required by individuals to work 
as effective team members is given in Table 1.
Strong relationships have been shown to exist between team 
processes and outcomes. The outcomes may be seen in terms 
of  safe care for patients although another subjective measure 
is by assessment of  the satisfaction of  the team members.[20] 
Several studies have shown that sub-optimal communication and 
teamwork can contribute to error and poor outcomes in medical 
emergencies.[21-23] Communication, leadership, and group decision-
making are essential to determine the priorities and goals for the 
team. In emergencies these priorities may change rapidly as the 
patient’s state evolves. The completion of  tasks may also need to 
EHXQGHUWDNHQLQDVSHFLÀFRUGHUUHTXLULQJFRRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQ
individuals. In well-rehearsed teams this coordination may be 
“implicit” requiring little communication, however if  the situation 
changes, or the team rarely works together, explicit communication 
WHY TEAMS, WHY TEAM TRAINING?
Emergency medical care, and particularly trauma care, is usually 
delivered by teams.[1,2] These clinical teams must deal with 
situations that are highly dynamic, with large volumes of  rapidly 
FKDQJLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQGXQFOHDURUSRWHQWLDOO\FRQÁLFWLQJJRDOV
All the while, the team members are under a time pressure, and 
the consequences of  making a wrong decision or undertaking 
the wrong action may lead to further injury or even death.[3-5] 
Although in some respects health and emergency care are unique 
human endeavors, these same challenges to human decision 
making and cognition are found commonly in other industries. [6,7] 
Military command and control, transport, and nuclear power 
generation have produced a wealth of  research in the last two 
decades that is being used to help inform how health care can 
best design effective team training programs.[8-10]
Effective teamwork is essential in emergency care, due to the 
volume of  tasks that need to be completed. The tasks themselves 
often require a level of  knowledge and skill, mandating advanced 
specialist training. As a result, team members coming together 
to work as emergency teams often have very different skills, 
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and leadership is needed.[24] If  breakdowns in teamwork and 
communication account for worse outcomes and are theoretically 
so important in ensuring safe care, then even small improvements 
are likely to have a positive effect in terms of  outcomes.
WHAT ARE THE FEATURES OF AN “EFFECTIVE 
EMERGENCY TEAM”?
There are currently no generally accepted models of  team 
SHUIRUPDQFH DQG RXWFRPHV VSHFLÀF WR KHDOWK RU HPHUJHQF\
care. However, theoretical models are available that address team 
culture, behaviors, and cognition.[25-28] Salas et al. proposed an 
integrated model of  teamwork in a medical setting[20] comprising 
input, process, and outcome measures in the context of  the 
healthcare environment [Figure 1]. Not all of  the factors in this 
model are amenable to change by team training alone, but it is 
worth considering these additional factors and how they might 
contribute to improvement in outcomes if  they are addressed. 
This framework also illustrates the interactions and constraints 
in terms of  the two targets for team training: the individual 
health professional, and the team in which they work. Strategies 
targeting the individual within the team have concentrated on 
cognitive approaches to train team skills, whereas team-based 
strategies also include fostering interpersonal relationships, a team 
working climate, and strengthening cohesion within the team. 
There is a substantial overlap in these approaches, but the focus 
on the “unit” of  training as individual or team is an important 
distinction when considering methods of  training.
An “effective trauma team” is “…one where each team member knows 
WKHLU UROHDQGDUH FRQÀGHQW LQ FDUU\LQJRXW WKHLU WDVNV LQD FRRUGLQDWHG
way towards a shared goal.”[29] The barriers to effective trauma 
WHDPIXQFWLRQFDQEHH[DPLQHGE\LQWHUYLHZLQJWHDPPHPEHUV
REVHUYLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH LQ UHDO RU VLPXODWHG FRQGLWLRQV DQG
reviewing adverse events to understand the task requirements and 
resources, and by engaging the management to help understand 
the broader organizational constraints.[30-32]
,QWHUYLHZVRI WUDXPDWHDPPHPEHUVUHYHDOWKDWGLIÀFXOWLHVLQ
achieving this aim in a trauma context are the result of  challenges 
such as:[29]
1. Maintaining situation awareness 
2. Leading disparate teams (including disciplines outside of  
emergency medicine or nursing)
Table 1: Individual knowledge, skills and attitude competencies to work as an effective team member from 
Baker et al.[18] after Salas et al.[19]
Competency Ƥ
Knowledge competencies
Shared task models/
Situation assessment
A shared understanding of the situation and appropriate strategies for coping with task demands
Team-mate characteristics familiarity Knowing the task-related competencies, preferences, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses of team-mates
Skill competencies
Mutual performance monitoring Tracking fellow team members’ performance to ensure that the work is running as expected and that proper procedures are followed
Flexibility/adaptability Ability to recognize deviations from expected course of events to readjust one’s actions accordingly
Supporting/back-up behavior Providing feedback and coaching to improve performance or when a lapse is detected; assisting team-mate in performing a task; 
and completing a task for the team member when an overload is detected
Team leadership Ability to direct/coordinate team members, assess team performance, allocate tasks, motivate subordinates, plan/organize, and 
maintain a positive team environment
Closed-loop communication / 
Information Exchange
ǡǡƤ
the message by the initial sender
Attitude competencies
Team cohesion ƤƪǢ
Mutual trust A positive attitude held by the team members regarding the aura, mood, or climate of the team’s internal environment
Collective orientation The belief that a team approach is better than an individual one
Importance of teamwork The positive attitude that team members exhibit toward working as a team
Figure 1: An integrated model of task performance after Salas et al.[20]
Team performanceTeam processes
Team formation 
Team leadership
&RQÀLFWUHVROXWLRQ
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ
Coordination
Cross-monitoring
:RUNORDGGLVWULEXWLRQ
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6XFFHVVLQDFKLHYLQJJRDOV
6DIHSDWLHQWFDUH
0HPEHUVDWLVIDFWLRQ
(UURUVFRPPLWWHG
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([SHULHQFH 3HUVRQDOLW\
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7HFKQLFDOVNLOOV
1RQWHFKQLFDOVNLOOV
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&RPPXQLFDWLRQVWUXFWXUH
3RZHUGLVWULEXWLRQ
0HPEHUKRPRJHQHLW\
7UXVWDQGFRKHVLRQ
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1DWXUHRIHPHUJHQF\
$YDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV
2UJDQL]DWLRQDOFXOWXUHVXEFXOWXUHV
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3. Lack of  feedback during the resuscitation
4. /DFNRI IHHGEDFNGHEULHÀQJDIWHUWKHUHVXVFLWDWLRQ
Analyses of  team performance in simulated and real world 
settings are only now starting to emerge in emergency medicine. 
Grissom et al. attempted to devise a scoring system for use in a 
WUDXPDVHWWLQJXVLQJLGHDOEHKDYLRUVHWVLGHQWLÀHGE\WUDXPDWHDP
members.[33] The aim of  the scoring system was to guide teams 
and team members in improvement of  their processes during 
resuscitation. The tool would therefore allow diagnosis of  team 
SURFHVVSUREOHPVDJXLGHIRUSRVWHYHQWGHEULHÀQJDQGSURYLGH
an indicator for where future training should be concentrated. 
Initial reliability measures using this tool have been variable, 
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWIXUWKHUPRGLÀFDWLRQPD\EHUHTXLUHGEHIRUHLWLV
ready for widespread use.[34,35]7KH0HG7HDPVSURMHFWLGHQWLÀHG
ÀYH´GLPHQVLRQVµRI WHDPSHUIRUPDQFH[36] These were based 
on a combination of  interview data and reviews of  previous 
incidents, and so are limited to some extent by hindsight bias. 
The dimensions are: (1) maintain team structure and climate, (2) 
apply problem solving strategies, (3) communicate with the team, 
(4) execute plans and manage workload, and (5) improve team 
skill. Each of  these dimensions has underlying actions that can 
be measured and prioritized during training.
0RUHJHQHUDOPRGHOVRI WHDPIXQFWLRQKDYHLGHQWLÀHGÀYHPDLQ
IDFWRUVIURPWKHOLWHUDWXUHWKDWDUHFRPPRQO\GHÀFLHQWLQSRRUO\
performing teams.[37]7KHVHÀYHIDFWRUVDUHRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDV
“the big 5 of  teamwork,” and consist of  (1) team leadership, 
(2) mutual performance monitoring, (3) back-up behavior, (4) 
adaptability, and (5) team orientation.
1. Team leadership. It is a logical proposition that if  tasks must 
be dynamically assigned and prioritized, a leader must be 
present and be able to have an overall view to perform 
this role effectively. However the leader’s role is not just 
one of  resource allocation: effective leaders establish and 
maintain a positive atmosphere of  collaboration, motivation, 
and feedback. They are also able to update team members 
to maintain their situation awareness and encourage 
questioning and suggestions.[38] Team leadership has been 
shown to be critical for the effective functioning of  trauma 
teams in observational and interview studies.[34,39]
2. Mutual performance monitoring. Effective team members are able 
to monitor other team members’ performance to check if  
WKHUHDUHHUURUVRUGLIÀFXOWLHVHYHQZKLOVWSHUIRUPLQJWKHLU
own tasks.[26] Often however a lack of  assertive behavior 
prevents the team members from speaking up.[40]
3. Back-up behavior. This is an extension of  mutual performance 
monitoring to help prevent or mitigate error if  another team 
PHPEHULVH[SHULHQFLQJGLIÀFXOW\7KHWHDPPHPEHUZLOO
assist with, or complete a task for another team member or 
provide feedback to assist with the task.[41]
4. Adaptability. As previously mentioned, situations and goals 
may change rapidly, particularly in the emergency medicine 
setting. Team members must be able to adapt to these 
changing priorities by switching tasks or strategies.[42] An 
example of  this is in airway management, where a failure 
of  intubation may lead to the formulation of  a new plan 
´RQWKHÁ\µUHTXLULQJWKHWHDPWRDGDSWDQGFRPPXQLFDWH
the new plan.[43]
5. Team orientation. Orientation to the team improves motivation 
and cooperation between members. Initiation into the 
group encourages the individuals to consider the other 
team members’ strengths and promote information sharing 
and others’ input. Arguably this is close to impossible if  
introductions and orientation to the group occurs whilst the 
HPHUJHQF\LVVWLOOGHYHORSLQJQHYHUWKHOHVVWKHIRUPDWLRQRI 
a trauma team with plenty of  advance notice may help this 
to occur routinely.
Effective communication underpins all of  the ideal teamwork 
processes. Without effective communication teams cannot 
develop shared mental models, make shared decisions, or 
dynamically adapt to their priorities. Any team-training program 
must address team communication issues. This component may 
be a primary focus of  the training such as in assertiveness training, 
or be integrated with the other goals of  the training, such as 
the use of  closed-loop communication within the MedTeams 
framework (see section “Methods of  Training”).
Translation of team training models from other 
settings
Much of  the evidence for team training comes from military 
DQGWUDQVSRUWVHWWLQJV,QWKHVHFRQWH[WVFRPEDWWHDPVRUÁLJKW
crews commonly work together for an extended time. An extreme 
example is the setting of  space travel: the group may be living 
and working together for a period of  months, and there is ample 
opportunity to select appropriate team members in advance.[44] 
Health care is clearly different to the majority of  these situations. 
In emergency medicine team members may know each other, but 
this is by no means the norm. Moreover they may come together 
IRUWKHÀUVWWLPHWRIRUPDWHDPDQGQHJRWLDWHUROHVHYHQDVWKH
crisis they are to manage is evolving.[45] Care must therefore be 
taken in terms of  extrapolating lessons learned from contexts 
where teams are “stable” to the transient teams of  emergency 
medical care.
Given the absence of  stable teams in all but a handful of  medical 
settings, it would seem futile to train individuals to work as though 
WKH\ZHUHSDUWRI DVSHFLÀFJURXS7HDPWUDLQLQJLQKHDOWKFDUH
should therefore focus on training individuals to work in team 
contexts rather than training the team as a unit.[46] 
METHODS OF TEAM TRAINING
Team training may take many forms. For instance, lecture-based 
material can be used to impart information, or critique of  
´WULJJHUYLGHRVµGHVLJQHGZLWKVSHFLÀFHGXFDWLRQDOREMHFWLYHV
can be used to promote discussion on varying teamwork 
WRSLFV5HSHDWHGSUDFWLFHLQDQDUWLÀFLDOFOLQLFDOHQYLURQPHQW
has been found to be particularly useful in exploring team-
working behaviors.[47] These realistic settings often include 
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sophisticated mannequins that can represent the patient and 
their accompanying clinical signs and pathophysiology. This 
method will be familiar to many readers as “simulation-based 
training,” although this represents just one of  many forms of  
simulation-based education. In addition to mannequin-based 
training, computer (screen)-based simulation, the use of  
part-task trainers (i.e. physical replicas of  parts of  the body), 
patient actors, or a hybrid of  these methods can be used to 
replicate aspects of  real world situations. Simulation also 
includes the use of  written cases and “mental simulation” of  
common problems,[48] games and virtual reality devices.[49] It 
can therefore be seen that simulation itself  is, as Gaba puts it: 
´«DWHFKQLTXH³QRWDWHFKQRORJ\³WRUHSODFHRUDPSOLI\UHDO
H[SHULHQFHVZLWKJXLGHGH[SHULHQFHV«WKDWHYRNHRUUHSOLFDWH
VXEVWDQWLDODVSHFWVRI WKHUHDOZRUOG«µ[50]
Simulation allows the same scenario to be repeated multiple 
times to the same or different participants. It allows practice 
without risk to the patient, in a controlled environment, where 
the interaction can be recorded for future review for education 
or research. However, the setting may not recreate the real world 
exactly and many of  the patient cues that would normally be 
present cannot be replicated by currently available devices-such 
as skin temperature, facial expression, or capillary return. The 
cost may also be prohibitive for many users, and access may be 
limited to only some members of  the organization due to cost 
and time constraints.[50]
The modes of  training have often been matched with the 
strategies for team training [Table 2]—overlaps exist and one 
mode of  training is rarely employed in isolation. Note also that 
not all of  these training strategies are used in training health 
care teams.
Crew/crisis resource management (CRM) training
The term “CRM training” is confusing, as CRM stands for 
“crew resource management” in aviation, but “crisis resource 
management” in healthcare. Confusion also exists because 
the terms “team training” and “CRM training” are often used 
interchangeably. CRM training is a form of  team training, often 
also referred to as “team coordination training” (TCT).[51] The 
main aim of  CRM training is to improve the coordination 
skills of  an individual within a team by encouraging behaviors 
such as closed-loop communication, information sharing, and 
back-up behaviors. This is usually undertaken by delivering 
information about ideal behaviors, often in the form of  a lecture 
or small group discussion, leading on to deliberate practice 
of  the behaviors in a realistic simulated scenario. After the 
“immersion” in a plausible situation, the team members are then 
able to “debrief ” their performance, often with the assistance 
RI YLGHRGDWDUHFRUGHGGXULQJWKHHYHQW7KHGHEULHÀQJDOORZV
WKHPWRUHÁHFWRQWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHDQGKRZWKLVFRPSDUHV
and contrasts with the ideal performance of  a well-coordinated 
team. This debrief  requires a skilled facilitator who is able to 
guide the discussion to achieve the optimal learning from the 
session.[51-53]
CRM training is perhaps almost synonymous with team training 
due to its wide (albeit slow) uptake in aviation in particular, and 
its eventual transference into health care contexts. The models 
RI &50WUDLQLQJKDYHHYROYHGVLQFHLWZDVÀUVWLQLWLDWHGLQWKH
late 1970s as “cockpit resource management” and later “crew 
resource management” in aviation.[16] Aviation CRM courses now 
rely less on the psychological theories of  teamwork, and more 
on the practical aspects of  identifying and minimizing risk - so 
called “Threat and Error Management” (TEM).[54] In contrast 
WRKHDOWKSURIHVVLRQDOVDOOÁLJKWFUHZKDYHEDVLFNQRZOHGJHLQ
“human performance limitations” at a very early stage of  their 
careers, and CRM builds on this knowledge by emphasizing how 
factors such as fatigue and the time-pressure of  emergencies can 
contribute to error. Despite 30 years of  experience in CRM-style 
WHDPWUDLQLQJWKHUHDUHFRQÁLFWLQJGDWDUHJDUGLQJLWVHIIHFWLYHQHVV
Improvements in outcome data for accidents or loss of  life are 
GLIÀFXOWWRDWWULEXWHVROHO\WR&50WUDLQLQJLQDYLDWLRQWKHVDPHLV
true in healthcare. Research tools to measure the effectiveness of  
CRM training in aviation have included safety attitudes surveys, 
behavioral scoring systems, and peer evaluation in simulated and 
UHDOÁLJKWFRQGLWLRQV[55-58] Studies have generally shown positive 
results with the training, although in most studies there has been 
a great degree of  variability, and the crews had often worked 
WRJHWKHUPXOWLSOH WLPHVPDNLQJ LW GLIÀFXOW WR FRPSDUHZLWK
settings such as health care. A meta-analysis of  training methods 
DFURVV LQGXVWULHV FRQÀUPVDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRI &50WUDLQLQJ
however only 3 of  the 45 studies examined were undertaken in 
health contexts.[59]
Table 2: Methods of team training in common use 
and their modes of delivery[30,69]
Team training 
strategy
Focus Modes of delivery
Crisis resource 
management 
(“CRM,” also “Team 
coordination 
training”: TCT)
Underlying processes of team 
coordination
Lecture 
Video critique 
Immersive simulation
Cross-training An understanding of the other 
aspects of the team’s work
Lecture 
Role modeling 
Immersive simulation
Team self-
correction training
Strategies for monitoring their 
own and others’ behaviors
Role play 
Immersive simulation
Assertiveness 
training
Assertive behaviors, especially in 
ơ
Role play 
Video critique
Perceptual contrast 
training
Underlying concepts of teamwork 
and how they are applied
Video critique
Scenario-based 
training
Ƥ
embedded in common situations
Screen-based simulation 
Immersive simulation
Guided error 
training
Experience and react to common 
errors to transfer knowledge to 
real work
Immersive simulation
Stress exposure 
training
ơ
of stress in the work environment
Lecture 
Video critique 
Immersive simulation
Metacognition 
training
Process of decision making and 
potential for error – “thinking 
about thinking”
Lecture 
Screen-based simulation 
Immersive simulation
Team leadership 
training
Ƥ
team in a given situation
Lecture 
Video critique 
Immersive simulation
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Cross training
In cross training the participants are given the opportunity to 
take on roles of  other members of  the team. This theoretically 
allows them to better understand and therefore monitor and 
anticipate the actions of  their teammates. Using cross training 
WKHWHDPPHPEHUVFDQVHHKRZWKHLUWDVNVÀWDQGFRRUGLQDWH
with the rest of  the team to achieve the common goal.[60] Cross 
training can work at three levels, relating to the responsibilities 
of  the individual’s position, how the duties of  their role relate 
WRRWKHUWHDPPHPEHUV·GXWLHVDQGÀQDOO\NQRZOHGJHRI KRZ
the duties of  others interact with their role. Training involves 
knowledge acquisition through lectures, and then role modeling 
and practice in another’s role. Immersive simulation can play a 
useful role in achieving this.
Cross training has been found to improve the effectiveness and 
HIÀFLHQF\RI WHDPVLQDLUWUDIÀFFRQWUROVHWWLQJVE\DOORZLQJD
deeper understanding of  roles and how back-up behaviors can 
assist colleagues within the context of  their work.[61]
Team self-correction training
This type of  training gives the team members the tools to 
critique their own performance and avoid potential errors. After 
GHEULHÀQJZLWKDQH[SHULHQFHGIDFLOLWDWRUWKHWHDPVDUHWKHQDEOH
WRXQGHUWDNHWKHLURZQGHEULHÀQJVHVVLRQVZLWKRXWH[WHUQDOKHOS
This type of  training is useful to create a “learning culture” within 
the team, and to involve all members of  the team to feel they can 
FRQWULEXWHWRWKHJURXS·VIHHGEDFN7HDPVWKDWDUHDEOHWRUHÁHFW
on successes and failures and are “pre-occupied with failure” are 
more likely to develop into highly performing teams.[62]
Unfortunately, due to its nature, this form of  training works 
most effectively with a stable team or group of  team members. 
7HDPVLQKHDOWKDOVRVWUXJJOHWRÀQGWLPHWRGHEULHI DIWHUWKH
HYHQWZKLFKFDQFUHDWHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQLPSOHPHQWLQJVXFKWUDLQLQJ
Assertiveness training
2QHRI WKHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQWHDPPDQDJHPHQWLVRIWHQWKHDELOLW\
to extract all the available information from the team members. 
In particular, junior members of  the team may feel awkward 
in speaking out, even when they realize they have a vital piece 
of  information required to manage the situation. Assertiveness 
training provides the tools for all team members to have their 
concerns and ideas heard. It allows team members to offer 
suggestions and initiate tasks without feeling threatened or 
demeaned, and without undermining the authority of  the team 
leader.[63] Assertiveness training may be undertaken using roleplay, 
perhaps with patient (or team-mate) actors or in simulated 
scenarios. This practice has been found to be essential to establish 
the new assertive behaviors.[63]
Perceptual contrast training
This uses examples, often “trigger videos”, of  situations and 
challenges the learners to detect the positive/negative aspects of  
the behaviors. The participants can then contrast the ideal (and 
non-ideal) behaviors against their own behaviors.[48] The examples 
shown may become increasingly subtle. These are thought to 
train an improved detection of  potential hazards and enhanced 
“situation awareness”[64]
Scenario-based training
This technique places the learners in representations of  situations 
to elicit responses from them. The environment may be an 
DFFXUDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI WKHUHDOZRUOGZLWKDQDUWLÀFLDOSDWLHQW
(mannequin or patient actor), a computer representation of  the 
situation, or combination, such as in a virtual reality simulation. 
The objective is to determine the ideal behaviors, both in terms 
of  task- and team- work in managing a situation. Scenario-based 
training typically re-runs the same situation more than once to 
allow the participants to try different strategies and evaluate 
which strategies are particularly useful.[65]
Guided error training, stress exposure training and 
metacognition training
7KHVHPHWKRGVXVHLPPHUVLYHVLPXODWLRQWRKLJKOLJKWGHÀFLHQFLHV
of  the environment, the processes and individual members for 
improvement. Guided error training allows the participants to 
make errors and then guides them through the consequences of  
these errors.[66] By experiencing the potential for errors, the team 
members should then be better able to avoid these in the future. 
Stress exposure training provides information about stress and its 
effects, and then places the participant in a stressful situation to 
modify the response to such stress. Ideally the stressful situation 
resembles a realistic situation from the work environment to 
maximize transference of  the improved responses to the real 
world.[67] Finally metacognition or “critical thinking” training 
VSHFLÀFDOO\HGXFDWHVWHDPPHPEHUVDERXWGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQG
cognitive biases during life-like situations.[68] The participants are 
taught to recognize their biases in making decisions by deliberate 
practice under simulated conditions.
7KHVHÀQDOWKUHHPHWKRGVDUHOHVVIUHTXHQWO\XVHGLQKHDOWKFDUH
than in other settings, however, there is evidence from settings 
outside healthcare to suggest their effectiveness in improving 
team performance [Table 2].[59]
LESSONS FROM TEAM TRAINING IN OTHER 
HEALTH DISCIPLINES
7KHÀUVWVLPXODWLRQEDVHGFRXUVHLQKHDOWKFDUHWKDWVSHFLÀFDOO\
addressed team training was described by Howard et al. 
in 1992.[52] The course used CRM principles derived from 
aviation and applied them to the operating theatre to address 
the management of  anesthetic crises as the Anesthesia Crisis 
Resource Management (ACRM) course. One criticism of  the 
ACRM model was the use of  actors (also termed “confederates”) 
to play the part of  the surgical team. Developing scenarios that 
also engaged surgeons in task and team work was later achieved 
as Team Orientated Medical Simulation or “TOMS.”[15] Despite 
the development of  a limited number of  TOMS scenarios, the 
scheduling required to train multidisciplinary teams is still a 
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common barrier to regular full team training, and its effectiveness 
over anesthesia team training alone has not been proven.[70] The 
ACRM model remains the archetypal team training course for 
health, and has spawned numerous similar courses for use in 
different settings, including emergency medicine.[71-73] Even so, 
there is scant evidence to suggest that CRM training in healthcare 
“works.” This is primarily due to the lack of  studies examining 
WKHHIIHFWVRI &50WUDLQLQJLQKHDOWKZLWKHYLGHQFHFRQÀQHGWR
post-course knowledge and reaction surveys, rather than evidence 
of  behavioral or clinical outcome effects.[74,75]
A different approach has been taken in several centers for 
obstetric team training. Draycott et al. used predominantly task-
focused, scenario-based instruction in the actual workplace to 
train all the staff  within an institution.[76] This method aimed 
to embed the behaviors within the organization rather than the 
individual, by training in multi-professional teams. The outcome 
measures used in this study were objective measures of  hypoxic 
ischemic encephalopathy and low Apgar scores of  the newborn, 
the rates of  both of  which were effectively halved by the training. 
This constitutes the only patient-based outcome evidence for 
team training in health care to this point.
Regular mandatory team training as is seen in domains such as 
aviation is still unlikely in the foreseeable future in health. A 
national standardized team-training course has been successfully 
developed in anesthesia in Australia and New Zealand.[77] 
Completion of  this course, the Effective Management of  
Anaesthetic Crises or “EMAC”, is one of  two course options 
(the other being a trauma management course) that must be 
taken to become a specialist in these countries.
EVIDENCE FOR TEAM TRAINING IN EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE
The first documented team-training course in emergency 
medicine was undertaken in the late 1990s by Small et al.[78] A 
limited evaluation of  this course showed a trend toward improved 
teamwork behaviors. Similar courses were developed that were 
tailored to the context of  the work including remote and rural 
emergency departments[72,73,79] and in-situ training with ongoing 
support.[80] These courses rated highly in perceived usefulness and 
change in practice, but there are little objective data to suggest 
improved patient outcomes.
Emergency medicine has continued with a predominantly CRM 
approach to team training using mannequin-based scenarios and 
GHEULHÀQJ7KH0HG7HDPVSURMHFWH[DPLQHGWKHXVHRI D7HDP
Coordination Training course in emergency medicine, termed 
the “Emergency Teams Coordination Course” (ETCC).[36,81] 
7KH(7&& LV LQLWLDOO\ GHOLYHUHG LQ D FODVVURRP HQYLURQPHQW
participants are then encouraged to practice the teamwork 
behaviors during a half-day session in a simulated environment. 
Behaviorally anchored ratings scales (BARS) are then used to 
DVVHVVDQGIHHGEDFNWKHGHÀFLHQFLHVLQWHDPZRUNEHKDYLRUVWRWKH
participants using a trained facilitator. The effect of  the ETCC 
training was assessed using a quasi-experimental study of  nine 
teaching and community emergency departments in military and 
civilian settings. Staff  attitudes to teamwork were improved, and 
error rates reduced after the training, although there were no data 
to support improved clinical outcomes, and there were many 
confounders due to the nature of  the study design.[82] Further 
behavioral effects were examined with a small study of  20 ED 
physicians and nurses, half  of  whom were trained as “stable 
teams” with the ETCC method and observed after a 2-week 
interval in a simulated environment.[83] In this study, there was a 
trend toward improved behavioral markers of  teamwork in the 
WUDLQHGJURXSWKDWGLGQRWUHDFKVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLÀFDQFH
One of  the problems of  current methods of  team training 
LVD ODFNRI YDOLGDWHGPHWULFV WRDQDO\]HWKHWHDPGHÀFLHQFLHV
and improve feedback for training that is explicitly linked to 
the learning objectives.[84] An event-based approach to training 
(EBAT) has been suggested, that directly links scenario events 
to learning objectives in a clear way. In this manner, each of  
the team-working competencies can be addressed explicitly and 
systematically.[85,86]
Whether team training, be it for junior staff  or as part of  
ongoing medical education, should be mandated as part of  
the credentialing process is still a question for the future. The 
Australasian College of  Emergency Medicine recently developed 
a simulation-based course to address the technical and behavioral 
aspects of  emergency medicine: The Acute and Complex 
Medical Emergencies (ACME) course.[87] This two and a half  day 
course may soon become compulsory for trainees in emergency 
medicine - it is not as yet for senior staff, but has been made 
YHU\DWWUDFWLYHWRVHQLRUVWDII GXHWRDVLJQLÀFDQWDOORFDWLRQRI 
Continuing Medical Education (CME) points by the College for 
undertaking the course. 
BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEAM 
TRAINING IN EMERGENCY MEDICINE
Given the effects of  factors external to the individual and team 
WR EH WUDLQHG QRWHG LQ ÀJXUH  DQ\ WHDP WUDLQLQJ SURJUDP
will be limited in its success if  the environmental and systemic 
features are not taken into account as part of  developing the 
training program[8] Burke et al.[10] and Salas et al.[88] suggest ten 
best practice guidelines for team training based on pre-training, 
training design, and post-training periods: 
Pre-training
1. %HIRUHWUDLQLQJFDQEHJLQDQDQDO\VLVRI WKHGHÀFLHQFLHVLQ
the teams should be undertaken. This assessment essentially 
acts as a training needs analysis for the training.
2. To maximize the limited time for training, particularly when 
using expensive modalities such as simulation, preparatory 
material and exercises can be initiated, such as pre-reading 
video critique or even role-playing exercises. 
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3. An examination of  the organization and its teamwork 
culture is essential to embed the proposed new behaviors 
into the overall context. This can be undertaken with safety 
attitude surveys and discussions with senior management.
Training design
1. The design of  the team training intervention needs to be 
grounded in the theory of  team competencies and existing 
models. 
2. Training should concentrate on developing shared 
understanding of  problems. This usually means training 
as a team rather than as individuals and in the same work 
context to improve team situation awareness. This may 
VXJJHVWDQDGGLWLRQDOEHQHÀWWKDWPD\EHFRQIHUUHGE\´LQ
situ” simulation training.
3. A positive training climate will allow a culture of  further 
learning after completion of  the training. Again this may 
be measured by the use of  attitudes surveys. 
4. Education that emphasizes the adaptive nature of  teams is 
more effective, as it will allow the teams to adjust to changes 
in goal and task requirements more readily. 
5. Communication between team members is essential and 
should be a part of  training. Particular aspects of  effective 
communication such as closed-loop communication and 
assertive behavior should be designed into the intervention. 
6. Training should be designed to allow explicit practice of  the 
key team competencies listed in Table 1.
Post-training guidance
1. Evaluation of  the intervention should be systematic and 
based on multiple sources of  data such as focus groups, 
observational data and post-course evaluations.
CONCLUSION
There is mounting evidence to support the use of  simulation-
based team training in emergency medicine. To be effective 
simulation-based education needs to: address individuals’ 
WHDPZRUNLQJ VNLOOV H[SORUH DFWXDO LVVXHV RI  LPSRUWDQFH LQ
WKHSDUWLFXODUZRUNSODFHDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWDQG
training teams that may perform together for an extended period. 
Best practice guidelines are available from other industries, but 
wholesale adoption of  these training models should be avoided 
due to the different ways teams form in these different contexts. 
Training in teams will likely become more common in the future, 
and may even become a mandatory requirement for ongoing 
practice in some areas.
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Cognitive aids such as checklists have been commonly used in aviation since the 1930s when it was felt that aircraft were becoming too complex to fly safely 
without written standardized procedures.1 Cognitive aids 
are tools created to guide users while they are performing a 
task, or group of tasks, with the goal of reducing errors and 
omissions and increasing the speed and fluidity of perfor-
mance.2,3 The main difference from guidelines, protocols or 
standard operating procedures is that they are to be used 
while the task is being performed (Table 1).4 Many cogni-
tive aids are derived from documents describing extensive 
and detailed sequences of actions that would be difficult to 
examine while undertaking a task,1,5,6 particularly during 
an emergency. Secondarily, their presentation as simplified 
instructions also makes them useful for training.6 A recent 
editorial suggested that “health care providers should not 
be expected to manage rare events well without the use of 
a cognitive aid”7 since safety checklists have been success-
fully developed, tested, and used in other high-risk indus-
tries. The aim of undertaking this literature review was to 
critically examine the evidence to support this view that 
cognitive aids should be developed and used for all crises 
in anesthetic practice. Evidence was sought to establish (1) 
whether cognitive aids improve performance of individuals 
and teams and (2) whether recommendations can be made 
for future cognitive aid design, testing, and implementation.
THE PROPERTIES OF THE IDEAL COGNITIVE AID
To understand how a cognitive aid may assist someone in 
a crisis, it is useful to consider the properties of an “ideal” 
cognitive aid. During an emergency, time and cognitive 
resources are limited. When under stress, clinicians are 
less able to recall remembered lists and are more likely 
to become fixated.8,9 A cognitive aid would theoretically 
guide stressed clinicians through a sequence of complex 
steps and prevent them from omitting key actions. It 
would also ensure that the sequence was the most effec-
tive for the situation and that unnecessary or extraneous 
measures were not taken. For this to happen, the cogni-
tive aid must have the following properties: (1) Its content 
Cognitive aids are prompts designed to help users complete a task or series of tasks. They may 
take the form of posters, flowcharts, checklists, or even mnemonics. It has been suggested 
that the use of cognitive aids improves performance and patient outcomes during anesthetic 
emergencies; however, a systematic assessment of the evidence is lacking. The aim of this 
literature review was to determine (1) whether cognitive aids improve performance of individu-
als and teams and (2) whether recommendations can be made for future cognitive aid design, 
testing, and implementation. Medical, nursing, and psychology databases were searched using 
broad criteria to find cognitive aids that have been reported in the literature for use in anes-
thetic emergencies. The reference lists of the articles selected for review were also screened 
to identify additional studies. Selected articles that described the evaluation of cognitive aids 
used in anesthetic emergencies were reviewed to determine how the content of the aid was 
derived, how the design was evaluated, and the success of the aid in improving technical and 
team performance. The search yielded 22 cognitive aids developed to support clinicians dur-
ing anesthetic emergencies that had been evaluated in 23 studies. Ten studies using simula-
tion suggested that technical performance improves with the use of cognitive aids in some 
anesthetic emergencies such as malignant hyperthermia, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and 
airway management. However, in 3 of the simulator-based evaluations, participants had either 
no improvement or took longer to diagnose and treat and made more incorrect diagnoses. 
Four studies investigated the effect of the aids on teamwork with differing conclusions. One 
study suggested improved participants’ coordination patterns and one found aids improved 
their decision-making scores, but 2 other studies indicated that there was no improvement and 
even provided evidence of reduced levels of team communication when teams used a cognitive 
aid in simulated conditions. The designs of cognitive aids were rarely considered. Education 
may compensate for a poorly designed aid, but only by ingraining correct actions for situations 
in which the aid provides little or no guidance. Cognitive aids should continue to be developed 
from established clinical guidelines where guidelines exist. They would also benefit from more 
extensive simulation-based usability testing before use. Further evidence is required to explore 
the effects of cognitive aids in anesthetic emergencies, how they affect team function, and their 
design considerations.  (Anesth Analg 2013;XX:00–00)
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must be derived from “best practice” guidelines or pro-
tocols; (2) Its design should be appropriate for use in the 
context of the emergency situation; (3) It should be famil-
iar, in a format that has been used in practice and training; 
(4) It should also assist other team members to perform 
their tasks in a coordinated manner. Researchers studying 
cognitive aids in aviation10,11 and health care12,13 have sug-
gested that cognitive aids that are deficient in these areas 
of content, design, training, and team alignment may pro-
mote the wrong sequence of actions and potentially cause 
harmful effects.
If an inaccurate or poorly designed cognitive aid can 
cause harm, we must consider to what degree it should 
be assessed before it is used in the clinical environment. 
Currently, there are no formal standards for development 
and evaluation; perhaps a useful analogy is to conceptual-
ize a cognitive aid as a medical device or tool that helps 
the user perform a task. The International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) defines a medical device as “…any 
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine … software 
or similar or related article … for one or more of the spe-
cific purposes of—diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, 
treatment or alleviation of disease…”14 A cognitive aid 
might arguably be within this definition, but a rigid legal 
application of the IEC standards to cognitive aids would 
be inappropriate. However, the IEC standard and other 
similar standards15,16 might be used to evaluate current 
cognitive aids and guide future development. Standards 
such as the IEC 62366 and American National Standards 
Institute/Association for the Advancement of Medical 
Instrumentation HE75:2009 describe the design, develop-
ment, and testing of medical devices in terms of content, 
format, and training, and these same principles could be 
applied to cognitive aids. Additional criteria for assessing 
the effects of the cognitive aid on team performance would 
also be appropriate.
Content
A medical device must possess the qualities that allow it to 
be applied to the task for which it is intended, termed its 
“Primary Operating Function.” For a cognitive aid, these 
qualities are the content, or information presented within 
the aid that should represent the most suitable way that 
the task is performed, i.e., the information should represent 
best clinical practice.
Design
In the same way that a poorly designed clinical monitor 
may display all of the relevant physiological information, 
merely having the correct content on a cognitive aid is not 
sufficient. The important information needs to be ordered 
and made salient with appropriate alarms, color, position, 
and font type and size. A device should be designed to 
make the job as efficient and effective as possible, termed 
its “Usability Specification.” The possibilities of harm from 
improper or unintended use should also be considered 
(“Hazard Identification”). The design should be evaluated 
against testable requirements; refining the device’s charac-
teristics is usually an iterative process. Poor design of cogni-
tive aids in aviation have caused unintended effects, such as 
the shutdown of the wrong engine during an emergency.10 
There is no reason to assume that poorly designed cogni-
tive aids in health care would not also lead to errors such as 
following the wrong arm of an overly complex flowchart.12
Table 1.  A Terminology of Standardized Practices4
Term Function Format Comment
Procedure (Standard Operating 
Procedure)
Sets out the expected standard 
for performing an operation 
or task
Lengthy and detailed document May have legal implications if not 
followed
Protocol Summarizes a complex set of 
procedures
Less detailed document than 
procedure
Potential legal implications 
if referring to a specific 
enforceable procedure
Guideline Describes ideal actions to 
perform a task, usually based 
on evidence from research
Often lengthy documents 
(e.g., cardiac resuscitation 
guidelines)
Usually not mandatory or legally 
enforced
Cognitive aid A “memory aid” specifically 
designed for use at the time 
of completion of the task
Variable, e.g., poster, computer 
program, mnemonic
Takes into account specific “rules 
of thumb” and requirements 
during task completion
Algorithm A form of protocol or cognitive 
aid presented as a flowchart
Usually a single page poster or 
document
Common format for a cognitive aid
Checklist A type of cognitive aid listing 
a suggested sequence of 
actions
May be paper- or screen-based 
or presented as an auditory 
prompt
Extensively used in other industries 
(e.g., aviation)
Types of checklist
 Static parallel One operator reads and 
performs tasks
Nonurgent, nonsequential 
checklist
Example: Preanesthesia machine 
checkout
 Static sequential with 
verification
A second person reads items 
and an operator confirms
Sequence of actions is 
important
Example: “Flight deck” pilot and 
copilot checklist.
 Static sequential with 
verification and confirmation
Multiple team members respond 
to a series of items and 
cross-check
Ideal for team settings with 
multiple different roles
Example: World Health Organization 
Preincision “Time Out” checklist
 Dynamic One or more team members 
develop a plan using a 
branching decision tree
Complex branching algorithm. 
May be too complex to use in 
emergencies
Example: ASA difficult airway 
algorithm
ASA = American Society of Anesthesiologists.
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Training
The appropriate training for the users should also be con-
sidered both in general terms of who will use the device, 
termed “User profiles,” and the training that is specific to 
the device. It could be argued that training in the use of a 
simple device is merely compensating for an inadequate 
design. But, training may improve the familiarity with a 
cognitive aid and enhance the chance of it being used effec-
tively, even if it is an apparently simple presentation like a 
poster or paper checklist.
Individual Versus Team Performance
Given the nature of anesthetic emergencies, in which 
multiple tasks are undertaken concurrently, a cognitive 
aid must support both the individual and the team in 
managing the emergency. A cognitive aid that distracts 
and interrupts the team from performing their tasks may 
increase the risk of errors and have the opposite of the 
intended effect. A partial solution to this problem of dis-
traction can be found in aviation where, in times of high 
workload such as takeoff and landing, only information 
directly related to that specific phase of flight is communi-
cated.17 Nevertheless, even an apparently “perfect” cogni-
tive aid may still distract clinicians when used in context 
and some degree of education about how to use the aids 
seems unavoidable.
In this review, evidence will be examined to determine:
1. Whether written cognitive aids are of benefit to 
both individuals and teams during emergencies in 
anesthesia.
2. Whether recommendations can be made for improv-
ing the development, testing, and acceptance of future 
cognitive aids.
Specifically, this review is aimed toward the use of cog-
nitive aids during crises, as this is one circumstance where 
they have been suggested to have a substantial role in 
improving safety.
METHODS
A literature search was performed for articles describing 
the use of cognitive aids in anesthetic emergencies. The 
MEDLINE (full database from 1950), EMBASE, Cochrane 
library, and PsycInfo databases were searched in all fields 
and MeSH for the terms “anesthesia/anaesthesia,” and 
for each of the terms: “algorithm,” “checklist,” “cognitive 
aid,” “standard operating procedure,” and “guideline.” 
No restrictions on language were made, and the search 
criteria were as broad as possible to ensure the literature 
was comprehensively covered. The reference lists of the 
articles selected for review were also scanned to identify 
additional studies not found using the original search 
terms. Articles were included if they met the following 
criteria:
rA cognitive aid was used or tested (papers merely 
referencing the development or existence of cognitive 
aids were excluded).
r The paper was specifically relevant to emergencies 
encountered in anesthetic practice such as airway 
emergencies or cardiac events.
r The cognitive aid related to anesthetic emergencies 
rather than the routine care to prevent emergencies 
such as machine checkouts.
r The paper described a cognitive aid that was not only 
for an educational or assessment purpose.
Papers were also included if they involved the use of a 
cognitive aid by a group other than anesthesia providers 
and if the aim of the aid was to assist in emergencies that 
might also occur during anesthetic care (e.g., the manage-
ment of cardiac arrest). For each of the papers included, 
6 aspects were used to examine the content, design, and 
training:
rHow the content of the cognitive aid was derived
rHow the aid was designed
rHow the aid was evaluated, such as surveys of per-
ceived usefulness, performance data in real or simu-
lated settings, or patient outcomes
rWhether education had been provided on the use of 
the aid
r Effects on team functioning
r Evidence of successful implementation as demon-
strated by accepted use in the clinical environment or 
improved clinical outcomes.
RESULTS
A flowchart of the search strategy and results are given in 
Figure 1. The Cochrane, EMBASE, MEDLINE, and PsycInfo 
database searches produced 18, 4222, 4472, and 55 results, 
respectively.
After a manual review of their abstracts, most articles 
were rejected because they did not refer to the use of a 
Figure 1. Literature search process.
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specific cognitive aid. In total, 22 cognitive aids were found 
described in 23 evaluation papers. One cognitive aid was 
evaluated in 3 separate studies,18–20 and 1 study evalu-
ated 2 different cognitive aids.18 Table 2 presents the stud-
ies reporting the cognitive aids, focusing on their content 
and how their content was developed. Table 3 presents the 
same studies, but focuses on how the cognitive aids were 
evaluated.
Content of the Cognitive Aid
Seven of the 22 cognitive aids were developed to help in a 
range of anesthetic crises, whereas the rest helped with spe-
cific crises or related groups of crises such as cardiac arrest 
or airway emergencies. The Abbreviated Stanford Manual 
was developed from one of the earliest cognitive aids found 
for a variety of crises in anesthesia, the crisis management 
handbook by Gaba et al.,22 now nearly 20 years old.
The content of 13 cognitive aids was derived from exist-
ing national guidelines18,19,26,29,30,32–37,40,42 including all of the 
aids relating to management of cardiac arrest of adults32–37 
and neonates.40 This may reflect the existence of established 
national and international guidelines for cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation.
Most of the aids with content derived from local expert 
consensus did not explain how the content was decided 
upon. The exception to this was the Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation (APSF) crisis management handbook,24 which 
has been extensively documented.23 A series of 7 national 
meetings of up to 100 anesthesiologists per meeting was 
held, and a consensus for ideal management was reached 
for each crisis. The authors subsequently condensed this 
content into a 74-page manual that used a common mne-
monic for many emergency situations in anesthesia.
Design of the Aid
The 22 cognitive aids discovered by this search were pre-
sented in forms as diverse as handbooks, cards, posters, 
or desktop or handheld computer-based help systems 
(Table 2). Two of the studies did not describe how the aid 
was presented.28,29
For 11 of the 22 cognitive aids, the design process was 
not described. Mills et al.34 described a subjective method 
of design by a working group, with the addition of an 
index and ring for attachment to the code cart. Participants 
reported that the additions improved the ease of use, 
although none of the questions in a later survey specifically 
addressed aspects of design. Only 1 of the 22 cognitive aids 
was developed using an iterative method that is the stan-
dard for other medical devices.27
Evaluation of the Aid
The cognitive aids were evaluated by surveys, simulation 
studies, and analyses of case reports (Table 3). The 3 stud-
ies that collected survey data21,34,41 concentrated mainly on 
how often the aid was used and how aware clinicians were 
of it in the clinical setting. These survey data will be dealt 
with in the section on implementation. Where the cognitive 
aids were tested, it appears they were not measured against 
any criteria, and in only 1 was the design altered to improve 
the usability as suggested by the international standards for 
medical devices (IEC 62366 Sections 5.6 and 5.9).14
Simulation-based studies were used to evaluate whether 
the cognitive aids could be useful in emergencies. In 13 
studies, researchers assessed technical performance such as 
speed of task completion and number of errors and omis-
sions.18,19,25–27,31–33,36–38,40,42 All but one of the studies used 
a part task trainer or mannequin-based simulators. The 
exception was the study by Berkenstadt et al.25 that used a 
screen-based computer simulator to determine whether an 
electronic help system reduced the number of knowledge-
based errors.
Ten of the 13 studies suggested an improvement in tech-
nical performance in diverse activities ranging from the 
management of an airway to managing malignant hyper-
thermia crises. Two of the remaining 3 studies showed 
no improvement in neonatal (Bould et al.40) and adult 
(Schneider et al.32) resuscitation. Coopmans and Biddle26 
showed a longer delay to diagnose and intervene during 
emergencies when a personal digital assistant device was 
provided.
Observational studies and case reports have also been 
used to determine the effect of introducing cognitive aids. 
Both Heidegger et al.28 and Combes et al.29 observed fewer 
failed intubations when a standardized approach was used. 
Marshall and Flanagan39 reported that treating anesthe-
siologists believed that successful management of malig-
nant hyperthermia was due to the use of a cognitive aid 
improving their task management, reducing omissions, and 
improving team performance.
The Australian Patient Safety Foundation took a larger 
scale approach by retrospectively analyzing thousands of 
incident reports from a national database. The first 2000 
reports were used to determine whether a standardized 
approach (the “COVERABCD” algorithm) could have pre-
vented or mitigated the incident using a “walkthrough” of 
the algorithm described by the cognitive aid.23 They found 
that 60% of incidents could have been rectified in <1 minute 
had the aid been used.
Training in the Use of the Cognitive Aid
Reports of formal orientation to the users about the cognitive 
aid were found in 8 of the 23 evaluation studies.18,25–27,32,33,36,37 
In 3 of the remaining 15 studies, the cognitive aid was delib-
erately not shown to participants before they used it, but 
participants were informed that a cognitive aid would be 
present.31,38,40 Presumably, this strategy was taken to deter-
mine whether the aid could be used effectively without 
prior knowledge of its contents or structure. In 2 studies 
that found no difference in performance while using a cog-
nitive aid, participants were allowed to familiarize them-
selves with the aid before using it.26,32
Effects on Team Functioning
Only 4 aids have been evaluated with regard to their 
effects on team functioning beyond the ability to merely 
perform tasks accurately and efficiently.18,20,40,42 Manser et 
al.20 observed the ability of teams to manage a malignant 
hyperthermia crisis when they referred to cognitive aids on 
personal digital assistants or cards that they carried. Teams 
that scored highly on a clinical performance score were 
more likely to discuss their assessment of the situation than 
the division of tasks. It was suggested that the cognitive 
Copyright © 2013 International Anesthesia Research Society. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Cognitive Aids in Anesthetic Emergencies
XXX 2013 ڇ Volume XX ڇ Number XX www.anesthesia-analgesia.org 5
Table 2.  Summary of Cognitive Aids (Grouped by Type of Incident That the Aids Were Designed to Address) 
and How the Aid Was Developed and Designed with Related Publications
Cognitive aid (papers 
describing evaluation)
Purpose of cognitive 
aid
Source content Presentation Design  
process
Abbreviated Stanford  
manual (Neily et al.,  
200721)
Management of a range 
of anesthetic crises
Local expert consensus 
derived from book by 
Gaba et al., 199422
Booklet designed for use in the OR/
electronic download
Not stated
Australian Patient  
Safety Foundation 
(Runciman et al.,  
2005 23)
Management of a range 
of anesthetic crises
National expert consensus 
conducted by the 
Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation, 199624
Handbook designed for use in the OR. 
A common approach is used with 
further subalgorithms
Not stated
Computerized help  
system (Berkenstadt  
et al., 200625)
Management of a range 
of anesthetic crises
Local expert consensus Online electronic help system Not stated
PDA device (Coopmans and 
Biddle, 200826)
Management of a range 
of anesthetic crises
National expert consensus Personal digital assistant Not stated
OR Critical Event  
Checklist (Ziewacz  
et al., 201127)
Management of 12 
common operating 
room crises
Local expert consensus Booklet of checklists Iterative testing 
using immersive 
simulation
Swiss airway algorithm 
(Heidegger et al., 200128)
Management of the 
difficult airway
Local expert consensus Not stated Not stated
Modified ASA algorithm 
(Combes et al., 200429)
Management of the 
difficult airway
National consensus 
guidelines
Not stated Not stated
ASA algorithm (Berkow  
et al., 200930)
Management of the 
difficult airway
National consensus 
guidelines
Laminated poster of ASA difficult 
airway algorithm
Not stated
NASA airway checklist  
(Seagull et al., 200731)
Airway management by 
novices
Local expert consensus 
and task analysis
Audiovisual computer-based prompts 
for intubation versus traditional 
paper-based version with written 
instructions and diagrams
Not stated
Helper computerized prompts 
(Schneider et al., 199532)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Displayed prompts on touch screen 
computer
Not stated
ARC 1993 guidelines:  
long and short (Ward  
et al., 199733)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Two wallet-sized “checklists” (termed 
“long” and “short”) with actions 
required during a cardiac arrest
Not stated
Modified AHA Handbook  
(Mills et al., 200434)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Handbook designed for use in cardiac 
codes to be kept on the code cart. 
Tabbed pages introduced for easy 
navigation
Not stated
EMD-aide (Dyson et al., 
200435)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Paper representation of mnemonic 
sent by post
Not stated
Cell phone prompts  
(Merchant et al.,  
201036)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Audio prompt only via cell phone Not stated but pilot 
tested with 3 
volunteers
iResus app. (Low et al., 
201137)
Management of cardiac 
arrest emergencies
National consensus 
guidelines
Displayed flowchart on smartphone Not stated
Pilots’ checklist (Hart  
and Owen, 200538)
Management of general 
anesthesia for 
emergency cesarean 
sections
National expert consensus Electronic auditory prompts of actions 
required for general anesthesia for 
emergency cesarean section
Not stated (existing 
aviation checklist 
device)
OCA poster (Burden  
et al., 201218)
Management of obstetric 
cardiac arrest
National consensus 
guidelines
Laminated posters Not stated
MHAUS poster (Harrison  
et al., 200619; Manser  
et al., 200920; Burden  
et al., 201218)
Management 
of malignant 
hyperthermia crises
National consensus 
guidelines
Participants’ own textbook, or 
personal digital assistant (Harrison 
and Manser). The MHAUS poster 
was available in all studies
Not stated
Australian MH cards  
(Marshall and  
Flanagan, 200739)
Management 
of malignant 
hyperthermia crises
Local expert consensus Task cards, with lists of actions for 
each team member
Not stated
NRP poster (Bould  
et al., 200940)
Management 
of neonatal 
resuscitations
National consensus 
guidelines
Poster for use in neonatal 
resuscitation with clinical situation 
and suggested desired actions
Not stated
AAGBI LA toxicity poster 
(Picard et al., 200941)
Management of local 
anesthetic toxicity
National expert consensus Checklist of actions and 
recommended doses of Intralipid®
Not stated
ASRA LA toxicity poster 
(Neal et al., 201242)
Management of local 
anesthetic toxicity
National consensus 
guidelines
Checklist of actions and 
recommended doses of Intralipid®
Not stated
ASA = American Society of Anesthesiologists; PDA = personal digital assistant; OR = operating room; EMD = electromechanical dissociation; NASA = National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration; ARC = American Red Cross; OCA = Obstetric Cardiac Arrest; MHAUS = Malignant Hyperthermia Association of the United 
States; MH = malignant hyperthermia; NRP = Neonatal Resuscitation Program; AAGBI = Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland; LA = local 
anesthetic; ASRA = American Society of Regional Anesthesia and Pain Medicine.
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Table 3.  Methods of Evaluation and Outcomes for Each of the Cognitive Aids (CAs) Tested
Paper (CA) Method of 
evaluation
Test subjects Education Comment
Runciman et al,. 200523 
(Australian Patient 
Safety Foundation)
Retrospective 
analysis of 
reported cases
Anesthesiologists 
reporting critical 
incidents (2000 cases)
None Claimed that 60% of incidents would be 
addressed in 40–60 s using the aid
Berkenstadt et al., 
200625 (computerized 
help system)
Randomized, 
controlled trial 
using screen-
based scenarios
Trainee and specialist 
anesthesiologists  
(n = 48)
30-min 
familiarization 
session
Fewer knowledge-based mistakes when using 
aid in 11 of 12 scenarios (all P < 0.01)
Neily et al., 200721 
(Abbreviated Stanford 
manual)
Survey of 
practitioners
Anesthesia providers  
(n = 596)
To some staff Low incidence of use during emergencies 
of 7%
Coopmans and Biddle, 
200826 (PDA device)
Crossover study. 
Time to identify, 
diagnose, and 
intervene in 
2 mannequin-
based scenarios
Certified Registered 
Nurse Anesthetists 
(n = 4)
Familiarization to 
settings and 
personal digital 
assistant
Longer duration to diagnose in one scenario 
when supplied with device (control 13 min, 
PDA 21 min and control 26 min, PDA 10 
min). Shorter to intervene in one (control 
30 min, PDA 13 min) and longer in the 
other (control 19 min, PDA 27 min) of the 
2 scenarios. No effect sizes were reported 
perhaps due to small numbers
Ziewacz et al., 201127 
(OR Critical Event 
Checklist)
Randomized 
controlled trial 
of performance 
in 8 immersive 
simulation 
scenarios
Operating room teams 
(n = 2)
Instructed in use 
of checklists
Reduction in the number of critical steps 
omitted when using the CA (control 11/46, 
CA 2/46, P = 0.007)
Burden et al., 201218 
(MHAUS and OCA 
posters)
Observational 
study using a 
confederate 
actor to read 
prompts from CA
Anesthesiology residents 
(n = 28)
Lecture including 
introduction 
to CA
Successful completion of all 12 critical items in 
all groups using a reader (3 of these failed 
to reach significance due to initially high 
completion rates (P = 0.31, P = 0.14, and 
P = 0.06) but reduced team communication 
noted while reading CA (P < 0.001)
Heidegger et al., 
200128 (Swiss airway 
algorithm)
Observational study 
of failed airway 
management
Physician and 
nurse anesthetic 
practitioners (n = 80)
Not stated Demonstrated low incidence of failed airway 
management using a standard approach 
(6/13,248 cases)
Combes et al. 200429 
(modified ASA 
algorithm)
Management of the 
difficult airway
Specialist 
anesthesiologists  
(n = 41)
Two-month period 
of skills training
Low incidence of failed airway using 
a standard approach (100 difficult 
intubations: 80 rescued using gum-elastic 
bougies, 15 rescued using intubating 
laryngeal mask airway, 2 awoken, 3 
deviated from algorithm). Transient 
hypoxemia occurred in 16 patients
Seagull et al., 200731 
(NASA airway 
checklist)
Accuracy and time 
to perform tasks 
on mannequin
Novices with no health 
care experience  
(n = 14)
None Improved speed for 4 of 6 tasks (P < 0.05) 
and accuracy for 3 or 4 tasks (P < 0.01) 
when using multimedia- versus paper-
based aid
Berkow et al., 200930 
(ASA algorithm)
Historical incidence 
of emergency 
surgical airway 
procedures
Data taken from a 
large hospital with 
over 27,000 cases 
per year. Number of 
anesthesiologists not 
stated
Formal yearly 
education 
program. No 
reference 
to specific 
education on CA
Reduction in number of surgical airways over 
14 y from 6.5 per year to 2.2 per year. 
Multiple interventions and introduction of 
new devices. Not solely due to CA
Schneider et al., 199532 
(helper computerized 
prompts)
Randomized 
controlled trial of 
CA versus no CA
Anesthesia residents  
(n = 39)
Participants given 
up to 30 min 
to familiarize 
themselves with 
device
Little difference in performance between 
groups in managing ventricular fibrillation, 
with epinephrine and lidocaine given by both 
groups (P = 0.58 and P = 0.16). Lidocaine 
dose was more frequently correct (P = 
0.015). More medications and infusions 
were given by CA group (P < 0.001)
Ward et al.33 (ARC 1997 
guidelines: long and 
short)
Randomized trial 
of performance 
of advanced 
life support on 
mannequin
Undergraduate students 
(n = 169)
Advanced life 
support training 
session with aid
A detailed checklist improves advanced life 
support skills 2 mo after training (overall 
P < 0.01)
Mills et al., 200434 
(modified AHA 
handbook)
Survey of 
practitioners at 
target hospitals
Twenty nursing and 
medical staff at each 
of 50 sites (n = 1000)
Single didactic 
session with 
some staff
Poor response rate (56.5%). Many of those 
who responded (41%) were not aware of 
the CA
(Continued)
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aid might have affected how the teams coordinated their 
activities. Three studies failed to find an improvement 
in team functioning. Studies by Neal et al.42 and Bould et 
al.40 observed individual anesthesia trainees working with 
“actors” performing the supporting clinical roles. No dif-
ferences in nontechnical skills were found between partici-
pants using versus not using a cognitive aid in either study, 
although Neal et al.42 suggested a slight improvement in 
the Decision Making category in the participants with 
the cognitive aid. Burden et al.18 noted a reduction in the 
volume of communication within the team when a cognitive 
aid was used.
Evidence of Implementation
Evidence of implementation in the actual clinical environment 
was identified in 3 studies.21,34,41 Two of these papers reported 
surveys of the use of cognitive aids in clinical settings. In each 
of these surveys only half of the respondents reported that they 
either would use or had used cognitive aids in emergencies.
Table 3.  (Continued)
Paper (CA) Method of 
evaluation
Test subjects Education Comment
Dyson et al., 200435 
(EMD-aide)
Recall of all 8 
causes of EMD 
after access to 
2 posters for a 
4-wk period
Junior residents (n = 149) Access to CA for 4 
wk prior
No difference between the 2 CAs in recall of 
all 8 items (P = 0.068)
Merchant et al., 201036 
(Cell phone prompts)
CPR effectiveness 
on part task 
trainer
Lay persons aged 18–60 
y (n = 160)
One-minute tutorial 
on how to use 
the telephone 
speed dial 
function
Improved quality of CPR with CA regardless of 
a lack of previous resuscitation education. 
Compression rate (P < 0.001), depth  
(P = 0.005), and hand placement  
(P < 0.001) all improved
Low et al., 201137 
(iResus app.)
Randomized 
controlled trial 
of performance 
metrics in 
simulated 
environment
Junior doctors  
(n = 31)
Ten-minute 
tutorial on 
use of iPhone 
application
Improved performance of CPR during 
simulated emergency with CA (P = 0.02)
Hart and Owen, 200538 
(Pilots’ checklist)
Randomized 
controlled trial 
in simulated 
environment
Experienced trainee 
and specialist 
anesthesiologists  
(n = 20)
None Low numbers of items omitted (13/40, range 
7–23) with the CA
Harrison et al., 200619 
(MHAUS poster)
Observational 
study comparing 
performance 
with use of aid
Teams of junior 
anesthesiologists 
(n = 48)
None Improved treatment scores in simulated 
environment when using aid for 2 groups 
(Spearman r = 0.59, P < 0.01 and 
Spearman r = 0.68, P < 0.001). Not 
blinded
Manser et al., 200920 
(MHAUS poster)
Observational 
study comparing 
performance 
with use of aid
Teams of junior 
anesthesiologists  
(n = 20)
None Coordination patterns noted to be different 
when CA was used (overall P < 0.001) 
with less task distribution (P < 0.01) and 
more situation assessment (P < 0.05). 
Not blinded
Marshall and Flanagan, 
200739 (Australian 
MH cards)
Anecdotal evidence 
only
Not applicable None Reports of successful use in real cases
Bould et al., 200940 
(NRP poster)
Performance 
of tasks, 
nontechnical 
skills 
assessment
Anesthesia residents  
(n = 32)
None No improvement of technical skills (P = 0.08) 
or nontechnical skills (P = 0.11) with CA
Picard et al., 200941 
(AAGBI LA toxicity 
poster)
Survey of facilities Not applicable Not applicable Delayed uptake of guidelines after publication 
with 50% of facilities not implementing 
guidelines until over 1 y following 
publication of guidelines
Neal et al., 201242 
(ASRA LA toxicity 
poster)
Randomized 
controlled trial 
of performance 
metrics and 
team working 
scores in 
simulated 
environment
Anesthesia trainees  
(n = 25)
None, but CA 
provided 4 wk 
before study
Improve technical performance with CA (P 
< 0.001). No improvement in overall 
teamwork score but underpowered to 
detect this (P = 0.143)
ASA = American Society of Anesthesiologists; PDA = personal digital assistant; EMD = electromechanical dissociation; CPR = cardiopulmonary resuscitation; 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration; ARC = American Red Cross; OCA = Obstetric Cardiac Arrest; MHAUS = Malignant Hyperthermia 
Association of the United States; MH = malignant hyperthermia; NRP = Neonatal Resuscitation Program; AAGBI = Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain 
and Ireland; LA = local anesthetic; ASRA = American Society of Regional Anesthesia and Pain Medicine.
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DISCUSSION
The literature on cognitive aids in anesthesia emergen-
cies appears to be expanding rapidly; 9 of the 23 articles 
found published in the last 3 years. Given the broad nature 
of the search and manual review of the papers, all of the 
cognitive aids currently available for anesthetic emergen-
cies are likely to have been included.43 Some cognitive aids 
that may improve patient safety, such as the World Health 
Organization Surgical Safety Checklist,44 have not been 
included as they are not generally used during an emer-
gency. There is some evidence that cognitive aids improve 
technical performance during emergencies, but there is 
much to be learned about when and why they fail.
Drawing the analogy between cognitive aids and medi-
cal devices may help us understand when and in what form 
cognitive aids may be useful. In common with medical 
devices, cognitive aids need to have the correct content, be 
well designed, and be accompanied by appropriate training 
to assist task performance. The content or knowledge con-
tained in cognitive aids should be developed from national 
or international guidelines or from broad consensus. To 
ensure continuing usefulness, their content needs to be 
reviewed and adapted as knowledge changes.
The content seems to have been the main focus during 
the development of most cognitive aids, with more than 
half being derived from established guidelines. In contrast, 
the design processes, presentation, and the resultant usabil-
ity of cognitive aids seem to have been less thoroughly 
considered. Only one of the cognitive aids was developed 
with a systematic design process and adapted as a result of 
evaluation data.27 Evidence from the human factors litera-
ture suggests that poorly designed cognitive aids may lead 
to unintended consequences.10,13 The use of a human factors 
design process, as mandated for medical devices,45 may 
help to reduce the likelihood of poor design but will not 
eliminate it. It is also important to select appropriate mea-
surements and testing scenarios, and then revise the design 
appropriately. There is little evidence that the majority of 
cognitive aids discovered in this literature review have 
been designed for the context in which they are to be used. 
Physical constraints of using aids, such as the ability to read, 
see, hear, or interact with the paper or computer-based aid, 
potential distraction caused by the aid, and the ability to 
perform concurrent tasks have not been addressed. These 
contextual issues could make aids very difficult to use in 
the actual working environment and may reflect the appar-
ent negative effects on team communication that have been 
reported.18 Research is currently lacking in this area not only 
in anesthesia and health care but also in other industries, 
despite the acknowledgment that checklist design has been 
a contributing factor in several airline accidents.11 There 
are functional differences between a long, nonsequential 
checklist and dynamic decision tree, and the design chosen 
depends on the intended context (Table 1).
Despite the perceived benefits to the team, there is mini-
mal evidence to support an improvement in team function 
with the use of cognitive aids. Data suggest that cognitive 
aids may change team coordination and improve task com-
pletion but their effects on team processes are not clear. In 
particular, the study by Burden et al.18 into the effects of a 
designated reader demonstrated decreased communication 
by the team. Reduction in team communication is gener-
ally considered deleterious to team coordination,46 and as 
such the aid may have distracted the team from commu-
nicating with each other. Conversely, it may be that the 
remaining communication was more efficient and targeted. 
Further studies are needed to determine how cognitive 
aids affect interpersonal communication during anesthetic 
emergencies.
Training in the use of a cognitive aid appears to be often 
cursory or absent. It is reasonable to assume that familiar-
ization to a cognitive aid before its use would mean that the 
participants would be more likely to use it and use it more 
effectively. This increased likelihood of use after education 
is supported by responses to Mills et al.’s survey34 about 
a cognitive aid for cardiac arrest management: those who 
had learned about the aid from a formal orientation session 
were more likely to use it in an emergency than those who 
were not oriented to the aid. Research shows that education 
raises awareness of the presence of the aid and helps iden-
tify how and when the aid should be used, both stimulat-
ing its use and making its use more effective.47 The counter 
argument is that a cognitive aid should be intuitive to use in 
an emergency situation, and that educating people to use a 
cognitive aid merely compensates for a poor design. Ideally, 
as with any medical device, for the best results the cognitive 
aid should be intuitive to use and should also be used only 
by individuals trained in its use.
Reports of implementation into clinical practice demon-
strate that even when clinicians are aware of the existence of 
cognitive aids they often do not use them. Part of the prob-
lem of the underuse of cognitive aids may be the existence 
of a professional culture that does not support their use. For 
example, when observing the use of cognitive aids in malig-
nant hyperthermia crises, one of the participants in Harrison 
et al.’s study19 reported the view that using a cognitive aid 
reflected a lack of confidence or knowledge. Several other 
studies also report participants’ comments that they did 
not need the cognitive aid to manage the emergency effec-
tively.19,21,34,40 In contrast, the results of Low et al.’s study37 
with junior doctors suggest a willingness to use cognitive 
aids, and their feeling that using them does not reflect a lack 
of competence of health professionals. A further issue that 
is rarely addressed is the positioning of the cognitive aid. A 
reminder of the aid and therefore prompting to use it can be 
improved by associating the aid with the task in the same 
way that any prospective memory task can be prompted.48 
For example, the cognitive aid for management of local 
anesthetic toxicity may be positioned with the Intralipid® 
on an emergency cart.
A recent editorial suggested that cognitive aids should 
be available for all rare emergencies in anesthesia7 but this 
poses more questions, such as who creates, updates, and 
designs the cognitive aids. A regular formal review of labo-
ratory and clinical evidence by a reputable body would be 
required for each emergency. The process currently used 
for the management of cardiac arrest by the International 
Liaison Committee on Resuscitation49 would seem to be 
the ideal template. Levels of evidence should ideally be 
included and should lead to a consensus about the actions 
required during the emergency. This information would 
then be passed to a human factors design team for design, 
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testing, and modification based on heuristic and simulation 
evaluation. Only then would the guidelines be available for 
distribution.
Cognitive aids are not commonly used during emer-
gencies in anesthesia and at present appear not to be sup-
ported by the culture. For cognitive aids to be more broadly 
accepted, further evidence may be needed that they confer 
benefits in emergency situations. Although we know that 
practitioners’ coordination patterns change when a cogni-
tive aid is used, there is a need for larger prospective trials 
of the effect of aids on task completion, practitioners’ team 
behaviors, and overall team functioning. Such trials will 
allow a deeper understanding of how teams may use an aid 
to best allocate roles so that they can rapidly process tasks 
in parallel. The trials should use robustly researched and 
designed aids and should assess outcome measures of accu-
rate and rapid task completion as well as process measures 
of team behaviors. Testing would best occur in simulation-
based settings, where the physiological variables and envi-
ronment can be more tightly controlled and replicated, and 
there are no direct risks to patients.
Cognitive aids should be integrated into anesthesiolo-
gists’ vocational and continuing education so that practitio-
ners are aware of when and how to use them appropriately. 
Continuing education programs have started to advocate 
the use of cognitive aids in emergencies through simula-
tion-based education50 but such education is not readily 
accessible to all anesthesia providers. Any future testing of 
cognitive aids in simulation-based settings should first let 
practitioners become oriented to the aids. The maximum 
benefit is likely only if practitioners are familiar with the 
structure of each aid, and how it should be used.
As this literature review has shown, the current evidence 
for the efficacy of cognitive aids in emergencies is incon-
clusive. However, although the evidence to support the use 
of cognitive aids in emergencies is currently weak, the suc-
cess in other settings is compelling. The lack of evidence is 
due to both the limited research that has been performed 
and the deficiencies in design and evaluation of current 
cognitive aids. By conceptualizing cognitive aids as medical 
devices, we may be able to address these deficiencies and 
improve the outcomes of patients experiencing anesthetic 
emergencies. E
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Summary
Guidelines outlining recommended actions are difficult to implement in the stressful, time-pressured situation of an
airway emergency. Cognitive aids such as posters and algorithms improve performance during some anaesthetic
emergencies; however, their effects on team behaviours have not been determined. In this study, 64 participants were
randomly assigned into control (no cognitive aid) and intervention (cognitive aid provided) groups before a simu-
lated ‘can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate’ scenario. Video analysis was undertaken of the non-technical skills and techni-
cal performance during the scenarios. All categories had higher Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) scores
when a cognitive aid was supplied (mean (SD) total ANTS score 10.4 (3.1) vs 13.2 (2.4), p < 0.001). The number of
times the cognitive aid was used was associated with higher ANTS scores (q = 0.383, p = 0.002). A trend towards
the establishment of an infraglottic airway within 3 min was also noted (control group 55.3% vs intervention 76.9%,
p = 0.076). Non-technical skills are improved when a cognitive aid is present during airway emergencies.
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Introduction
Failure to oxygenate a patient successfully is a rare and
feared crisis of airway management. Rapid action is
needed to create a passage by which oxygen can be
delivered; otherwise, hypoxic brain injury and death
will occur. According to established guidelines, when all
other measures to provide oxygen fail, the final com-
mon step is the insertion of a surgical infraglottic air-
way [1, 2]. It is reassuring that emergency infraglottic
airways are rarely needed, but accordingly, it is also
something that few critical care specialists have seen or
performed during an emergency. The recent fourth UK
National Audit Project (NAP4) identified that there
was a systemic lack of anaesthetists’ experience in surgi-
cal airway access [3]. This lack of proficiency has been
suggested as the main reason why over 60% of initial
attempts at needle cricothyroidotomy failed [4]. When
an infraglottic airway is indicated, there is often a reluc-
tance to initiate it and there is confusion about the best
method to use. Consequently, an algorithm has recently
been developed to help with decision making during a
‘can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate’ (CICO) crisis [5]. This
algorithm was based on the observation of over 2000
clinicians performing infraglottic airway access on
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sheep models, and it is becoming the accepted standard
of practice in Australia and New Zealand.
To help providers follow these algorithms, dis-
played prompts or ‘cognitive aids’ have been produced
for use at the point of care. Cognitive aids have also
been attempted with many other emergency guidelines
[6] and it is generally accepted that they improve per-
formance of routine tasks with the omission of fewer
required actions [7]. However, previous studies in
emergency situations have not consistently demon-
strated improvements in measures of performance
such as rapidity and accuracy of task completion, and
the reasons for this are not clear [8]. Deficiencies in
design or content of the cognitive aid may be to
blame, or perhaps an unwillingness or lack of knowl-
edge of how to use the aid effectively.
The ‘non-technical’ or team working skills of indi-
viduals are also becoming recognised as important
indices of performance linked to patient outcomes.
When team working behaviours are perceived as good,
patient outcomes are more likely to be positive [9].
However, few studies have investigated the assertion
that cognitive aids support teams’ communication and
coordination. Only one retrospective observational
study has shown that cognitive aids change how teams
coordinate their activities [10]. Another prospective
study suggested no effect on team behaviours during a
local anaesthetic toxicity emergency, but this was prob-
ably underpowered, recruiting a total of only 25 train-
ees [11].
We conducted a prospective randomised study to
determine if displaying a version of an algorithm in a
simulated setting would affect how critical care special-
ists and anaesthetists manage a CICO crisis. We hy-
pothesised that both technical measures such as time to
oxygenate a patient using a surgical approach, and indi-
vidual practitioners’ non-technical measures using the
Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) framework
[12] would be improved when a cognitive aid was avail-
able. As individuals may elect not to use the cognitive
aid even when present, we examined if cognitive aid use
was correlated with improved processes and outcomes.
Consequently, four hypotheses were proposed:
Hypothesis 1: the presence of a cognitive aid is
associated with higher ANTS scores and fewer
instances of conflict within the team (primary
outcome measures).
Hypothesis 2: the presence of a cognitive aid
reduces the time to achieve oxygenation.
Hypothesis 3: the observed frequency of use of
the cognitive aid is correlated with higher ANTS
scores and fewer instances of conflict within the
team.
Hypothesis 4: the observed frequency of use of
the cognitive aid is correlated with improved
technical performance.
Methods
This prospective randomised controlled trial was
granted ethics committee approval. Experienced critical
care clinicians (anaesthetists, intensive care and emer-
gency physicians) undertaking an annual one-day
course on advanced airway management (www.airway.
org.au), on three occasions (July 2010–July 2012) were
provided with information about the study by email
two weeks before the course date. Informed, written
consent was obtained on the day of the course. Clini-
cians were excluded if they had previously performed
an emergency infraglottic airway.
Prior generation of a random sequence (www.ran-
dom.org) and preparation of sealed envelopes ensured
random allocation of the participants into control (no
cognitive aid provided) and intervention (cognitive aid
provided) groups.
Participants in both the control and cognitive aid
groups were familiarised with the simulation room and
the cognitive aid (Fig. 1) before the testing phase for
a minimum of 10 min. All participants were shown
the equipment that was provided and its position in
the room. Detailed explanations were given about the
patient’s airway and anterior neck and the oxygenation
equipment, scalpels and cannulae on the trolley on
which the cognitive aid was placed. The participants
were informed that the cognitive aid may or may not
be present and advised to use it if it were available to
them. Despite allowing the participants to look at the
cognitive aid and ask questions, they were not given
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any instructions about how they should use it. The
cognitive aid used was a linear version of the algo-
rithm described by Heard, Green and Eakins [5]. The
aid was modified from the original branched version
to improve the clarity of the instructions. Immediately
before entering the simulation scenario, the partici-
pants were given a pre-briefing that explained they
were entering a ‘can’t intubate can’t oxygenate sce-
nario’ and again advising them to use the cognitive aid
if it were present.
A standardised scenario (see Appendix 1) was then
run for between 5 and 10 min during which the par-
ticipants were expected to establish an infraglottic air-
way by using a needle cricothyroidotomy or open
technique. The ‘patient’ was a Laerdal SimMan! (ver-
sion 2; Stavenger, Norway) manikin with an additional
25 mm thick layer of closed cell foam taped to the
anterior neck. This ensured the anatomical structures
were not palpable and replicated the features of an
obese patient. The closed cell padding did not allow
air to be aspirated through the foam structure, as
would be the case with excess anterior neck tissue. If
the cognitive aid was provided, it was placed on a trol-
ley with the surgical airway equipment. The trolley
and cognitive aid were placed out of the field of view
of the video cameras recording the scenario. The par-
ticipants were not prompted to use the aid during the
scenario.
The two roles of senior anaesthetic trainee and
emergency department nurse were performed by con-
sultant anaesthetists. The senior trainee and nurse
actors explained that they had already unsuccessfully
attempted to insert an tracheal tube and laryngeal
mask airway (LMA). Other than present the informa-
tion and to state they had a ‘can’t intubate and can’t
oxygenate situation’, the actors were instructed to be
helpful. The participant was called to assist with falling
oxygen saturations at 70% and heart rate at
40 beats.min!1.
Audiovisual recordings were taken and saved for
later analysis (Fig. 2). Two independent observers eval-
uated the primary outcome of ANTS scores and the
secondary outcome of time to first oxygenation via an
infraglottic approach. These observers were two spe-
cialist anaesthetists. Inter-rater reliability was estab-
lished with a 4-h training session on the ANTS
framework that included evaluating five training videos
unrelated to this study. These videos were pre-
recorded educational material demonstrating varying
levels of performance. Reliability between the observers
was maintained, firstly by discussion after scoring each
of the first five cases, and thereafter every five to ten
cases of independent scoring. The ANTS scores were
recorded as the overall category scores on a scale of 1–
4 as described by the authors of the ANTS framework.
The cognitive aid was not visible to the observers on
the video unless the participants moved the trolley or
cognitive aid. If the participants were seen to refer to
Figure 1 The linear cognitive aid used in this study
derived from the can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate algo-
rithm by Heard, Green and Eakin [5].
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the cognitive aid, the observers collected additional
data on how many times it was looked at or touched.
The observers also attempted to identify evidence of
conflict within the team such as shouting, aggressive
or demeaning language as additional displays of poor
team behaviour.
Pilot data for the primary outcome measure (non-
technical skills, ANTS) were not available; therefore,
power calculations were based on the secondary mea-
sure of time to provide oxygenation as demonstrated
in a previous study using a similar algorithm [5].
Assuming a 25% reduction in the time to oxygenate
required by group with access to the cognitive aid
compared with the control group, power calculations
suggested 22 participants would be required in each
group (a = 0.05, 1 ! b = 0.8). Consequently, two
years of data collection comprising a maximum of 40
participants at the course each year were anticipated.
Statistical analysis of ANTS scores were undertaken
using one-way independent samples ANOVA to deter-
mine differences between the control and cognitive
aid groups after normal distributions had been estab-
lished. Proportions of participants providing oxygena-
tion within 3 min in each group and mean times to
oxygenation were analysed using Fisher’s exact and
Student’s t-tests, respectively. Times to oxygenation
were transformed to normal distributions using log
transformations before analysis. Correlations between
cognitive aid use and ANTS scores and oxygenation
times were assessed using Spearman rank correlation
and Pearson’s coefficients, respectively. Inter-rater
reliabilities were assessed using Cohen’s Kappa
analyses.
Results
A total of 113 participants consented to the study.
However, due to a technical failure, no recorded data
were available from the second of the three courses, so
the 38 participants from this course were not studied
(Fig. 3). A further 11 participants were not studied
because of prior experience in performing infraglottic
airways (three in the control group and eight in the
cognitive aid group). The remaining 64 participants
were roughly equivalent in terms of clinical experience,
but there was a trend towards fewer years of clinical
experience in the cognitive aid group compared with
the control group (Table 1).
Of the 26 participants provided with the cognitive
aid, 20 (76.9%) were observed to read from it, hold it
or place it on the patient’s chest during the scenario.
Figure 2 A still frame of the recorded data from one of the scenarios (with permission of the participants). The
participant (right) has placed the cognitive aid on the patient’s chest and is assessing the adequacy of oxygenation
via the needle cricothyroidotomy.
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Only one of the participants in the control group
asked for the cognitive aid.
There were no significant differences in technical
performance between the groups with and without the
cognitive aid. However, there was a trend towards a
higher proportion of the clinicians in the cognitive aid
group being able to oxygenate within 3 min of enter-
ing the room (Table 2).
Inter-rater reliability was good for all ANTS cate-
gory scores (j = 0.608 to j = 0.714, Table 2). The
group with access to the cognitive aid had higher
ANTS scores in all categories compared with the con-
trol group (Table 2).
The incidence of conflict between the participants
and the rest of the team was low, with only five inci-
dents evident in the video data. However, all of these
occasions occurred when there was no cognitive aid
present (p = 0.066). Common conflicts included ques-
tioning the competence of other members of the team
and overloading team members with tasks before
becoming agitated that they were not rapidly com-
pleted.
There were moderately strong positive correlations
between the number of times the cognitive aid was
Table 1 Characteristics of course participants without (Control) and with (Intervention) a cognitive aid. Values are
number (proportion) or mean (range).
Control
(n = 38)
Intervention
(n = 26) p value
Clinical specialty
Anaesthetics 32 (84.2%) 21 (80.8%) 0.51
Emergency medicine 2 (5.3%) 2 (7.7%)
Intensive care 2 (5.3%) 0
Rural general practice 2 (5.3%) 3 (11.5%)
Experience; years 14.0 (1.0–37.5) 9.8 (0.5–35.0) 0.06
Prior training in infraglottic airway techniques 32 (84.2%) 21 (80.8%) 0.72
Would use a cognitive aid if it were available 32 (84.2%) 19 (73.1%) 0.13
Figure 3 Flow diagram for participants and reasons
for exclusion.
Table 2 Technical and non-technical performance of course participants without (Control) and with (Intervention) a
cognitive aid. Values are mean (SD) or number (proportion).
Control
(n = 38)
Intervention
(n = 26)
Inter-rater reliability
Cohen’s j (p value)
F value
(ANOVA test) p value
Technical
Time to provide oxygenation; s 183.8 (65.0) 165.4 (64.4) – – 0.27
Oxygenation provided within 3 min 21 (55.3%) 20 (76.9%) – – 0.076
Anaesthetists’ Non-technical Skills score
Team management 2.5 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8) 0.714 (< 0.001) 10.0 0.002
Team working 2.6 (0.9) 3.3 (0.7) 0.638 (< 0.001) 9.66 0.003
Situation awareness 2.6 (0.8) 3.5 (0.6) 0.608 (< 0.001) 18.4 < 0.001
Decision making 2.7 (0.8) 3.4 (0.6) 0.713 (< 0.001) 13.9 < 0.001
Total score 10.4 (3.1) 13.2 (2.4) – 15.8 < 0.001
Evidence of conflict
Number of episodes 5 (13.2%) 0 0.881 (< 0.001) 0.066
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used and the ANTS scores (q = 0.338 to q = 0.404).
There was no statistically significant correlation
between the number of times the cognitive aid was
used and the time to oxygenate the patient (Table 3).
Discussion
This study shows that when a cognitive aid is present
for a CICO crisis, critical care specialists perform non-
technical skills better, but they do not perform techni-
cal skills faster. No prompts about how to manage the
team were present on the cognitive aid. Presumably,
the improvement in non-technical skills was because
the cognitive aid promoted a better understanding
amongst the team about the goals and tasks required.
The cognitive aid may also have helped the partici-
pants by reducing the mental workload required to
remember the sequence of actions, allowing them to
attend to how the team was functioning.
A previous study by Neal and colleagues investi-
gated the effect of cognitive aids on the technical man-
agement of a local anaesthetic systemic toxicity and
included ANTS scores as a secondary measure [11].
They noted an improved decision-making score when
the aid was provided, but added the scores of the two
observers without reporting the inter-rater reliability.
This summated score could incorrectly amplify any
effect detected. The authors also performed a subgroup
analysis of the teams depending on if they used the
checklist ‘fully’ or ‘partially’. They found higher ANTS
scores were attained if the checklist was used more
extensively, but comparatively small numbers (n = 5
vs n = 7) were analysed. The results of our study are
more robust because we followed the recommenda-
tions of the authors of the ANTS scoring system; our
observers underwent training, their inter-rater reliabil-
ity was tested, and recurring comparisons were made
to check that there was no drift in scoring patterns.
Many of the participants in both the control and
the intervention groups who took longer than 3 min
to complete the infraglottic airway first attempted
other futile strategies that did not seem to be affected
by the cognitive aid. This was despite being told that
they had a ‘can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate’ situation
before the scenario and again by the senior trainee on
entering the room. Many of the participants attempted
LMA insertion and direct laryngoscopy at least twice
before proceeding to an infraglottic approach.
Repeated attempts at laryngoscopy are a common fea-
ture of failed airway incidents leading to hypoxic brain
injury or death [13–15]. The inability to change strat-
egy represents a fixation error and it is not yet clear if
or how cognitive aids may prevent this. The training
of teams in a common approach to airway manage-
ment may allow other clinical staff to question
assumptions of their team members. The ability of
team members to challenge other clinicians in airway
crises has some promise in preventing them from per-
sisting with ineffective airway management strategies,
and to focus on oxygenation rather than device place-
ment [16].
Previous studies in this area have noted that many
clinicians fail to use cognitive aids even when the aids
are present and they have been familiarised with their
use. We observed that over three-quarters of partici-
pants who had the aid used it. This proportion is
higher than has been reported in professional settings
[17] and this may be because the cognitive aid was
positioned with the surgical airway equipment in plain
view of the participants and because the participants
were introduced to the aid immediately before the sce-
nario. The low rate of uptake of the aid in the clinical
setting may be attributed to a culture that views reli-
ance on aids as a weakness [18]. Alternatively, it may
be because the aid is not helpful during a crisis [8]. In
our study, over 80% of participants reported that they
would use a cognitive aid if it were available. However,
many would probably not think to ask for the aid if it
were not immediately accessible to them.
The importance of design of cognitive aids
requires more attention. Several previous studies have
Table 3 Correlations between number of times the
cognitive aid was used and performance of technical
and non-technical skills.
Correlation
coefficient (q) p value
Time to oxygenate patient 0.026 0.837
Team management score 0.368 0.003
Team working score 0.338 0.006
Situation awareness score 0.383 0.002
Decision-making score 0.404 0.001
Total ANTS score 0.383 0.002
ANTS, Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills.
674 © 2014 The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland
Anaesthesia 2014, 69, 669–677 Marshall and Mehra | Cognitive aid and team behaviours
suggested that performance may be worse with a cog-
nitive aid than without [19–21]. In one case, the aid
encouraged participants to follow the incorrect proto-
col [19]. This potential for error caused by poor design
has been seen in other settings [22, 23]. In the present
study, the cognitive aid took the form of a paper-based
linear flow chart; however, branched flow charts are a
more usual mode of presentation for decision aids in
clinical settings [1, 2, 24]. Further research needs to be
undertaken to test whether cognitive aids with
branched presentations are as effective in assisting the
technical and non-technical aspects of performance.
A potential drawback of this study was that it was
in a simulated setting using other experienced anaes-
thetists as actors instead of other team members. Con-
sequently, the actual environment, the distractions
present and the responses of the staff members may
not be the same as in the real clinical setting. The
advantage of using a simulation setting is to enable
tight control of experimental conditions and the
facility to present the same clinical setting and situa-
tion to multiple participants. The unit of measure in
this study was the individual and not the team;
therefore, it was appropriate that the rest of the team
be standardised as much as possible to minimise
variability.
Blinding of the observers to the intervention is dif-
ficult to achieve in a study such as this as, to observe
the participants using the cognitive aid, it must be
seen. We attempted to conceal the cognitive aid from
the video recording, anticipating that some of the par-
ticipants may not use it, or might use it in a way that
was not visible to the observers. Despite this potential
observer bias, we believe that the combination of
strongly positive results and minimal disadvantages to
the use of a cognitive aid represent important out-
comes. Furthermore, the correlation between the num-
ber of times the aid was used and the ANTS scores
further strengthen the assertion that cognitive aids
improve individuals’ team working skills.
Another limitation of our study is that the perfor-
mance of the participants is likely to be better than
that of the wider population of critical care specialists.
The testing scenario was part of a course on advanced
airway management that included instruction on how
and when to perform an infraglottic airway, and
participants were motivated to attend the course. All
participants experienced a 45-min lecture on cricothy-
roidotomy and jet ventilation techniques before the
testing.
The study shows that individuals’ non-technical or
‘team working’ skills are improved with a cognitive aid
when other members of the team are controlled for in
terms of role and ability. It is important to note that
this study was investigating individuals’ team skills and
not functioning of teams. Manser and co-workers’ ret-
rospective analysis of teams managing malignant
hyperthermia has already shown that coordination pat-
terns are altered with the presence of a cognitive aid.
These changes in coordination patterns are correlated
with improved technical performance [10]. A recent
paper by Burden et al. [25] demonstrated that the
technical performance with a cognitive aid is improved
if the team designates someone to be the ‘reader’ of
the cognitive aid to help its content be implemented.
Future research should examine how clinical teams
modify their coordination patterns to become more
effective when cognitive aids are present.
This study demonstrates that the use of a cognitive
aid is associated with higher scores of the quality of
team behaviour during an airway emergency. Future
work should determine how to help clinicians make
the transition to an infraglottic approach by preventing
fixation error. A deeper understanding of how the cog-
nitive aid should be presented and used by teams is
also needed.
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Appendix 1
Can’t Intubate, Can’t Oxygenate (CICO)
scenario
Stem (read to participant before entering simulation
room):
A 43-year old female has been admitted to the
emergency department with a history of headaches
and sudden loss of consciousness that is presumed to
be a subarachnoid haemorrhage. She has a past history
of cervical spine fusion 10 years ago following a road
accident.
You have been called to the emergency depart-
ment to assist the senior anaesthetic registrar with
intubation. He has called for help, as he is unable to
ventilate or intubate the patient.Single participant
Additional roles:
Anaesthetic registrar – not able to manage airway
effectively. Has self-inflating bag and mask on with 2
hands and Guedel airway in situ.States on arrival of
participant “This is a can’t intubate, can’t oxygenate
situation, I can’t ventilate through a facemask or LMA
and this lady is a grade 4 laryngoscopy”.
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Emergency nurse – Able to assist with airway
material.
Set up:
Laerdal Simman in female clothing and wig
Neck padding (25mm closed cell foam wrapped in
sleek tape) applied to neck with sleek.
Airway trolley with laryngoscope, #6.0 ETT, Bou-
gie, disposable scalpel, Cook Melker kit, #3 LMA, 14G
non-safety iv cannula (In-Syte brand), Sanders injector,
Enk insufflator.
Cognitive aid (flowchart) on airway trolley
depending on randomisation.
Console:
All airway adjuncts ON (tongue swelling, trismus,
ROCM)
SaO2 72%, HR 35 (SR), BP 75/30
Recording ON
When O2 is delivered via a surgical airway
increase SaO2 to 90% over 30 seconds)
Cease scenario after 5 minutes regardless of
outcome.
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Abstract 
Introduction 
Cognitive aids have been shown to improve the technical performance of 
individuals and teams during emergencies but their effects on team function are less 
clear. The design of a cognitive aid and its method of use could affect the 
communication and coordination of the team by either assisting or distracting team 
members with tasks to be completed. This multicenter repeated-measures study was 
undertaken to determine how two contrasting designs of cognitive aids affect team 
performance during simulated intraoperative anaphylaxis crises. 
Methods 
Following familiarization to the simulated environment and cognitive aids, teams 
consisting of an anesthesiologist, an anesthesia resident and an anesthetic assistant 
managed three simulated intraoperative anaphylaxis emergencies. Each team was 
assigned at random to a counterbalanced order of 1) no cognitive aid, 2) a linear 
cognitive aid or 3) a branched cognitive aid. Scenarios were recorded and later scored 
by two experienced anesthesiologists using a previously validated team scoring 
system, and a checklist for completion of key actions required for effective 
management.  
Results 
A total of 24 teams were recruited from three teaching hospitals. When a linear 
version of the cognitive aid was used, scores were significantly higher than for no 
cognitive aid for measures of ‘Leadership and Team Coordination’ (F (2,42)=4.30, 
p=0.020), ‘Verbalizing Situational Information’ (F (2,42)=7.639, p=0.001) and ‘Team 
Overall Behavioral Performance’ (F (2,42)=4.822, p=0.022). When a branched 
version of the cognitive aid was used, scores were significantly higher than for no 
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cognitive aid for Verbalizing Situational Information compared to no cognitive aid. 
There was no significant effect of either cognitive aid on the ‘Mutual Performance 
Monitoring’ category of the team score (F (2,42)=2.093, p=0.136). When a team 
member was assigned to read the cognitive aid, teams tended to be more likely to call 
for help (n=15, p=0.007) and teams using the linear cognitive aid had higher scores 
for Team Overall Behavioral Performance (F (2,24)=5.771, p=0.009) compared to no 
aid or the branched aid. No other associations with task performance and cognitive 
aid use were identified. 
Discussion 
The design and method of use of two cognitive aids during simulated intraoperative 
anaphylaxis events are associated with indices of team functioning. A cognitive aid 
improves coordination of the team’s activities and supports team members in 
verbalizing their actions. In this study there was no effect of the cognitive aids on task 
performance, perhaps because the team members were primed by prior knowledge of 
the emergency and thus had an opportunity to consider the ideal actions they should 
take. Further research is needed on the design of cognitive aids. 
Number of words: 420  
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Introduction 
Cognitive aids such as posters, checklists and flowcharts improve the rapidity and 
accuracy of task completion during anesthetic crises in many circumstances (1). 
However, the effect of a cognitive aid on the team’s function is less clear. It is 
believed that cognitive aids improve team performance by aligning the team’s 
understanding of the cues and tasks required in the situation with the team’s 
expectations of how the situation will develop (2). This is often referred to as ‘team 
situation awareness’, which allows team members to monitor each other’s 
performance and speak up if a teammate requires help, or there is a safety issue (3). 
Conversely, a cognitive aid may distract the team from performing key tasks or may 
require resources that exceed what are available. In this context a cognitive aid may 
impair team function, leading to poorer outcomes (4).  
Studies examining the effects of cognitive aids on team performance have either 
looked retrospectively at team coordination or used scores of individual team 
members’ behaviors such as non-technical skills scoring systems (1, 5, 6). Manser and 
colleagues observed that the presence of a cognitive aid for malignant hyperthermia 
management led to changes in coordination patterns and was associated with better 
team performance (5). The coordination patterns included the type and function of 
information that was shared. The study suggested that focusing on task coordination 
rather than recurrent assessment of the situation led to poorer performance. However, 
this study was a retrospective observational study in which participants were allowed 
to use either the Malignant Hyperthermia Association of the United States (MHAUS) 
cognitive aid, their own electronic devices, or no cognitive aid (7). In a later study 
Burden et al observed a decrease in communication levels when a cognitive aid was 
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present; however, it is not clear if this reflected a shared mental model or distraction 
within the team (6). 
A more recent study demonstrated improved individual non-technical skills and a 
reduction in conflict when a cognitive aid was provided and used (8). The authors of 
the study speculated that this was because the cognitive aid reduced the cognitive load 
on the clinician leading the team, allowing them to pay more attention to team aspects 
rather than remembering the priority of tasks. 
The design of cognitive aids has been given little attention in the medical literature 
(1). It is possible that when cognitive aids fail to improve performance, the design 
may have been a factor. Design failures may promote errors (9, 10), make the use of 
aids problematic (4), or discourage aid use (11). When evaluating a cognitive aid it is 
important to ensure the design will prompt the users to perform the required tasks 
without producing omissions or errors (1). 
Flowcharts, or decision trees with multiple branches depending on the clinical 
situation, are common in health care settings; however, it is not clear if non-linear 
designs of these kinds are the best way to represent information for use in an 
emergency. They may be confusing, difficult to follow, and lead to more errors (12).  
In addition, they may potentially require more cognitive and team resources than 
otherwise necessary during a crisis. An example of a complex flowchart is the 
American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) difficult airway algorithm (13) which 
has multiple options that may be challenging to enact during a clinical crisis. 
Guidelines for the management of perioperative severe allergic reactions have 
recently been developed by the Australian and New Zealand Anaesthetic Allergy 
Group (ANZAAG) (14). These guidelines reflect current best practice, but are 
complicated with many steps to perform. The detailed guidelines were designed as a 
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set of four cards representing 1) Diagnosis; 2) Immediate Management; 3) Refractory 
Management and 4) Post-event Management. Two cards (Immediate Management 
and Refractory Management) were specifically designed for use during a crisis and 
two designs were developed; linear and a branched flowchart versions for both cards. 
To date, no version of the cards has been empirically evaluated. Accordingly, the 
aims of undertaking the present study were as follows.  
1) To compare the effect of two designs of cognitive aid (linear or branched) versus 
no cognitive aid on aspects of team function during a simulated intraoperative 
anaphylaxis emergency. 
2) To determine the effect of the two cognitive aids on task completion, omissions 
and dangerous actions such as incorrect medication doses during the simulated 
emergencies. 
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Methods 
Ethics approval for this multicenter repeated measures trial was obtained from 
Monash Health, Hunter New England and University of Queensland human research 
ethics committees (approval numbers 12228L, LNR/12/HNE/380 and 2014000724 
respectively). 
The 72 participants were members of anesthesia teams from three healthcare 
organizations (Monash Health and Peninsula Health in Victoria, and Hunter New 
England Health in New South Wales, Australia). Each study team of three consisted 
of an anesthesiologist or anesthesia fellow, an anesthesia resident and an anesthetic 
assistant. The make-up of the team reflected the actual role composition of anesthesia 
teams commonly found in each organization. Each team member provided written 
informed consent. 
The scenarios were performed at two simulation centers using anesthesia 
machines similar to those used in the participants’ clinical areas. The ‘patient’ was a 
Laerdal SimMan® 3G mannequin (Stavanger, Norway) with the integrated monitor 
replacing the usual vital signs monitor. All the regular equipment, medications and 
intravenous fluids were available to the participants and they were oriented to the 
location of the equipment and to the mannequin for a period of 30 minutes prior to the 
scenarios. Also preceding the scenarios, participants were introduced to the new 
guidelines and the cognitive aids they would be using during the scenarios during a 
further 30-minute presentation. 
A sign stating that no cognitive aid was available or a box containing one of two 
cognitive aid designs was placed outside the operating room, depending on the 
condition a team was about to experience. The two designs were either linear (Figure 
1) or branched versions (Figure 2) of the immediate and refractory management cards. 
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The linear and branched designs represented the same information on the ‘Immediate 
management’ and ‘Refractory Management’ cards, but the same checklist-style 
design for the two other cards (‘Diagnostic’ and ‘Post Emergency Management’) 
included in the box. The format and wording were kept as similar as possible but due 
to space and font size constraints a few changes were made. A subcommittee of the 
Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA) endorsed the 
designs, color scheme, wording and content. Additional information was provided in 
the box with the aid as suggested on the ANZAAG website: Hospital infusion 
protocols; referral forms for allergy testing center; a letter and information booklet for 
patients and pathology tubes and forms for mast cell tryptase measurement. This 
additional information was not provided to the team when the cognitive aid was not 
provided, but was available on request. 
Each team of three participants undertook three scenarios. The first scenario 
presented (appendix 1a) was always a severe allergic reaction on induction of 
anesthesia. The second and third scenarios (appendix 1b and 1c) were reactions to a 
colloid intravenous fluid with refractory hypotension, and reactions to a chlorhexidine 
impregnated central line with refractory bronchospasm. The orders of the second two 
scenarios and of the three cognitive aid conditions across all three scenarios were 
counterbalanced across teams using a study design based on Latin squares (15).  The 
counterbalancing resulted in 12 unique sequences of scenarios and cognitive aids, The 
set of 12 sequences was repeated, to arrive at 24 instances of sequences. The order in 
which the 24 participating teams were assigned to one of the 24 sequences was 
randomized.  
Audiovisual recordings were taken of the scenarios and of the debriefing at the 
conclusion of the three scenarios for later analysis. Two specialist anesthesiologists 
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(SM and HK) analyzed the video data following 2 hours of rater reliability training. 
Rater reliability was maintained by intermittent discussion initially after every 
scenario, and then up to every six scenarios. Team performance was assessed using 
the Auckland team score using the mean of element scores of the three categories 
‘Leadership and Team Coordination’ (LTC), ‘Mutual Performance Monitoring’ 
(MPM) and ‘Verbalizing Situational Information’ (VSI) and the value for the ‘Team 
Overall Behavioral Performance’ (TOBP) score (16). The Auckland team score was 
chosen because it is the most rigorously validated method of scoring entire teams 
during emergency situations. The times from the start of the allergic reaction (as 
indicated by a change in the capnography trace or systolic hypotension below 
100mmHg) to key behaviors were measured. The dose and route of epinephrine and 
any dangerous behaviors were also noted. 
All statistical analyses were undertaken using SPSS® version 20 (IBM). Repeated 
measures ANOVA tests with the within-subjects factor of cognitive aid conditions 
and the between-subjects factor of counterbalancing sequence were performed for the 
Auckland team scores and for the number of key actions taken. The ANOVA tests of 
team scores were also performed for just the teams that used the cognitive aid 
whenever it was provided. The latter analyses were undertaken to determine the effect 
on performance of using cognitive aids as they were designed, rather than the effect of 
merely having them available to a team. In all ANOVA tests Mauchley’s test of 
sphericity was performed on the repeated measures, and a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used where needed. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were made using 
Tukey HSD tests. 
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Fisher-Halton Exact tests were used to evaluate associations between whether 
teams completed key actions and (1) cognitive aid condition and (2) use or otherwise 
of a reader. A Bonferroni correction was applied to the Type I error rate (α). 
Times to perform key actions were transformed into normally distributed data using 
logarithmic functions, and ANOVA tests were then applied with factors of cognitive 
aid condition and counterbalancing order.  
Power calculations based on scoring of a similar pilot study of medical student 
teams suggested that with a repeated measures design, 24 teams would be required to 
observe a mean improvement of 50% for each measure (effect size f=0.4, α=0.05, 1-β 
=0.99). 
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Results 
A total of 24 teams of three participants per team were recruited from three health 
care organizations (Table 1). Due to availability, teams were not equally sampled 
from each organization. In six cases the team comprised of a senior trainee, e.g. 
anesthesia fellow, a junior resident and anesthetic nurse rather than an attending 
anesthesiologist, trainee and anesthetic nurse. Over half of the participants had 
previously treated a case of anaphylaxis (n=39, 54.2%) and a majority stated they 
would use a cognitive aid for anaphylaxis management if it were available (n=65, 
90.2%). 
Effect of cognitive aid on team scores  
The presence of the linear design of cognitive aid was associated with higher team 
performance scores for LTC, VSI, and TOBP compared to no cognitive aid, but not 
for MPM (Table 2). The presence of the branched design of cognitive aid was 
associated with higher VSI scores compared to no cognitive aid, but not for LTC, 
TOBP, or MPM. Pairwise comparisons between the linear and branched designs 
revealed no significant differences for any team performance score. Additionally, 
there were no significant effects of the order of cognitive aid presentation on LTC, 
MPM, VSI or TOBP scores. The only significant interaction with order was that when 
the branching design was encountered in the first scenario, the VSI score was 
especially low (F (4,42)=3.96, p=0.008). 
The cognitive aid was either not used at all, or was not read aloud to other team 
members, in 9 of the 72 scenarios observed. Further exploratory analyses were 
performed including only the 15 teams that had actively used the cognitive aids in 
both scenarios in which the aid was available. Teams were included if they used the 
cognitive aid and at some stage had a team member that verbalized the contents of the 
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aid in both the scenarios when a cognitive aid was provided. These analyses showed 
that the linear aid supported better team performance than did either the branching aid 
or no aid (Table 3). As in the initial analysis, there were no significant interactions 
between team scores across different orders of cognitive aid presentation. 
Effect of cognitive aid on technical performance 
Associations were sought between the type of cognitive aid, use of a reader of the 
cognitive aid, and the number of teams that did versus did not complete critical 
technical tasks. There were no associations between the type of cognitive aid provided 
and the completion of critical tasks (Table 4). However, a trend was found associating 
the use of a reader of the cognitive aid with the likelihood of calling for help. There 
were no associations between the total numbers of critical actions performed (listed in 
Table 4, but excluding the identification of the trigger because this was required in 
only two scenarios) and the presence of a cognitive aid, or with the order of 
presentation of the cognitive aid or scenario. In addition, no associations were found 
between cognitive aid condition and the time taken to perform critical tasks (Table 5). 
There was a trend towards higher numbers of critical actions being completed when a 
cognitive aid was used (F (2,24)=2.88, p=0.076) (Table 6). 
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Discussion 
This study demonstrates that the presence of a cognitive aid has positive 
associations with indices of the LTC, VSI and TOBP team performance measures, 
whereas scores of MPM by team members do not seem to be affected by the presence 
of cognitive aids. Furthermore, the associations were seen when the cognitive aid was 
used in the intended manner, with one team member reading the information from the 
aid to the rest of the team. The associations were largely independent of the order of 
the presentation of cognitive aids, suggesting that the results cannot be explained by a 
learning effect from undertaking the series of scenarios. 
This study also tested the assertion that the mere availability of the aid is not 
sufficient and that the design and method of use are important. The groups that 
consistently used the aid by assigning a reader always had numerically higher team 
scores when using the linear design than did the groups that did not consistently use 
the aid by assigning a reader. This has important implications for the design, testing, 
and implementation of future cognitive aids for emergencies. 
A previous study of cognitive aids on teams suggested that the amount of 
communication is reduced when an aid is present (6). Our study did not measure the 
volume of communication but showed that leadership and coordination was enhanced 
even if that communication was reduced. Indeed, the higher scores on the VSI team 
performance category suggest that sharing of relevant information may in fact be 
increased when a cognitive aid is used. This observation is in keeping with the 
findings of Manser et al. that the volume of information management was higher both 
in teams that were more effective and in teams that used a cognitive aid (5). The 
teams that performed better in Manser et al.’s observational study had a rapid and 
explicit task distribution, resulting in less communication after the initial stage of the 
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crisis. The present study measured the perceived effectiveness rather than the number 
of communication episodes over time and so the impact of a cognitive aid on the 
amount of communication was not tested. 
The ability of team members to monitor each other’s activities, termed ‘mutual 
performance monitoring’, was not significantly affected by the cognitive aid in our 
study. Previous research has suggested that the indication of potential errors or 
omissions by team members and responses to those challenges are key actions of 
highly performing teams (17). It may be that cognitive aids do not assist with mutual 
performance monitoring or that the content or design in this study did not prompt 
these behaviors. A different design of the cognitive aid or different scenarios may be 
required to prompt mutual performance monitoring. A different design could 
specifically mention the expectation of the role of each team member during the 
emergency and could note common errors. Against this suggestion, however, is the 
potential risk that a more prescriptive cognitive aid might limit flexibility and 
communication during the emergency and therefore prevent adaptive coordination 
strategies (18). 
It was also demonstrated that the specific design of the cognitive aid might have an 
effect on team performance. Cognitive aids in the form of algorithms in anesthesia 
emergencies are commonly presented as branched flowcharts. Linear and branched 
versions of a cognitive aid are not the only method of presentation—smartphone 
applications and computer-based prompts are increasingly used—but a comparison of 
different versions has not been undertaken until now even in paper format. By 
analyzing results only for teams that used the cognitive aid as designed in both 
conditions, variance is reduced that may have been caused when teams did not use the 
aid or used it ineffectually. For the teams that used the cognitive aid as designed, there 
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was a trend towards the linear version of the aid being more effective than the 
branched version in improving verbalization of information during the crises. This 
poses a potential challenge to the common presentation of branched algorithms in 
clinical practice. Communication may be better with a linear aid than a branched aid 
because it is easier to navigate during an emergency or easier for a reader to 
summarize to the team. The linear design may facilitate the process of a reader calling 
out items and multiple team members responding. This method of use is termed a 
‘static sequential checklist with verification and confirmation’ and is thought to 
support team performance when there are multiple team members taking diverse roles 
(19). This finding warrants further investigation in a separate confirmatory study. 
Previous studies into team performance have focused on individual team members 
rather than examining the overall team. Two previous studies were insufficiently 
powered to detect changes in non-technical skills scores during simulated crises of 
neonatal resuscitation and systemic local anesthetic toxicity (4, 20). However, a 
recent study of simulated airway management crises showed strong associations 
between the use of the cognitive aid and higher non-technical skills scores of 
individuals (8). Some of the improvement in the team scores may be due to a 
reduction of cognitive load on the individuals because of a reduced need to remember 
the steps and tasks required during the emergency. Reducing cognitive load may give 
the participants more time to consider the team aspects of the emergency. 
The primary aim of this study was to examine the effect of the cognitive aids on 
team behaviors, with task completion being a secondary measure. The power of this 
study was not sufficient to determine which of the two cognitive aids or which 
method of aid use improved task completion. Many previous studies have shown the 
benefit of cognitive aids on technical performance (1). The present study indicated, 
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however, that teams using a reader of the cognitive aid tended to be more likely to call 
for help. This potential association should be tested in a more powerful confirmatory 
study. 
The results of this study are likely to be generalizable, at least within the Australian 
tertiary hospital context. Teams were sourced from three large teaching hospital 
networks in two Australian states and represented a wide range of anesthetic 
experience. The teams worked in combinations that are typical during their routine 
work. 
A weakness of this study was that teams were expecting to encounter serious 
anaphylactic reactions in all three scenarios and so were primed to perform well. The 
participants were given informed consent forms two weeks prior to the scenarios, and 
on arrival at the testing location were given a 30-minute tutorial on the anaphylaxis 
guidelines and familiarized to the cognitive aids that would be used during the testing. 
This prior knowledge may be the reason that the effects of the aid on technical 
performance were minimal. The team members were equally primed to demonstrate 
good team performance behaviors, yet team performance was still improved when the 
cognitive aids were used. It may be that larger effects would be seen in teams that are 
not primed, as would be the case in routine clinical settings.  
A limitation of simulation-based studies is the learning effect of undertaking 
multiple scenarios. The participants received a detailed familiarization to the 
simulation room, the anesthesia machine and the mannequin prior to testing. This was 
done partly to reduce the likelihood of improving by merely learning where 
equipment was kept and how to work the equipment, and also to make the participants 
comfortable in the environment. The learning effect of subsequent scenarios was 
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controlled for by the counterbalanced, within-subjects design and appears to have had 
no effect or only a small effect on the teams’ performance.  
This study used a paper-based presentation of a cognitive aid. However, given the 
availability of mobile technology and a culture of instant access to information, future 
studies in the use of cognitive aids during emergencies will need to compare paper 
based formats to electronic checklists that may be integrated with the clinical monitor. 
In conclusion, this multicenter trial shows that the presence and design of a 
cognitive aid for use during an intraoperative anaphylaxis improves team 
coordination, communication, and overall performance. Technical performance was 
not affected by the presence of the aid. New cognitive aids should be tested before 
widespread clinical introduction to ensure they support team activities and do not lead 
to distraction, omissions, or increased numbers of errors. 
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Figure Legends: 
Figure 1 
The linear version of the immediate (1a) and refractory (1b) management cards 
Figure 2 
The branched version of the immediate (2a) and refractory (2b) management cards 
 
 
  




Table 1. Participant characteristics (n=72) 
Characteristic Frequency (%)  
Organization 
1 
2 
3 
 
21 (29.2) 
24 (33.3) 
27 (37.5) 
 
Role 
 
Attending Anesthesiologist 
Trainee (Resident) Anesthesiologist 
Anesthetic nurse / assistant 
 
 
18 (25.0) 
30 (33.3) 
24 (58.3) 
Median duration in current role 
(Range) 
7.0 years (0.9 – 30.0 years) 
3.0 years (0.2 – 13.0 years) 
5.0 years (1.0 – 23.0 years) 
“Have you ever treated a case of 
anaphylaxis?” 
Yes 
No 
 
 
33 (45.8) 
39 (54.2) 
Median duration since last 
anaphylaxis case (Range) 
1 year (4 weeks – 35 years) 
If a cognitive aid / algorithm were readily 
available for the management of 
anaphylaxis do you think you would use 
it? 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
 
65 (90.3) 
5 (6.9) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Within-subjects effects of presence and type of cognitive aid on team 
scores (n=24 teams). 
 
Measure Mean (SEM) F obtained Significance 
Leadership and Team Coordination (LTC)*  
No cognitive aid 5.120 (0.167) 
4.300 p=0.020 Linear cognitive aid 5.519 (0.196) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.375 (0.191) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.013 
p=0.057 
p=0.310 
Mutual Performance Monitoring (MPM)  
No cognitive aid 5.122 (0.173) 
2.093 p=0.136 Linear cognitive aid 5.493 (0.222) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.455 (0.183) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.074 
p=0.046 
p=0.874 
Verbalizing Situational Information (VSI)**  
No cognitive aid 5.035 (0.161) 
7.639 p=0.001 Linear cognitive aid 5.568 (0.197) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.406 (0.190) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.001 
p=0.005 
p=0.322 
Total Overall Behavioral Performance (TOBP)*  
No cognitive aid 5.125 (0.176) 
4.822 
p=0.022 
(GreenhouseLinear cognitive aid 5.583 (0.207) 
Branched cognitive aid 
5.292 (0.215) 
-Geisser 
correction) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.005 
p=0.149 
p=0.126 
 
*Significant differences between No cognitive aid and Linear version of the aid 
only 
**Significant differences between No cognitive aid and Linear and Branched 
versions of the aid  
 
Table 3 Within-subjects effects of presence and type of cognitive aid for the subset 
of teams that used a reader for both designs of cognitive aid (n=15 teams). 
 
Measure Mean (SEM) F obtained Significance 
Leadership and Team Coordination (LTC)* 
No cognitive aid 5.439 (0.139) 
13.366 p<0.001 Linear cognitive aid 6.061 (0.154) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.857 (0.160) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p<0.001 
p=0.006 
p=0.127 
Mutual Performance Monitoring (MPM) 
No cognitive aid 5.576 (0.145) 
2.059 p=0.149 Linear cognitive aid 6.111 (0.250) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.700 (0.211) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.083 
p=0.609 
p=0.202 
Verbalizing Situational Information (VSI)* 
No cognitive aid 5.280 (0.215) 
14.315 p<0.001 Linear cognitive aid 6.121 (0.175) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.764 (0.208) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p<0.001 
p=0.004 
p=0.061 
Total Overall Behavioral Performance (TOBP)** 
No cognitive aid 5.625 (0.137) 
5.771 p=0.009  
Linear cognitive aid 6.222 (0.175) 
Branched cognitive aid 5.708 (0.212) 
Pairwise comparisons No aid vs linear aid 
No aid vs branched  
Linear vs branched 
 
p=0.009 
p=0.592 
p=0.039 
 
*Significant differences between No cognitive aid and Linear and Branched 
versions of the aid (p<0.001) 
** Significant differences between No cognitive aid and Linear and between Linear 
and Branched versions of the aid  
Table 4 Associations between cognitive aid type or method of aid use with 
completion of 10 critical tasks.  
Critical task Condition No. of teams 
observed 
Critical task 
performed 
Significance of 
Fisher-Halton 
Exact Test Yes (%) No 
Call For Help 
No cognitive aid 24 20 (83.3) 4 
p=0.903 Linear aid 24 21 (87.5) 3 
Branched aid 24 22 (91.7) 2 
No cognitive aid 24 20 (83.3) 4 
p=0.007 Aid but no reader 11 7 (63.6) 4 
Aid used with reader 37 36 (97.3) 1 
Inspired oxygen 
increased 
No cognitive aid 24 23 (95.8) 1 
p=0.536 Linear aid 23 21 (91.3) 2 
Branched aid 23 23 (100) 0 
No cognitive aid 24 23 (95.8) 2 
p=0.027 Aid but no reader 11 9 (81.8) 4 
Aid used with reader 35 35 (100) 0 
Volatile agent 
reduced 
No cognitive aid 24 22 (91.7) 2 
p=0.154 Linear aid 24 20 (83.3) 4 
Branched aid 24 24 (100) 0 
No cognitive aid 24 22 (91.7) 2 
p=0.043 Aid but no reader 11 8 (72.7) 3 
Aid used with reader 37 36 (97.3) 1 
Correct initial 
Epinephrine dose 
given 
No cognitive aid 24 22 (91.7) 2 
p=0.768 Linear aid 24 24 (100) 0 
Branched aid 24 23 (95.8) 1 
No cognitive aid 24 22 (91.7) 2 
p=0.144 Aid but no reader 11 10 (90.9) 1 
Aid used with reader 37 37 (100) 0 
Incorrect 
Epinephrine 
doses given 
No cognitive aid 24 2 (8.3) 22 
p=1.000 Linear aid 24 2 (8.3) 22 
Branched aid 24 2 (8.3) 22 
No cognitive aid 24 2 (8.3) 22 
p=0.293  Aid but no reader 11 2 (18.2) 9 
 Aid used with reader 37 2 (5.4) 35 
Triggering agent 
identified 
(scenarios 2 and 
3 only) 
No cognitive aid 15 13 (86.7) 2 
p=0.671 Linear aid (n=16) 16 15 (93.8) 1 
Branched aid 24 13 (51.2) 11 
No cognitive aid 15 13 (86.7) 2 
p=1.000 Aid but no reader 3 3 (100) 0 
Aid used with reader 29 25 (86.2) 4 
Epinephrine 
infusion started 
No cognitive aid 24 11 (45.8) 13 
p=1.000 Linear aid 24 12 (50.0) 12 
Branched aid 24 12 (50.0) 12 
No cognitive aid 24 11 (45.8) 13 
p=0.054 Aid but no reader 11 2 (18.2) 9 
Aid used with reader 37 22 (59.5) 15 
Norepinephrine 
infusion started 
No cognitive aid 24 4 (16.7) 20 
p=0.370 Linear aid 24 4 (16.7) 20 
Branched aid 24 1 (4.2) 23 
No cognitive aid 24 4 (16.7) 20 
p=0.439 Aid but no reader 11 2 (18.2) 9 
Aid used with reader 37 3 (8.1) 34 
Intravenous 
Salbutamol given 
No cognitive aid 24 7 (29.2) 17 
p=0.950 Linear aid 24 9 (37.5) 15 
Branched aid 24 8 (33.3) 16 
No cognitive aid 24 7 (29.2) 17 
p=0.105 Aid but no reader 11 1 (9.1) 10 
Aid used with reader 37 16 (43.2) 21 
Potentially 
dangerous action 
observed 
No cognitive aid 24 5 (20.8) 19 
p=1.000 Linear aid 24 5 (20.8) 19 
Branched aid 24 4 (16.7) 20 
No cognitive aid 24 5 (20.8) 19 
p=0.844 Aid but no reader 11 1 (9.1) 10 
Aid used with reader 37 8 (21.6) 29 
 
Findings are considered significant at α<0.005 in a Bonferroni correction that 
accounts for the 10 measures tested with each condition breakdown 
 
Table 5. Within subjects effects of presence and type of cognitive aid on times to 
perform critical actions. ANOVA test results are after natural log transformation to 
normal distribution. No significant interactions were found between cognitive aid 
condition and either the order of presentation of the cognitive aids or scenarios. 
Number of observations relate to repeated measures when the same team completed 
the action in all three scenarios. 
 
Action Mean time in 
seconds (SEM) 
F obtained Significance 
Time to call for help (n=18)    
No cognitive aid 128.50 (23.14) 
0.130 p=0.878 Linear cognitive aid 118.79 (16.11) 
Branched cognitive aid 125.00 (26.71) 
Time to give first dose Epinephrine (n=24)   
No cognitive aid 157.00 (14.77) 
0.139 p=0.871 Linear cognitive aid 169.00 (18.59) 
Branched cognitive aid 164.25 (15.43) 
Time to increase inspired oxygen (n=19)   
No cognitive aid 103.09 (37.63) 
1.405 p=0.261 Linear cognitive aid 76.04 (29.89) 
Branched cognitive aid 111.55 (23.68) 
Time to reduce volatile agent (n=19)   
No cognitive aid 110.67 (28.17) 
1.282 p=0.291  Linear cognitive aid 110.56 (30.83) 
Branched cognitive aid 143.11 (28.94) 
    
 
 
Table 6. Within-subjects effects of cognitive aid type on mean number of the ten 
critical actions (listed in Table 4) that were performed. No significant interactions 
were found between cognitive aid condition and either the order of presentation of the 
cognitive aids or scenarios (n=15). 
Condition Mean number of critical 
actions out of 10 (SEM) 
F Significance 
No cognitive aid 6.347 (0.203) 
2.879 p=0.076 Linear cognitive aid 7.014 (0.287) 
Branched cognitive aid 7.028 (0.274) 
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Appendix 1 Simulation scenarios used for testing 
Appendix 1a Induction scenario 
Major Problem 
 
Intraoperative anaphylaxis on induction 
 
Narrative Description 
  
A 54 year old female for a right hemicolectomy for a cecal 
tumor develops a life threatening allergic response on 
induction. The scenario is terminated after an epinephrine 
infusion has commenced or 3 doses of epinephrine have 
been given. 
Staffing 
 
Simulator Team 
A faculty member acting 
as a surgeon is available if 
called, console operator and 
debriefer present in control 
room 
Participants 
2 Anesthesiologists 
1 Anesthesia nurse 
Case Briefing 
 
 
 
All Participants 
You have just prepared a 54 year-old lady for a right 
hemicolectomy with the insertion of a 16G peripheral line, 
central line and arterial line. The surgeon has just gone to the 
tea room and is ready to start.  
You will enter the room and induce the patient. 
She has no previous health issues, has a normal airway 
(TMD 6.5cm, good neck extension and mouth opening MP 2) 
She does not take any medication and has no known 
allergies. 
Her Hb is 13.2, Na 140, K 4.7 Creat 65. 
She has refused an epidural, but wishes to proceed with a 
GA and PCA for post operative analgesia 
Simulator Set Up 
Mannequin Preparation 
3G mannequin with female wig, genitals and hospital gown. 
Arterial, central and peripheral lines in place.   
Monitor connected with CVP and Arterial line traces 
Room Set Up Normal theater set up 
Drugs drawn up: Propofol (20ml), Morphine (10ml), Fentanyl 
(10ml), Atracurium (5ml red barrel) 
Simulator Operation Initially HR 80/min SR, BP 140/80, SpO2 99% 
After induction HR 140/min SR, BP 70/30 SpO2 94% 
(Assuming 100% O2) Only improves with epinephrine – no 
response to Metaraminol or similar 
Props Needed Surgical drapes and instruments 
 
 
Appendix 1b Colloid trigger / refractory cardiovascular scenario 
Major Problem 
 
Intraoperative anaphylaxis to colloid (CVS) 
 
Narrative Description 
  
A 54 year old female for a right hemicolectomy for a cecal 
tumor develops a life threatening allergic response shortly 
after induction. The scenario is terminated after epinephrine 
has been given, the iv colloid infusion ceased and at least 
1000mls of fluid have been given. 
Staffing 
 
Simulator Team 
A faculty member acting as a 
surgeon is available if called, 
console operator and 
debriefer present in control 
Participants 
2 Anesthesiologists 
1 Anesthesia nurse 
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room 
Case Briefing 
 
 
 
All Participants 
You have just induced a 54 year-old lady for a right 
hemicolectomy as per the previous scenario. As previously 
she has a 16G peripheral line, central line and arterial line. 
The surgeon been called to start.  
You will enter the room shortly after the patient has been 
induced. 
She has no previous health issues, has a normal airway 
(TMD 6.5cm, good neck extension and mouth opening MP 2) 
She does not take any medication and has no known 
allergies. 
Her Hb is 13.2, Na 140, K 4.7 Creat 65. 
She has refused an epidural, but wishes to proceed with a 
GA and PCA for post operative analgesia 
Simulator Set Up 
Mannequin Preparation 
3G mannequin with female wig, genitals and hospital gown. 
Arterial, central and peripheral lines in place.   
Monitor connected with CVP and Arterial line traces 
Room Set Up Normal theater set up 
Drugs drawn up: Propofol (remainder from 1st scenario), 
Morphine (remainder from 1st scenario), Fentanyl (remainder 
from 1st scenario), Atracurium (remainder from 1st scenario) 
Simulator Operation Initially HR 80/min SR, BP 140/80, SpO2 99% 
After induction HR 140/min SR, BP 70/30 SpO2 94% 
(Assuming 100% O2) Only improves with epinephrine – no 
response to Metaraminol or similar 
Props Needed Surgical drapes and instruments 
 
 
Appendix 1c Chlorhexidine central line trigger / refractory bronchospasm scenario 
Major Problem 
 
Intraoperative anaphylaxis to chlorhexidine CVC with 
refractory bronchospasm 
 
Narrative Description 
  
A 54 year old female for a right hemicolectomy for a cecal 
tumor develops a life threatening allergic response shortly 
after induction. The scenario is terminated after epinephrine 
has been given, the central line has been removed and a 
salbutamol bolus 100-200mcg given. 
Staffing 
 
Simulator Team 
A faculty member acting as a 
surgeon is available if called, 
console operator and 
debriefer present in control 
room 
Participants 
2 Anesthesiologists 
1 Anesthesia nurse 
Case Briefing 
 
 
 
All Participants 
You have just induced a 54 year-old lady for a right 
hemicolectomy as per the previous scenario. As previously 
she has a 16G peripheral line, central line and arterial line. 
The surgeon been called to start.  
You will enter the room shortly after the patient has been 
induced. 
She has no previous health issues, has a normal airway 
(TMD 6.5cm, good neck extension and mouth opening MP 2) 
She does not take any medication and has no known 
allergies. 
Her Hb is 13.2, Na 140, K 4.7 Creat 65. 
She has refused an epidural, but wishes to proceed with a 
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GA and PCA for post operative analgesia 
Simulator Set Up 
Mannequin Preparation 
3G mannequin with female wig, genitals and hospital gown. 
Arterial, central and peripheral lines in place.   
Monitor connected with CVP and Arterial line traces 
Room Set Up Normal theater set up 
Drugs drawn up: Propofol (remainder from 1st scenario), 
Morphine (remainder from 1st scenario), Fentanyl (remainder 
from 1st scenario), Atracurium (remainder from 1st scenario) 
Simulator Operation Initially HR 80/min SR, BP 140/80, SpO2 99% 
After induction HR 140/min SR, BP 70/30 SpO2 94% 
(Assuming 100% O2) Only improves with epinephrine – no 
response to Metaraminol or similar 
Props Needed Surgical drapes and instruments 
 
 
 
Appendices!
 
Appendix!A:!!
Keane, M., Marshall, S.D. (2010). Implementation of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist: Implications for 
Anaesthetists. Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, 38(2), 397-398. 
&255(6321'(1&(
$QDHVWKHVLDDQG,QWHQVLYH&DUH9RO1R0DUFK
,QWUDYHQRXVODEHWDOROLVDYDLODEOHLQ$XVWUDOLD
,Q $XVWUDOLD LQWUDYHQRXV ODEHWDORO LV DQ RUSKDQ
GUXJ ZLWK VSHFLILF DSSOLFDWLRQ WR WUHDWPHQW RI SUH
HFODPSVLD WKDW FOLQLFLDQVPD\ KDYH WKRXJKW ZDV QRW
DYDLODEOH+RZHYHULQWUDYHQRXVODEHWDOROLVDYDLODEOH
,W LV PDQXIDFWXUHG E\ 3KHEUD 6\GQH\ 16:
D 7KHUDSHXWLF *RRGV $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ DSSURYHG
SKDUPDFHXWLFDO PDQXIDFWXULQJ IDFLOLW\ DQG LW LV
SURYLGHGXQGHU6FKHGXOH$²VXEUHJXODWLRQ$
RIWKH7KHUDSHXWLF*RRGV$FWDQG5HJXODWLRQV
7UHDWPHQW RI VHYHUH K\SHUWHQVLRQ LQ SUHJQDQF\
GHILQHG DV D EORRG SUHVVXUH  PP+J LV
UHFRPPHQGHG WR UHGXFH PDWHUQDO PRUELGLW\ DQG
PRUWDOLW\ 2UDO GUXJV PD\ EH XVHG LQ ZRPHQ ZLWK
QRQOLIHWKUHDWHQLQJ K\SHUWHQVLRQ LQ SUHJQDQF\ EXW
LQWUDYHQRXVDJHQWVDUHIUHTXHQWO\UHTXLUHGLQZRPHQ
ZLWKVHYHUHK\SHUWHQVLRQHVSHFLDOO\ LQWKHVHWWLQJRI
SUHHFODPSVLDDQGDUHXVHGWRVWHDGLO\UHGXFHEORRG
SUHVVXUHRYHUPLQXWHV
,QWUDYHQRXV ODEHWDORO D QRQVHOHFWLYH
`DGUHQRFHSWRU DQWDJRQLVW ZLWK _DGUHQRFHSWRU
DQWDJRQLVPKDVQRWEHHQZLGHO\DYDLODEOHDQGWKXVWKH
VDIHVWFKRLFHRI LQWUDYHQRXVDJHQWVKDVEHHQ OLPLWHG
SULPDULO\ WR K\GUDOD]LQH ZLWK PLQLGRVH GLD]R[LGH
DOVR XVHG LQ VRPH VHWWLQJV 2WKHU DJHQWV VXFK DV
VRGLXP QLWURSUXVVLGH JO\FHU\O WULQLWUDWH FORQLGLQH
DQGSUD]RVLQKDYHEHHQXVHGEXWWKHLUXQIDYRXUDEOH
VLGHHIIHFW SURILOH OLPLWV WKHLU FOLQLFDO XVHIXOQHVV
5HIUDFWRU\ K\SHUWHQVLRQ KDV EHHQ GLIILFXOW WR WUHDW
VDIHO\DQGHIIHFWLYHO\
(OVHZKHUH LQ WKHZRUOG LQWUDYHQRXV ODEHWDORO KDV
EHHQ DYDLODEOH IRUPDQ\ \HDUV DQG LV RIWHQ WKH ILUVW
OLQHRIWUHDWPHQWRIVHYHUHK\SHUWHQVLRQLQSUHJQDQF\
PDLQO\EHFDXVHRILWVIDYRXUDEOHVLGHHIIHFWSURILOHRI
OHVVPDWHUQDOK\SRWHQVLRQDQGWDFK\FDUGLDFRPSDUHG
ZLWKK\GUDOD]LQHDQGRWKHUGUXJV,WLVJHQHUDOO\JLYHQ
DV DQ LQWUDYHQRXV EROXV RI  WR PJ WKHQ  WR
PJHYHU\WRPLQXWHVWRDPD[LPXPRI
PJ ,W PD\ EH JLYHQ DV DQ LQWUDYHQRXV LQIXVLRQ DW
 WR  PJPLQXWH /DEHWDORO LV FRQWUDLQGLFDWHG LQ
ZRPHQZLWKDVWKPDRUFDUGLDFIDLOXUH
8VHG DSSURSULDWHO\ ZLWK PRQLWRULQJ RI WKH
K\SHUWHQVLYH ZRPDQ DQG IRHWXV DQG D ORFDO GUXJ
SURWRFRO ZH FRQVLGHU WKDW LQWUDYHQRXV ODEHWDORO
UHSUHVHQWV D PDMRU VWHS IRUZDUG LQ WKH WUHDWPHQW
RI K\SHUWHQVLYH HPHUJHQFLHV LQ ZRPHQ ZLWK SUH
HFODPSVLD,WJLYHVWKHFOLQLFLDQDQRWKHUVDIHUDSLGO\
DFWLQJLQWUDYHQRXVGUXJWKDWPD\EHXVHGVHSDUDWHO\
RU LQ FRPELQDWLRQZLWK RWKHU GUXJV WR WUHDWZRPHQ
ZLWKVHYHUHK\SHUWHQVLRQLQSUHJQDQF\
$'(11,6
6:$/.(5
3'5,1.:$7(5
-&52:+8567
+HLGHOEHUJ9LFWRULD
5HIHUHQFHV
 /HZLV*7KH&RQILGHQWLDO(QTXLU\ LQWR0DWHUQDO DQG&KLOG
+HDOWK&(0$&+6DYLQJ0RWKHUV·/LYHVUHYLHZLQJPDWHUQDO
GHDWKV WR PDNH PRWKHUKRRG VDIHU   /RQGRQ
&(0$&+
 3RG\PRZ7$XJXVW38SGDWHRQWKHXVHRIDQWLK\SHUWHQVLYH
GUXJVLQSUHJQDQF\+\SHUWHQVLRQ
 /RZH 6$ %URZQ0$ 'HNNHU *$ *DWW 6 0F/LQWRFN &.
0F0DKRQ /3 HW DO *XLGHOLQHV IRU WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI
K\SHUWHQVLYHGLVRUGHUVRISUHJQDQF\$XVW1=-2EVWHW
*\QDHFRO
 'XOH\/+HQGHUVRQ6PDUW'-0HKHU6'UXJVIRUWUHDWPHQW
RI YHU\ KLJK EORRG SUHVVXUH GXULQJ SUHJQDQF\ &RFKUDQH
GDWDEDVHRIV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZV2QOLQH&'
 2EVWHWULF $QDHVWKHVLD 6FLHQWLILF (YLGHQFH :RUNLQJ 3DUW\
 $1=&$ )URP KWWSZZZDQ]FDHGXDXIHOORZVVLJ
REVWHWULFDQDHVWKHVLDVLJREVWHWULFDQDHVWKHVLDVFLHQWLILF
HYLGHQFH$FFHVVHG-XO\
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQLVDWLRQ
6XUJLFDO6DIHW\&KHFNOLVW,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU
DQDHVWKHWLVWV
7KH $XVWUDOLDQ DQG 1HZ =HDODQG &ROOHJH RI
$QDHVWKHWLVWV UHFHQWO\ HQGRUVHG WKH :RUOG +HDOWK
2UJDQL]DWLRQ·V 6XUJLFDO 6DIHW\ &KHFNOLVW 7KLV
ODXGDEOH DWWHPSW WR UHGXFH DGYHUVH HYHQWV GXULQJ
VXUJHU\KDVDOUHDG\GHPRQVWUDWHGDUHGXFWLRQLQ
PRUWDOLW\DQGDUHGXFWLRQLQFRPSOLFDWLRQVE\RYHUD
WKLUGLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPXOWLFHQWUHWULDO
'HVSLWH WKHVH HQFRXUDJLQJ UHVXOWVZH EHOLHYH WKH
XOWLPDWH VXFFHVVRI WKH FKHFNOLVWZLOO GHSHQG ODUJHO\
RQ KRZ LW LV LPSOHPHQWHG 7KH RSHUDWLQJ WKHDWUH
LV D FRPSOH[ VRFLDO DQG WHFKQLFDO HQYLURQPHQW
DQ\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ VXFK DV WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI
WKH FKHFNOLVW ZLOO SHUWXUE WKDW V\VWHP SHUKDSV LQ
XQLQWHQGHG DQG XQSUHGLFWDEOH ZD\V (IIHFWV RQ
KXPDQ SHUIRUPDQFH LQ SDUWLFXODU FDQ EH H[SHFWHG
IROORZLQJ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH FKHFNOLVW
VXFK DV FKDQJHV LQ FRJQLWLYH ORDG GLYLGHG DWWHQWLRQ
DQG SURVSHFWLYH PHPRU\ )RU H[DPSOH VLPLODU WR
PHGLFDWLRQ FKHFNLQJ DQ\ FKHFNPXVW EH FRPSOHWHG
ZLWK FRQVFLRXV HIIRUW UDWKHU WKDQ DV DQ DXWRPDWLF
VXSHUILFLDO WDVN 7KH VXJJHVWHG FKHFNV RI ¶WLPH
RXW· DQG ¶VLJQ RXW· DUH UHFRPPHQGHG WR RFFXU
GXULQJ RU LPPHGLDWHO\ IROORZLQJ LQGXFWLRQ DQG
GXULQJ HPHUJHQFH UHVSHFWLYHO\ $W WKHVH WLPHV WKH
DQDHVWKHWLVW PXVW GLYHUW KLV RU KHU DWWHQWLRQ IURP
WKH DQDHVWKHWLF WR SHUIRUP D VHSDUDWH LQGHSHQGHQW
FRJQLWLYH WDVN ZLWK LWHPV WKDW DUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\
UHODWHG WR WKH SULPDU\ WDVN0RUHRYHU WKHVH HYHQWV
RFFXU DW SUHFLVHO\ WKH WLPHV RI SHDN FRJQLWLYH ORDG
ZKHQ DWWHQGLQJ WR DQ DGGLWLRQDO XQUHODWHG WDVN DQG
PDLQWDLQLQJ YLJLODQFH KDYH EHHQ VKRZQ WR EH PRVW
GLIILFXOW ,Q RXU REVHUYDWLRQV RI WKH FXUUHQW ¶WLPH
RXW·SUDFWLFHDWDQXPEHURI9LFWRULDQKRVSLWDOV WKH
SURFHVV LV XVXDOO\ LQLWLDWHG DQG SHUIRUPHGSULPDULO\
E\WKHQXUVLQJVWDIIZLWKOLWWOHUHJDUGWRWKHUHDGLQHVV
RIWKHDQDHVWKHWLVW1RWXQFRPPRQO\WKHVXUJHRQKDV
 &255(6321'(1&(
$QDHVWKHVLDDQG,QWHQVLYH&DUH9RO1R0DUFK
PLQLPDO LQYROYHPHQWDQGIUHTXHQWO\ WKHVXUJHU\KDV
DOUHDG\VWDUWHG
7KH HWKRV EHKLQG WKH FKHFNOLVW KDV PXFK LQ
FRPPRQ ZLWK FKHFNOLVWV XVHG WR HQKDQFH DLUOLQH
VDIHW\ &RQYHUVHO\ ZLWKLQ WKH DLUOLQH LQGXVWU\ LW LV
UHFRJQLVHG WKDW GXULQJ FULWLFDO WLPHV RI IOLJKW LH
WDNHRII DQG ODQGLQJ WKH IOLJKW FUHZ VKRXOG EH
DWWHQGLQJRQO\WRWKHWDVNDWKDQG,QGHHGWKHFRQFHSW
RI ´VWHULOH FRPPXQLFDWLRQµ ZLWKLQ WKH FRFNSLW LV
HQVKULQHGLQ8QLWHG6WDWHV5HJXODWLRQV,QRUGHUWR
SUHYHQWFRJQLWLYHRYHUORDGDWWKHVHFULWLFDOWLPHVWKH
IOLJKWFUHZDUHQRWWREHGLVWXUEHGZLWKDQ\H[WUDQHRXV
WDVNVRUTXHVWLRQV
´1R IOLJKW FUHZPHPEHU PD\ HQJDJH LQ QRU PD\
DQ\ SLORW LQ FRPPDQG SHUPLW DQ\ DFWLYLW\ GXULQJ D
FULWLFDO SKDVH RI IOLJKW ZKLFK FRXOG GLVWUDFW DQ\ IOLJKW
FUHZPHPEHUIURPWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIKLVRUKHUGXWLHV
RU ZKLFK FRXOG LQWHUIHUH LQ DQ\ ZD\ ZLWK WKH SURSHU
FRQGXFWRIWKRVHGXWLHVµ
:HEHOLHYHDPRUHDSSURSULDWHWLPHWRSHUIRUPWKH
¶WLPHRXW·FKHFNOLVWZRXOGEHEHIRUHLQGXFWLRQ$WWKH
YHU\OHDVWWKHUHVKRXOGEHDIRUPDOFRQILUPDWLRQZLWK
WKHDQDHVWKHWLVWWKDWWKH\DUHDYDLODEOHWRSDUWLFLSDWH
7KH 6XUJLFDO 6DIHW\ &KHFNOLVW SUHVHQWV D PRVW
H[FLWLQJ RSSRUWXQLW\ WR LPSURYH WKH VDIHW\ RI RXU
SDWLHQW DQG DQDHVWKHWLVWV PXVW SOD\ D OHDGLQJ
UROH LQ LWV HIIHFWLYH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 1HYHUWKHOHVV
FDXWLRQ LV ZDUUDQWHG ZKHQ SODQQLQJ WKH WLPLQJ RI
WKLV LPSRUWDQW DGGLWLRQDO WDVN 8QLQWHQGHG DGYHUVH
HIIHFWV UHVXOWLQJ IURPDQDHVWKHWLVWV·GLVWUDFWLRQ IURP
SULPDU\DQDHVWKHWLFWDVNVPD\SDUDGR[LFDOO\WKUHDWHQ
SDWLHQW VDIHW\6XFFHVVIXO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQZRXOG VHH
DOO PHPEHUV RI WKH RSHUDWLQJ WKHDWUH WHDP UHDG\
HQJDJHGLQWKHSURFHVVDQGDEOHWRH[SUHVVDQ\VDIHW\
FRQFHUQVWKH\PD\KDYH
0-.($1(
6'0$56+$//
0HOERXUQH9LFWRULD
5HIHUHQFHV
 6XUJLFDO 6DIHW\ &KHFNOLVW 7KH $1=&$ %XOOHWLQ 6HSWHPEHU

 +D\QHV $% :HLVHU 7* %HUU\ :5 /LSVLW] 65 %UHL]DW
$+'HOOLQJHU(3HW DO$ VXUJLFDO VDIHW\ FKHFNOLVW WR UHGXFH
PRUELGLW\DQGPRUWDOLW\LQDJOREDOSRSXODWLRQ1(QJO-0HG

 2·&RQQHOO%&UDZIRUG67XOO$*DVNLQ&-1XUVHV·DWWLWXGHV
WRVLQJOHFKHFNLQJPHGLFDWLRQVEHIRUHDQGDIWHU LWVXVH ,QW-
1XUV3UDFW
 ,QVWLWXWH IRU 6DIH 0HGLFDWLRQ 3UDFWLFHV ,603 0HGLFDWLRQ
6DIHW\$OHUW7KHYLUWXHVRILQGHSHQGHQWGRXEOHFKHFNV²WKH\
UHDOO\DUHZRUWK\RXUWLPH$FXWH&DUH1HZVOHWWHU0DUFK
)URPZZZLVPSRUJQHZVOHWWHUVDFXWHFDUHDUWLFOHV
DVS
 :HLQJHU0%+HUQGRQ2: =RUQRZ0+ 3DXOXV03*DED
'0'DOOHQ/7$QREMHFWLYHPHWKRGRORJ\IRUWDVNDQDO\VLVDQG
ZRUNORDG DVVHVVPHQW LQ DQHVWKHVLD SURYLGHUV $QHVWKHVLRORJ\

 )HGHUDO $YLDWLRQ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ )OLJKW FUHZPHPEHU GXWLHV
&RGH RI )HGHUDO 5HJXODWLRQV $HURQDXWLFV DQG 6SDFH 3DUW
 2SHUDWLQJ5HTXLUHPHQWV6XESDUW7)OLJKW2SHUDWLRQV
6HF )URP ZZZULVLQJXSFRPIDUVLQIRSDUW
)$5VKWPO$FFHVVHG'HFHPEHU
$FHWD]RODPLGHDVDQDGMXQFWWRVRGLXPELFDUERQDWH
LQWKHWUHDWPHQWRIUKDEGRP\RO\VLV
,Q UKDEGRP\RO\VLV SUHFLSLWDWLRQ RI P\RJORELQ LV
HQKDQFHG LQ DQ DFLGLF HQYLURQPHQW FDXVLQJ UHQDO
G\VIXQFWLRQ %DVHG RQ RXU UHFHQW H[SHULHQFH ZH
ZRXOG OLNH WR SRVWXODWH DQ DGGLWLRQDO WUHDWPHQW WR
UDLVH XULQDU\ S+ $FHWD]RODPLGH LV DQ LQKLELWRU RI
FDUERQLF DQK\GUDVH DQG WKXV SURPRWHV DQ DONDOLQH
GLXUHVLV :H SUHVHQW D FDVH ZKHUH WKH XVH RI
DFHWD]RODPLGH DVVLVWHG LQ LQFUHDVLQJ XULQDU\ S+
ZKHUHVRGLXPELFDUERQDWHDORQHZDVLQDGHTXDWH
$\HDUROGZRPDQZDVDGPLWWHGWRWKHKRVSLWDO
IROORZLQJDQLEXSURIHQRYHUGRVH2QDGPLVVLRQWRWDO
FUHDWLQH NLQDVHZDV  ,8O LQ NHHSLQJZLWK WKH
FOLQLFDO SLFWXUH RI UKDEGRP\RO\VLV $ UHK\GUDWLRQ
VWUDWHJ\ZDV LQVWLWXWHGZLWK ODFWDWHG ULQJHUV VROXWLRQ
DQGDPDQQLWROLQIXVLRQZDVFRPPHQFHGWRPDLQWDLQ
GLXUHVLV 8ULQH S+ ZDV IRXQG WR EH  DQG VRGLXP
ELFDUERQDWH LQIXVLRQ  ZDV DGPLQLVWHUHG DW
POKRXUZLWKDQDLPWRLQFUHDVHXULQDU\S+WR
5HQDOIXQFWLRQGHWHULRUDWHGDQGWRWDOFUHDWLQHNLQDVH
URVH WR  ,8O GXULQJGD\ WZR8ULQHS+QHYHU
H[FHHGHGGXULQJWKLVSHULRGDQGDFHWD]RODPLGHZDV
VWDUWHG DW DGRVHRI PJHLJKWKRXUO\8ULQHS+
URVHWRIROORZLQJWKHILUVWGRVHDQGUHPDLQHGZLWKLQ
WKH UDQJH  WR  WKHUHDIWHU 8ULQH RXWSXW ZDV
PDLQWDLQHGWKURXJKRXWDQGE\GD\QLQHWRWDOFUHDWLQH
NLQDVHKDG IDOOHQ WR ,8/6KHGLGQRW UHTXLUH
UHQDO UHSODFHPHQW WKHUDS\ 7KHUH ZHUH QR DGYHUVH
HIIHFWVQRWHGGXULQJWKHWUHDWPHQWFRXUVH
:H WKHUHIRUH VXUPLVH WKDW LI DONDOLQLVLQJ WKH
XULQHGRHVLQIDFWUHGXFHWKHUDWHRISUHFLSLWDWLRQRI
P\RJORELQLQWKHUHQDOWXEXOHVDFHWD]RODPLGHPD\EH
XVHGHIIHFWLYHO\LQWKLVFOLQLFDOVFHQDULR
07+21'(%+$9,68%%$5$0$,$+
'6$36)25'
(%$1+$0+$//
%XU\6W(GPXQGV6XIIRON8QLWHG.LQJGRP
5HIHUHQFHV
 %RVFK;3RFK(*UDX-05KDEGRP\RO\VLVDQGDFXWHNLGQH\
LQMXU\1(QJO-0HG
 6XPPDU\ RI SURGXFW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV 'LDPR[ 7DEOHWV
PJ *ROGVKLHOG SOF )URP KWWSHPFPHGLFLQHVRUJXN
PHGLFLQH63&',$02;7DEOHWVPJ
$FFHVVHG'HFHPEHU
&DUGLRFLUFXODWRU\FROODSVHDIWHUDVLQJOHGRVHRI
VXVWDLQHGUHOHDVHYHUDSDPLOLQDFLUUKRWLFSDWLHQW
XVHIXOQHVVRIK\SHULQVXOLQDHPLDHXJO\FDHPLD
WKHUDS\
6HULRXV DGYHUVH HYHQWV PD\ RFFXU HYHQ DIWHU
WKHUDSHXWLFGRVHVRIFDOFLXPFKDQQHOEORFNHUV&&%
LQSDWLHQWVZKRDUHSDUWLFXODUO\DWULVN:HGHVFULEH
VXFKDFDVHVXFFHVVIXOO\WUHDWHGE\´ K\SHULQVXOLQDHPLD
HXJO\FDHPLDWKHUDS\µ
 Appendix!B:!!
Marshall S.D. (2014) Response to: The use of cognitive aid checklist leading to successful treatment of 
malignant hyperthermia in an infant undergoing craniosynostosis repair. Anesthesia and Analgesia 
118(6), 1388-1389. 
E LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
1388   www.anesthesia-analgesia.org ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA
In Response
It is gratifying to read Ranganathan et al.’s1 description of a 
successful team effort in managing a malignant hyperther-
mia emergency, attributed in part to the use of a cognitive 
aid. The authors have quite rightly identified that improved 
coordination and reduced reliance on memory are impor-
tant in enhancing the team’s performance with an aid.
However, it is currently unclear from the literature 
to what extent existing cognitive aids support or hinder 
effective team behavior.2 Factors such as the personnel 
available, time pressures, and noise during an anesthetic 
emergency must be taken into account in the design and 
implementation of new cognitive aids. Other key issues for 
consideration include how the aid is presented, the team’s 
familiarity with the aid, the team’s structure, and the ability 
to disseminate the information within the team.3
In the case described by Ranganathan et al.,1 it appears 
that the team used a “reader” of the cognitive aid. This strat-
egy has been suggested to enhance team performance by 
developing shared situation awareness and improved team 
communication.4
Clearly, it would be difficult and undesirable to test the 
designs and methods of use of cognitive aids on actual 
patients because of the risk of harm and the thankfully 
infrequent nature of these events. Immersive simulation 
studies using whole teams in actual or replicated clinical 
settings provide a potential solution and allow experimen-
tal control to test the appropriateness of design and method 
of use of cognitive aids. Nevertheless, reports of successful 
use are valuable sources of feedback and link these simula-
tion studies to clinical practice. 
Stuart D. Marshall, MB.ChB. M. HumanFact
Academic Board of Anesthesia and Perioperative Medicine
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Cognitive Engineering Research Group
School of Psychology
The University of Queensland
Emergency Manuals and Flight 1549
To the Editor
Goldhaber-Fiebert and Howard1 cite the successful outcome of U.S. Airways Flight 1549 that landed on the Hudson River as an example of the effective 
use of an emergency manual by the crew of that aircraft. 
I disagree. Yes, the “dual engine failure” checklist and the 
 emergency-landing checklist were surely consulted when 
both engines failed and could not be restarted. There is, 
however, no “recommended management action” in the 
emergency manual for where to crash-land an airplane. 
That lonely choice was the responsibility of the pilot in com-
mand, Captain Chesley Sullenberger.
In the case of Flight 1549, the passengers and crew 
aboard were fortunate to have an immensely experi-
enced pilot whose long commercial aviation career was 
preceded by service in the U.S. Air Force flying combat 
missions during the Vietnam War. It was his experi-
ence, judgment, flying skill, and intuition that made 
possible the successful outcome that occurred that day. 
In aviation, the mantra “aviate, navigate, communi-
cate” in response to sudden, adverse changes in conditions 
allows the pilot to direct attention to the most important 
issues first. In my institution, we have adapted this mantra 
to “call (for help), communicate (the problem), and delegate 
(tasks),” allowing the anesthesiologist to maintain focus on 
the patient.
Emergency manuals may prove their usefulness in 
anesthesia over time, but as Captain Sullenberger dem-
onstrated, good training, clinical experience, and com-
mitment to safety remain the core components of crisis 
management.
Conflicts of Interest: David Borshoff is the author of The 
Anesthetic Crisis Manual, North American Edition, Geoffrey 
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Had Captain Sullenberger attempted to reach another 
airport—he declined a suggestion to do so from air traf-
fic control—he may well have come up short, resulting 
in substantial loss of life and property. Instead, he turned 
toward the Hudson. That decision, along with the gray-
haired Sullenberger’s superior piloting skills, is what 
brought the passengers of Flight 1549 back to earth safely, 
not the use of an emergency manual. 
James Lee White, MD
Department of Anesthesiology
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia
jlw9s@virginia.edu 
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report then goes through in detail each checklist item that 
was appropriately executed, omitted items that would 
have been helpful but were too far down to get to, and 
suggested components of both checklist design as well 
as staff training that could further improve on effective 
checklist use during a critical event. The design improve-
ment section focuses on high-level if-then statements that 
they call “opt-outs” or “gates” that would quickly direct 
personnel to a more applicable checklist. For example, in 
this case, it may have been helpful for the dual engine 
failure checklist to say immediately “If altitude too low, 
go to…” At no point does the report suggest that team 
performance would be improved by not using checklists. 
In fact, Captain Sullenberger was the one to call for the 
QRH immediately after taking control of the aircraft, 
which the National Transportation Safety Board analy-
sis declared as an appropriate action: “The Engine Dual 
Failure checklist was the most applicable checklist con-
tained in the U.S. Airways QRH… the flight crew did not 
complete the Engine Dual Failure checklist, which had 3 
parts and was 3 pages long … This accident demonstrates 
that abnormal events, including a dual-engine failure, 
can occur at a low altitude and, therefore, that a checklist 
is clearly needed to address such situations.”5
More research is needed on how to optimally design, 
implement, and use emergency manuals clinically 
as well as to better understand the facilitators, barri-
ers, and limitations. The Stanford Emergency Manual 
(http://emergencymanual.stanford.edu), used effec-
tively in the reported malignant hyperthermia case,1 
was designed integrating many of the lessons from 
aviation and has undergone iterative testing in simu-
lated settings. Further resources and literature from 
many institutions can be found at the Emergency 
Manual Implementation Collaborative Web site (www.
emergencymanuals.org). Please join us by sharing your 
resources and experiences. 
Sara N. Goldhaber-Fiebert, MD
Department of Anesthesiology, Perioperative, 
and Pain Medicine
Stanford University School of Medicine
Stanford, California
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In Response
We congratulate Raganathan et al.1 for their effective clini-
cal use of an emergency manual in treating an episode of 
malignant hyperthermia. Based on their report, vital fac-
tors for institutional implementation supporting effective 
use during critical events included: (1) accessibility of the 
manual in each operating room, (2) familiarity and train-
ing, while not explicitly discussed, were implied and then 
confirmed by the corresponding author in a personal com-
munication, (3) roles included a reader, (4) culture that was 
supportive of cognitive aid use for the purpose of help-
ing the clinical team deliver optimal care, and (5) Crisis 
Resource Management or teamwork skills facilitating 
effective delivery of care.
Drs. Borshoff and White2,3 raise important points 
regarding explicit limitations of checklists for Flight 1549’s 
 dual-engine failure and, more generally, for many critical 
events in aviation or health care. As we described,4 we agree 
that even a well-designed cognitive aid is not helpful alone 
but rather in the context of other important skills including 
training, judgment, experience, and teamwork. Moreover, 
we agree that checklists may be distracting if design or 
use is not optimized, and that limitations include fixation 
on an incorrect algorithm. However, we have seen in real 
and simulated cases many more vital actions being omit-
ted and errors left uncorrected by teams not using cognitive 
aids than by teams using cognitive aids, albeit sometimes 
imperfectly. The use of checklists in health care compared 
with other high hazard industries is nascent, and there are 
many issues to consider and research during implementa-
tion. This all reinforces the need for training on why, how, 
and when to use emergency manuals.
Regarding the details of Flight 1549, we refer readers 
to the full National Transportation Safety Board report5 
and the discussion that “The first officer indicated that, 
because he had just completed training … he was able to 
promptly locate the procedure listed on the back cover 
of the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), turn to the 
appropriate page, and start executing the checklist.” The 
Brisbane, Australia
Monash Simulation
Monash Medical Centre
Melbourne, Australia
stumarshall@monashsimulation.com 
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Should cognitive aids be treated as medical devices? 
Stuart Marshall 
 
Cognitive aids are displayed prompts designed to help users complete a task or series 
of tasks (1). If seen as tools to help users’ performance, they could reasonably be 
conceptualised as medical devices. The development of medical devices their design 
processes and testing are expected to conform to the international standards for 
medical devices (2). 
A literature review was undertaken to discover the extent to which cognitive aids for 
anaesthetic emergencies conform to medical devices standards in terms of the content 
to achieve their intended goals, their design and training in their use (3).  
The majority of papers describing a cognitive aid show that great care is taken to 
ensure current best practices are adhered to. Unfortunately, little attention seems to be 
paid to the design or training in the cognitive aid. Usability specifications are often ill 
defined and testing in real world or simulated naturalistic settings are uncommon. 
Specifically, the devices are rarely tested in the team-based situations that most will 
be used in, with no evidence that cognitive aids improve team performance in 
simulated crises. 
Cognitive aids should be considered as medical devices. Processes of cognitive aid 
development should adhere to existing usability engineering principles related to 
medical devices. By treating cognitive aids in this way, it can reasonably assured that 
they are fit for the purpose for which they were intended. 
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Abstract
Background: The rapid response system (RRS) is a process of accessing help for health professionals when a
patient under their care becomes severely ill. Recent studies and meta-analyses show a reduction in cardiac arrests
by a one-third in hospitals that have introduced a rapid response team, although the effect on overall hospital
mortality is less clear. It has been suggested that the difficulty in establishing the benefit of the RRS has been due
to implementation difficulties and a reluctance of clinical staff to call for additional help. This assertion is supported
by the observation that patients continue to have poor outcomes in our institution despite an established RRS
being available. In many of these cases, the patient is often unstable for many hours or days without help being
sought. These poor outcomes are often discovered in an ad hoc fashion, and the real numbers of patients who
may benefit from the RRS is currently unknown. This study has been designed to answer three key questions to
improve the RRS: estimate the scope of the problem in terms of numbers of patients requiring activation of the
RRS; determine cognitive and socio-cultural barriers to calling the Rapid Response Team; and design and
implement solutions to address the effectiveness of the RRS.
Methods: The extent of the problem will be addressed by establishing the incidence of patients who meet
abnormal physiological criteria, as determined from a point prevalence investigation conducted across four
hospitals. Follow-up review will determine if these patients subsequently require intensive care unit or critical care
intervention. This study will be grounded in both cognitive and socio-cultural theoretical frameworks. The cognitive
model of situation awareness will be used to determine psychological barriers to RRS activation, and socio-cultural
models of interprofessional practice will be triangulated to inform further investigation. A multi-modal approach
will be taken using reviews of clinical notes, structured interviews, and focus groups. Interventions will be designed
using a human factors analysis approach. Ongoing surveillance of adverse outcomes and surveys of the safety
climate in the clinical areas piloting the interventions will occur before and after implementation.
Background
Patients that become critically unwell in a hospital ward
environment commonly exhibit a recognisable period of
abnormal physiological signs before they suffer a cardiac
arrest or other catastrophic event [1-6]. It has been
established that early intervention may halt their dete-
rioration and prevent a cardiac arrest or unplanned
intensive care unit (ICU) admission. The rapid response
system (RRS) is a process whereby health professionals
can promptly access help if a patient under their care
deteriorates and before they become critically ill to pre-
vent further instability. The type of assistance varies
depending on the setting, but typically the medical
emergency team (MET) that responds consists of
trained specialist staff members such as intensivists and
senior nurses.
Many studies [7-9] and a recent meta-analysis [10]
showed that the number of cardiac arrests in hospitals
can be reduced by the introduction of a RRS. The
MERIT study [11], the only multicentre prospective
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randomised study, initially showed no benefit. A recent
post hoc analysis of the MERIT data of both intervention
and control hospitals, however, demonstrated early
intervention using a RRS clearly reduces in-hospital car-
diac arrests and mortality [12].
The difficulty in establishing the effectiveness of RRSs
and METs has at least in part been due to the failure of
clinical staff to call for help early in all circumstances. A
review of critical incidents in our own institution, sug-
gested that a failure to call the MET was a common fac-
tor in a large proportion of cardiac arrests and
unplanned ICU admissions [13]. The reasons behind
this failure to call for help have not previously been
investigated.
Failure to activate the RRS
In order to help health professionals to identify when a
patient is becoming physiologically unstable, specific cri-
teria based on the vital signs are often fixed for use at
the point of care. Deviation outside of these physiologi-
cal criteria such as those listed in Table 1 represent a
state where the patient is thought to be at an increased
risk of further deterioration, or has a limited reserve to
cope with additional physiological insults [1].
It is currently unclear how many patients in a routine
ward environment would meet the abnormal physiologi-
cal criteria, or if they would progress to an unstable
state and benefit from activation of the RRS. Defining
the subgroup of patients who would probably have ben-
efitted from early intervention would allow the underly-
ing factors to be more readily investigated and
addressed by redesigning of the process and more tar-
geted education for the staff.
Several barriers have already been identified in the lit-
erature that prevent the initial implementation of a RRS;
failure to view errors as a product on the system rather
than individual mistakes, lack of data that METs are life
saving, professional control issues, effective education,
and financial pressures [14]. It is possible the barriers to
ongoing effectiveness are similar, but these have not
been identified in the literature. We hypothesise that
further barriers exist to prevent the staff members call-
ing for help. These involve both the individual health
professionals’ internal cognitive processes and cultural
expectations from the clinical context and professional
identities.
Theoretical framework
As noted above, no single theory is available to describe
why, when patients meet defined criteria, that the staff
members do not activate the RRS. We will employ theo-
retical triangulation [15] using theories from the cogni-
tive engineering model of situation awareness, and
sociologically informed models of inter-professional
practice [16] to aid further investigation (Figure 1). Both
of these theories will be applied in parallel to develop a
detailed understanding of the psychosocial process of
RRS activation.
Situation awareness
Situation awareness describes the gathering and under-
standing of cues in the environment leading to a projec-
tion of the possible future consequences [17]. In the
circumstance of a deteriorating patient, each health pro-
fessional makes his or her own assessment of the situa-
tion and decides on a resultant course of action,
perhaps in consultation with colleagues. The situation
awareness model has three distinct parts: perception,
comprehension, and projection.
Perception
Perception of the vital signs of a deteriorating patient
typically means that the observations have been taken
and transposed to the observation chart. If the patient
Table 1 Medical emergency team call criteria or triggers
Airway Respiratory Distress
Threatened Airway
Breathing Respiratory Rate > 30 breaths per minute
Respiratory Rate < 6 breaths per minute
Oxygen Saturation <90% on oxygen
Circulation Blood Pressure < 90 mmHg despite treatment
Pulse Rate > 130 beats per minute
Neurology Decreased level of consciousness
Fitting
Other Concerned
Need of treatment & prompt help
Figure 1 A theoretical framework describing the cognitive and
socio-cultural barriers to calling the Medical Emergency Team
(MET)
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is deemed to be unwell, these observations will usually
be repeated more frequently to ensure that a further
deterioration is not occurring and that treatment is
effective.
Comprehension
Comprehension of the meaning of the physiological
signs is also important. Specifically with the RRS, the
clinical staff must be able to recognise how the
patient’s observations relate to the triggering criteria.
A deeper level of comprehension of the patient’s phy-
siological state may occur with more experienced staff
members. This may lead to a recollection and com-
parison to past experiences of similar cases to guide
future decision making and information gathering
[18]
Projection of future state
The ability of the health professional to project the
future course of events is determined by an understand-
ing of the current state and their previous experiences
with similar situations. The rationale given for the clini-
cal staffs’ predictions may not always be obvious, even
to them. This ‘sixth sense’ of being able to project the
future state is often the result of cues that may not be
consciously recognised [19]. One of the advantages of
the RRS is that it removes the necessity of the clinical
staff to fully understand and diagnose the problem
before asking for help. If the health professional looking
after the patient is confident they know what the clinical
problem is, they may be able to troubleshoot the pro-
blem without requiring help. Conversely, if the health
professional is junior with only minimal experience, the
triggering criteria should trigger them to call for
assistance.
Sociological models of inter-professional practice
Even if the health professional realises the patient fulfils
the physiological criteria for activation of the RRS, there
may be socio-cultural and political barriers preventing
them from calling for help. These barriers may occur
between professional groups, within professional groups,
or as a result of a group identity existing such as within
a ward or specialty area.
Inter-professional barriers
Barriers may occur at an inter-professional level where
there are perceived to be differing levels of trust and
cooperation between professional groups [20]. The RRS
may be prevented from being activated by levels of dis-
trust between the emergency team attending and the
treating groups. Similarly, barriers may be occurring
because of the differing views and perceived role of the
RRS by nursing and medical staff.
Intra-professional barriers
Pre-existing pathways to activating the RRS may be
based in the culture of the profession [21]. It has been
established that nursing staff are more likely to activate
the RRS than medical staff [22]. This difference between
professional groups could be a result of cultural barriers
within the medical profession that have not previously
been identified.
Contextual and local cultural factors
Specific clinical areas of the institution may exhibit dif-
fering cultures about the role and function of the MET
and pathways to access help. These clinical areas are in
turn situated within the complexity of the character of
the institution itself. One of the many potential factors
that has already been identified in supporting a RRS is
whether the hospital has a teaching function [23]. Other
local cultural aspects have not been investigated, such as
the presence of implicit or explicit directions to seek
help from other sources before activating the RRS,
which may vary between clinical areas.
The experiences of individuals’ interpersonal interac-
tions during MET calls also may have a detrimental
effect on future optimal MET call behaviour amongst
staff. For example, the attitude of the MET call team on
their arrival may have a substantial effect on the culture
of the clinical area. If the team is negative and critical,
the ward staff may be reluctant to call for help on future
occasions, whereas a helpful team that supports and
educates the staff will encourage a positive attitude [24].
Aims of this study
The aims of the proposed study are threefold: to estab-
lish the scope of the problem; to examine the barriers to
calling the MET; and to pilot a redesign of the RRS to
improve its effectiveness.
Establishing the scope of the problem
First, we intend to determine the prevalence of patients
meeting the physiological criteria for activation of the
RRS at a number of hospitals. We will identify the num-
ber of patients who would have benefited from early
intervention but didn’t receive it. This will allow a
further measure to be developed: the ‘missed MET’,
which will be useful in examining the barriers to calling
the MET.
Examining the barriers to calling the MET
The reasons why the RRS was not activated by ward
staff will be determined using the theoretical framework
described in figure 1. Health professionals will be
approached from all groups involved in RRS activation,
from junior and senior medical and nursing staff, to
members of the MET themselves to ascertain the
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common reasons why help may not be called, or called
too late. Staff involved in successful and unsuccessful
rapid response events will be approached as well as
those involved in cases of ‘missed MET’.
Redesigning the MET system
In any knowledge translation activity, it is essential that
the end users of the knowledge are included to ensure that
the knowledge and its subsequent implementation are
relevant to their needs [25]. Once the scope and barriers
to the RRS are understood, we will pilot a redesign of the
RRS to increase its effectiveness. Evaluation of these inter-
ventions will be determined by repeat measurements from
the first two phases of the study (Figure 2).
Methods
Three related studies will be undertaken concurrently
with data collected before and after the design and
implementation of an intervention to address the issues
identified (Figure 2).
Point prevalence study
The prevalence of patients meeting the physiological cri-
teria for MET calls will be measured across four hospi-
tals of differing size and caseload over a 24-hour period.
These hospitals include an outer suburban 520 bed
acute hospital, a small 120 bed elective surgical and
oncology centre, a large metropolitan teaching hospital,
and an outer suburban community hospital. These four
hospitals comprise the majority of the acute care of a
health network with over 12,000 staff, 2,100 beds and
180,000 hospital admissions. A team of researchers will
examine the clinical notes of all adult in-patients that
are not being cared for in critical care areas (ICU, emer-
gency department, or operating theatres). The clinical
staff involved with those patients at the time the criteria
Figure 2 Overview of methods to be used
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were attained will be interviewed to determine why a
MET call had not been made. Data collected from these
structured interviews will be used due to the time con-
straints of the study and potential to interrupt clinical
work. The interview questions will be based on the the-
oretical framework given in Figure 1. All of the patients
identified will be followed up to discharge from hospital
to determine if the rate of adverse outcomes in patients
meeting the physiological criteria. Particular note will be
made to determine if any of these patients subsequently
became critically ill, require ICU admission or a cardiac
arrest call.
This point prevalence study will be the main study
determining the scope of the problem, and to define the
‘missed MET’ for future study. The data collected from
the interviews are expected to be sketchy in terms of
determining barriers to the MET call due to the limited
time available, but may inform the direction of later
phases.
Focus groups
Knowledge translation activities require an in-depth
understanding of the context of the user-groups such as:
In what formal or informal structures is the user group
embedded? What is the political climate surrounding
the user group? To whom is the user group accounta-
ble? Are changes expected in any of these? [26]. There-
fore, focus group interviews of nursing and medical staff
will be used to examine these socio-cultural mediating
factors that may influence calling for help using the
MET system. A minimum of ten focus group interviews
will be taken from representative individuals from the
four hospitals using criterion and maximum variation
sampling [15]. Participants will be sampled by profession
(nursing and medicine) and institution (hospital), and
stratified by level of experience within the nursing and
medical professions and by institutional location. The
participants own experience of the MET call system
along with aspects of professional, local, and organisa-
tional culture will be sought.
After transcription, themes will be identified from
both the focus groups and interviews of barriers to call-
ing of the MET. The Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
Culture (HSOPSC) [27] will be completed by all the
clinical staff on the pilot wards before and at three
months after the interventions have been introduced.
Differences between the responses before and after the
intervention on the pilot wards will be analysed using a
one-way repeated measures ANOVA.
Prospective audit
Analysis of all unplanned ICU admissions and cardiac
arrests will be performed over an eight-week period
before the intervention and an eight-week period three
months following implementation of the interventions
across all four hospitals in the study.
The clinical notes of all unplanned ICU admissions
and cardiac arrests will be examined for evidence of a
‘missed MET’ in the preceding hours or days. This will
determine if an early intervention may have prevented
the patient becoming critically ill. Clinical staff involved
in the care of a patient that has a ‘missed MET’ will be
interviewed using the same structured interview used in
the point prevalence study.
The prospective audit will further allow the barriers to
the MET call to be determined from actual cases.
Furthermore, the incidence of ‘missed MET’ will be able
to be determined.
Intervention design
Adapting knowledge to the local context is a crucial
component in the knowledge translation process [25].
Up to six common barriers identified from the point
prevalence, focus group, interview, and prospective case
methods will be determined. These barriers will be pre-
sented at a workshop consisting of up to twenty clinical
staff involved in the MET call process. Case studies will
be used to illustrate how the barriers contribute to
‘missed MET’ calls, and the participants in the workshop
will be asked to provide solutions. The potential solu-
tions will then be categorised using the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), and solu-
tions developed using the Human Factors Intervention
Matrix (HFIX) [28]. These potential solutions will be
rated in terms of feasibility, acceptability, cost effective-
ness, effectiveness, and sustainability. Up to five solu-
tions will be chosen, and be implemented as part of the
redesign process. The effects of each individual interven-
tion will not be assessed separately.
Six clinical areas will be chosen from the four hospital
sites to introduce the redesigned MET system. These six
areas will also have additional point prevalence surveys to
determine if the mechanism for dealing with the physiolo-
gically unstable patient has changed after introduction of
the new system. A further prospective audit will also be
used to assess the effectiveness of the redesigned solution.
Discussion
The care of the deteriorating patient is a priority for
most health services because it represents an area of
high clinical risk, such that there is a high likelihood of
an event occurring with the potential for a poor out-
come if a patient becomes critically ill. We hypothesise
that an effective MET system will minimise this risk by
reducing the occurrence of critical deterioration in ward
patients. Timely involvement of specialised clinicians
should prevent vital organ system collapse or cardiac
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arrest. The findings of this study will be important in
determining how often and what ways the MET call
‘safety net’ is used by the junior and senior nursing and
medical staff members. In addition, the study will give
an insight into why clinical staff fail to call for help
when it is needed, and what cognitive or socio-cultural
factors are the overriding factors in this. Identification
of the barriers to calling for help will hopefully allow
the design of effective solutions to bypass them. These
solutions may take many forms from technological, to
process redesign, financial, education, or policy develop-
ment for the organization.
It is not clear to what extent this study may be limited
by the frequency of poor outcomes that can be directly
attributed to a failure to call for help. One of the impor-
tant aspects of this study will be to examine precisely
this rate of occurrence so the phenomenon of failure to
act when a patient becomes seriously unwell can be
more comprehensively understood.
Ultimately we hope the findings of this study will
translate to the implementation of improved systems of
care of the deteriorating patient. These in turn will
reduce the incidence of unplanned ICU admissions and
cardiac arrests and improve the survival of those that do
occur through early intervention.
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What stops hospital clinical staff from
following protocols? An analysis of the
incidence and factors behind the
failure of bedside clinical staff to
activate the rapid response system in
a multi-campus Australian
metropolitan healthcare service
Bill Shearer,1,2 Stuart Marshall,2,3 Michael David Buist,4 Monica Finnigan,1
Simon Kitto,5 Tonina Hore,6 Tamica Sturgess,6 Stuart Wilson,6 Wayne Ramsay6
ABSTRACT
Objective: To explore the causes of failure to activate
the rapid response system (RRS). The organisation
has a recognised incidence of staff failing to act when
confronted with a deteriorating patient and leading to
adverse outcomes.
Design: A multi-method study using the following:
a point prevalence survey to determine the incidence of
abnormal simple bedside observations and activation
of the rapid response team by clinical staff;
a prospective audit of all patients experiencing
a cardiac arrest, unplanned intensive care unit
admission or death over an 8-week period; structured
interviews of staff to explore cognitive and
sociocultural barriers to activating the RRS.
Setting: Southern Health is a comprehensive healthcare
network with 570 adult in-patient beds across four
metropolitan teaching hospitals in the south-eastern
sector of Melbourne.
Measurements: Frequency of physiological instability
and outcomes within the in-patient hospital population.
Qualitative data from staff interviews were thematically
coded.
Results: The incidence of physiological instability in the
acute adult population was 4.04%. Nearly half of these
patients (42%) did not receive an appropriate clinical
response from the staff, despite most (69.2%)
recognising their patient met physiological criteria for
activating the RRS, and being ‘quite’, or ‘very’
concerned about their patient (75.8%). Structured
interviews with 91 staff members identified
predominantly sociocultural reasons for failure to
activate the RRS.
Conclusions: Despite an organisational commitment to
the RRS, clinical staff act on local cultural rules within
the clinical environment that are usually not explicit.
Better understanding of these informal rules may lead
to more appropriate activation of the RRS.
OBJECTIVE
Failure of bedside hospital clinical staff to
follow established treatment protocols has
been identified as a common factor in
patients having an adverse event during their
hospitalisation. Post hoc analysis1 of the data
from the Australian Quality and Health Care
Study (AQHCS)2 found that ‘that misappli-
cation of, or failure to apply a rule; or use of
a bad or inadequate rule’ and ‘violation of
a protocol or rule’ together occurred in 13.6%
of the adverse events identified in the
AQHCS. These two iterative categories of
adverse event causation were associated with
death or permanent disability in 26% and
28% respectively of adverse events identified
in the AQHCS. Of most concern, the authors
rated the degree of preventability of these two
causation categories at 90% and 80% respec-
tively based on the actual adverse events in the
AQHCS. Likewise, a number of smaller mostly
retrospective single institution studies have
found various associations between failure to
follow established treatment protocols and
guidelines for clinically deteriorating patients
and increased mortality.3e7
One strategy to counter the problem of in-
hospital adverse events has been the use of the
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rapid response system (RRS) to manage clinically deteri-
orating patients. In essence a RRS has two essential
components: first an afferent arm that is a system of rules
that determine the criteria for activation of the rapid
response team; and second, the efferent arm which is the
system of response once the activation criteria are
breached. Varying types of RRS are now common in many
European, North American and Australasian hospitals.8 9
In its simplest form a RRS is merely a rule or protocol that
requires the bedside clinical staff to comply with the crit-
ical requirement of activating the RRS for it to be of
benefit.10 In the Medical Emergency Response Interven-
tion Trial (MERIT).11 there was a significant rate of failure
to activate such a system in the control and intervention
hospitals that may have contributed to the equivocal
results of the study. Specifically, in the 11 control hospitals
over the 6-month study there were 246 cardiac arrests. In
44% of these arrests the bedside staff did not activate an
emergency response despite the observations fulfilling the
response criteria for an emergency team call. Similarly, of
the 12 hospitals assigned to the RRS intervention, there
was still a failure rate of 30% to activate the RRS in the
250 cardiac arrests that occurred.
Anecdotally, failure to activate the RRS has been
thought to be associated with inadequate education
about recognition of clinically deteriorating patients or
insufficient knowledge of the RRS. In support of this is
a post hoc analysis of the MERIT data12 that indicates an
inverse relationship between the frequency of emer-
gency response team calls (in the control and interven-
tion hospitals) and the primary outcome measures of
cardiac arrest, critical unit admission and hospital
mortality. Similarly, Santamaria et al13 reported data from
one of the intervention hospitals of the MERIT study
5 years after the study suggesting that an intervention
like a RRS takes years not months to derive benefits.
Theoretically then, the rate of RRS activation should be
high in a system where it has been in place for many
years and the clinical staff have adequate training.
In 2007 the Quality and Safety Unit, Southern Health,
Melbourne identified 11 sentinel cases in which signifi-
cant patient harm occurred in association with the failure
of bedside staff to call the medical emergency team. This
was despite the fact that our organisation had a mature
policy and procedure in place for the activation of the
RRS that has been well established with an organisational
commitment to its use.14 15 Attempts to rationalise and
pattern-match the underlying features of these incidents
using clinical reviews and root cause analyses were
unsuccessful. There appeared to be no obvious cause in
terms of poor staff training, lack of motivation or under-
standing of the patients’ clinical states.16
While previous studies17e21 have documented the
incidence of failure of bedside clinical staff to activate an
emergency response team, to our knowledge no study
has investigated the reasons why staff do not activate the
RRS. As such, we undertook a multi-method examina-
tion to determine the incidence of clinical staff failing to
call the RRS and the human and sociological factors that
may be involved.
DESIGN
Ethics approval
The Southern Health Research and Ethics Committee
exempted this study from requiring ethics approval
because it fulfilled the NHMRC criteria for a quality
assurance project.
Methods and participants
We have previously published the methodology for this
study.22 In summary there were three parts to this study.
Point prevalence study of missed RRS incidence
On 17 April 2009 between 11:00 and 12:00 all adult
inpatient observation charts were reviewed (excluding
critical care areas such as intensive care units (ICUs),
high dependency units, the emergency department and
the theatre complex). Evidence of documented physio-
logical instability as defined by the RRS activation
criteria (table 1) was determined by review of the patient
observation charts over the previous 24 h. If patients
fulfilled these physiological criteria then the actions of
the staff in response to clinical instability were recorded.
If the RRS was not activated when RRS activation criteria
were met, the event was termed a ‘missed RRS call’.
Prospective study of missed RRS calls
Over an 8-week period from 26 April to 7 July 2009 all
cardiac arrests and unplanned ICU admissions from the
ward areas were examined to determine if the patient
fulfilled the activation criteria for a RRS call (table 1) for
Table 1 The rapid response system physiological criteria
or triggers
Airway Respiratory distress
Threatened airway
Breathing Respiratory rate >30 breaths per min
Respiratory rate <6 breaths per min
Oxygen saturation <90% on oxygen
Difficulty speaking
Circulation Blood pressure <90 mm Hg despite
treatment
Pulse rate >130 beats per min
Neurology Decreased level of consciousness
Fitting
Other Concerned
Need for treatment and prompt help
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a minimum of 4 h in the 24 h period prior to the index
event. In the event that the RRS was not activated, all the
clinical staff involved were interviewed (see below) and
these events were also labelled ‘missed RRS call’.
Interviews of staff members involved in missed RRS calls
The clinical staff involved in ‘missed RRS calls’ in the
first two parts of the study were interviewed (online
appendix 1). These staff members included the junior
medical and nursing staff and members of the medical
emergency or intensive care teams that were called to
assist. The interview questions were derived from the
cognitive theory of situation awareness23 and from brief
open-ended questions designed to explore the socio-
cultural barriers identified in health systems.24
Quantitative data were recorded as frequency data as
this was an exploratory study and not designed to
distinguish adverse event rates among clinical areas.
Interview responses were coded independently by two
coders for themes and the coding system iteratively
developed until agreement was achieved.25
Setting
Southern Health is a comprehensive university tertiary
healthcare provider for the south-eastern suburbs of
Melbourne. Over 13000 staff service a catchment popu-
lation of 880 000 and provide acute health services at four
hospital sites; all acute services are provided with the
exception of burns, spinal injury and major organ trans-
plantation. Southern Health was an early and enthusiastic
adopter of the RRS with establishment of the medical
emergency team in one hospital in 1996. This resulted in
substantial and significant improvements in patient
outcome14 15 and this system of care was standardised
throughout the organisation by 2006. Additionally our
organisation committed to training all junior members of
clinical staff in the purpose built simulation centre.26
RESULTS
Incidence of physiological and missed RRS calls
On the day of the point prevalence study, 23 (4.04%)
patients fulfilled the activation criteria for a RRS call in
the 24 h before the index event according to the 570
observation charts that were surveyed (table 2). The RRS
was not activated in 10 (1.75%) of these patients (missed
RRS call). The research team activated the RRS for one
patient who was subsequently admitted to the ICU and
underwent emergency surgery that day. Hypotension and
oxygen de-saturation were the most common reasons for
RRS call activation (73.3% and 80.0% respectively).
Prospective identification of missed RRS calls
Over the prospective study period a further 31 cases were
identified across the four acute hospital sites (table 2).
Interviews of clinical staff involved in a missed RRS call
Incomplete qualitative data were obtained from 8 of the
91 interviews for questions relating to sociocultural
barriers to activation of the RRS and so were not used.
Table 2 Adverse event and rapid response system (RRS) data collected from the point prevalence study and the prospective
study period
Casey Clayton Dandenong Moorabbin Total
Frequency (per 1000 bed days)
Point prevalence study
Acute adult patients 59 287 177 47 570
Patients who
met RRS activation criteria
0 13 8 2 23 (4.04%)
Missed RRS calls 0 5 3 2 10 (1.75%)
Prospective study
Bed days 2643 13719 (8 weeks) 16756 (10 weeks) 3642 36760
RRS activation 14 (5.30) 142 (10.4) 180 (10.7) 21 (5.67) 357 (9.71)
Cardiac arrest calls 2 (0.76) 36 (2.62) 15 (0.90) 1 (0.27) 54 (1.47)
Unplanned ICU admission 0 15 (1.09) 8 (0.48) 2 (0.55) 25 (0.68)
ICU admission following
RRS/cardiac arrest call
1 (0.38) 69 (5.03) 52 (3.10) 5 (1.37) 127 (3.45)
Death 0 4 (0.29) 3 (0.18) 0 7 (0.19)
Missed RRS callsdlate
RRS calls/ICU admissions/deaths
0 20 (1.46) 10 (0.60) 1 (0.27) 31 (0.84)
Interviews from missed RRS calls 0 58 (26 nurses,
18 medical staff,
14 ICU nursing
and medical staff)
32 (17 nurses,
11 medical staff,
4 ICU nursing
and medical staff)
1 (junior
medical
staff)
91 (qualitative
data available
from 83)
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Cognitive barriers for failing to activate the RRS
Even though they did not activate the RRS, the majority
of staff in the prospective study (63 of 91, 69%) recog-
nised that the patients met the calling criteria. Further-
more, 69 of the 91 respondents (75.8%) were either
‘quite concerned’ (33 of 91, 36.3%) or ‘very concerned’
(36 of 91, 39.6%) about their patient at this time.
Fifty-seven respondents (62%) were unaware that their
patient had been classified as a missed RRS, and of these,
27 (47.4%) thought the patient would deteriorate
despite treatment.
Sociocultural barriers of failure to activate RRS
Ten themes were identified in the responses of staff
involved with missed RRS calls. The staff believed they
would be perceived by their nursing and medical
colleagues in similar ways had they activated the RRS.Many
stated their colleagues would be supportive of whatever
actions they felt necessary (40 of 83, 48.2% for nursing
colleagues, 21 of 83, 25.3% for medical colleagues) with
fewer concerned there would be a negative or hostile
response (11 of 83, 13.3% for nursing colleagues and 22 of
83, 26.5% for medical colleagues) (figure 1).
One of the main barriers given by respondents was
a feeling that they should be able to manage patients by
themselves on the ward (34 of 83, 41.0% for nursing staff
and 33 of 83, 39.8% for medical staff).
Actions and explanations for the delay of activation of the RRS
When activation of the RRS was delayed four themes were
identified, including the need to wait for further investi-
gations, and treatment and reviews by the treating and
ICU teams. (table 3). When the RRS was not activated at
all a further eight themes were identified (table 3). The
most common of these were that the RRS did not need to
be activated and that the assembled team had the neces-
sary expertise. This was most commonly noted when the
physiological instability was in the area of expertise of the
treating team (eg, tachycardia on the cardiology ward).
A significant proportion of interviewees (25 of 83, 30.1%)
believed the patient had already been discussed with the
ICU team and felt that continued responsibility for the
patient was unclear.
DISCUSSION
Principle findings
On the day of the point prevalence study, 1 in 25 patients
across the four acute care hospitals fulfilled the activa-
tion criteria for the RRS. The RRS was not activated in
42% of instances, despite the maturity of the RRS and
educational support for its use in our organisation.
Interviews with staff involved with missed RRS calls
revealed that, even though they did not activate the RRS,
nearly three-quarters of respondents recognised that
their patients met the RRS activation criteria and
a similar proportion were concerned about their
patients’ wellbeing. In these situations the bedside staff
took other actions to manage their patients, which in
most cases involved further investigations, treatments or
clinical reviews (table 3). Of concern though, a minority
of respondents (nurses 13% and doctors 26%) were
concerned about a negative or hostile reaction from
colleagues for activating the RRS.
The most common reason for failure to activate the
RRS was that the bedside staff felt that the clinical situ-
ation was under control in the ward setting. The second
most common reason was that the critical care team had
already been involved but that there were no critical care
beds available. Less common reasons were a feeling that
the bedside clinical team had enough experience to
manage the situation without activating the RRS; poor
communication and prioritisation by the medical team
involved; and failure to repeat abnormal observations.
Taken together these reasons suggest that although staff
recognised that their patients were in difficulty, they
elected not to activate the RRS while further clinical
investigations and clinical reviews were pending. Half of
respondents felt that the clinical situation was under
control in the ward setting. To a certain extent, data
from the point prevalence study validate the experience
of the bedside clinical staff; namely that among the 23
patients who met RRS activation criteria, only one had
a serious adverse event. The other 22 patients had no
adverse consequences irrespective of whether the RRS
was activated or not. These results suggest that from the
perspective of bedside staff there is not sufficient ‘face
validity’ in the sensitivity and specificity of the RRS acti-
vation criteria. Therefore bedside staff re-prioritise the
requirement for RRS activation based on the particular
clinical scenario, taking into account a multitude of
Figure 1 Thematic analysis of responses to the question:
‘How would you think you would be perceived by your nursing/
medical colleagues if you called a MET call now?’
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factors: the environment, the status of pending investi-
gations, the perceived competence of attending medical
staff, and the degree of involvement of critical care or
critical outreach. However, one RRS missed call resulted
in prolonged critical care admission with multiple
reoperations. Potentially, if timely RRS activation had
occurred this could have been avoided. Therefore, from
an administrative and more specifically critical care view-
point, prevention of these types of critical admissions is of
huge benefit to the patient and the hospital as a whole.
However, from the viewpoint of bedside staff, in most
instances of RRS activation breach, the patients come to
no harm. This may explain why it takes so long for the
RRS to be completely accepted within the culture of
a particular hospital system, simply because the frequency
of useful RRS activations is low and that it takes years for
bedside staff to accept and value such a system.
An additional but less common reason for not acti-
vating the RRS was prior involvement of critical care
teams in the management of patients who fulfilled acti-
vation criteria. Thirty per cent of respondents stated that
if the critical care team had been involved with the
patient (and particularly if no critical care bed was
available) then the requirement for a RRS call was
negated. This may reflect a perception that critical care
teams should manage critically ill patients in the critical
care unit and that other critically ill patients in the
hospital should be managed by other clinical teams with
the assistance of the critical care team.
Across the four hospitals in this study there was
a different pattern of events during the study period.
Casey, one of the newer (2002) smaller community
hospitals with no on-site critical care service, had 18 RRS
activations, none of which were assessed as being missed.
The other smaller hospital, Moorabbin, an elective
surgical facility that also has no on-site critical care service,
had 22 RRS activations but only one missed RRS call. In
contrast, the two large acute tertiary referral centres
accounted for almost all the missed RRS calls and
accounted for all but one of the subsequent interviews.
Although both hospitals had a similar RRS activation rate
the incidence of missed RRS calls was much less at
Dandenong (0.60 vs 1.46 events per 1000 acute adult bed
days). As such, the majority of the staff interviews took
place at Clayton. Also, at Dandenong, the incidence of
cardiac arrest calls and unplanned critical care admissions
was less than half that at Clayton. This may reflect
a difference in case mix at these two hospitals as Clayton
has a number of tertiary specialty referral units
(neurology, renal, cardiac and neuro-surgery) that are not
present at Dandenong. Alternatively, these differences
may be because Dandenong had a RRS in place for 13
years at the time of the study whereas the RRS at Clayton
had only been in place for 3 years. Despite this, there were
still 13 missed RRS calls across the point prevalence and
prospective parts of this study at Dandenong.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
The main limitation of this study was the relatively low
incidence of missed RRS calls that could be explained by
the maturity of the RRS system. Consequently fewer
interviews than anticipated could be performed during
Table 3 Thematic analysis of structured interview responses from the prospective data collection phase. All patients
experienced a missed RRS call with an adverse clinical event
Characteristics of interviewees Frequency of responses (n[83), n (%)
Junior ward nurse 28 (33.7)
Senior ward nurse 16 (19.3)
Junior doctor (intern/resident) 16 (19.3)
Senior doctor (registrar/consultant) 13 (15.7)
Other (eg ICU outreach nurse) 18 (21.7)
Actions performed prior to activating RRS
Awaited further review or response by medical staff 43 (51.8)
Specific treatment or investigations delaying RRS activation 42 (50.6)
Involved ICU outreach or requested ICU review 28 (33.7)
Involved senior nursing staff 10 (12.0)
Explanation as to why RRS was not activated
Felt the situation was under control in the ward setting 45 (54.2)
ICU team already involved but no ICU bed was available 25 (30.1)
Team involved were experienced in this type of patient and
felt RRS activation was not required
14 (16.9)
Poor communication/prioritisation by medical team 13 (15.7)
Additional skills were not required to manage the patient 8 (9.6)
No further clinical observations had been taken 6 (7.2)
Altered thresholds for RRS activation but not documented 4 (4.8)
Thought they were too junior to activate RRS 1 (1.2)
ICU, intensive care unit.
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the point prevalence stage. Despite this, we were able to
refine the coding of the qualitative responses for the
prospective case collection stage. These qualitative data
are contaminated in part by the knowledge that the
patients involved had suffered an adverse event (cardiac
arrest, unplanned ICU admission or death) following
a period of physiological instability. Interviews were
abandoned if conducted more than 72 h following the
adverse event. This led to a reduced number of inter-
views, but ensured that the data collected were fresh in
the respondents’ minds. Although the data from this
study come from a single organisation, the four acute
hospitals involved each have unique characteristics and
consequently we believe the results can be generalised.
CONCLUSION
There are two important messages from this study. First,
the main reason why staff did not follow the RRS acti-
vation protocol was not failure of cognition, but rather
local sociocultural factors and intra-professional hierar-
chies in the clinical areas. On this basis, we question the
value of efforts to improve RRS effectiveness by making
such patients more identifiable (eg, colour-coded
observation charts), the push for an increase in the
frequency of RRS activation and even the suggestion that
RRS protocols become mandatory. Instead, the results
suggest that there should be more effort in under-
standing individual and bedside cultural issues that may
be preventing staff from activating the RRS. For
example, in this study, referral to or involvement of
critical care teams, particularly when the critical care
unit has no beds, may confuse the situation for the
general bedside ward staff caring for the patient.
Second, implementing systems of care that signifi-
cantly alter the traditional hierarchical referral model of
care, regardless of their potential benefits, takes years to
appropriately implement. As mentioned above, we
believe this may reflect the lack of ‘face validity’ that
bedside staff may have for the RRS because of the
perceived poor sensitivity and specificity of the activa-
tion criteria. The decision of whether to activate the
RRS was often made by junior staff members who do not
have the clinical experience to safely make this decision.
While a RRS call gives junior staff members the oppor-
tunity to ask for help if they are uncomfortable with the
clinical situation, some clearly believed that their
colleagues expect them to cope with some situations.
This expectation was confirmed by Stewart27 in a study
across 21 hospitals in the UK which analysed decision-
making by pre-registration house officers on whether or
not to call for senior help. This study found that the
decision to call for help is a complex judgement that
balanced the desire for clinical autonomy with the
understanding of certain consequences to self, senior
colleagues and patients. In our study, there was
a common belief that the treating team should be able
to deal with problems close to their area of specialty. For
example, the cardiothoracic surgery team would be able
to manage patients with tachy-arrhythmias but may
perhaps struggle to deal with patients who had a drop in
their Glasgow Coma Score. When deterioration
occurred within the area of specialty the junior staff
would be more likely to call senior nurses and doctors
within the specialty rather than activate the RRS. This
context sensitivity of the RRS has not previously been
described but appears to be a strong sociocultural influ-
ence on whether junior staff activate the RRS.
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Rapid Response Systems and collective (in)competence: An exploratory analysis of 
intraprofessional and interprofessional activation factors 
  
Abstract 
The rapid response system (RRS) is a patient safety initiative instituted to enable healthcare 
professionals to promptly access help when a patient’s status deteriorates. Despite patients 
meeting the criteria, up to one-third of the RRS cases that should be activated are not called, 
constituting a ‘missed RRS call’. Using a case study approach, ten focus groups of senior and 
junior nurses and physicians across four hospitals in Australia were conducted to gain greater 
insight into the social, professional and cultural factors that mediate the usage of the RRS. 
Participants’ experiences with the RRS were explored from an interprofessional and collective 
competence perspective. Health professionals’ reasons for not activating the RRS included: 
distinct intraprofessional clinical decision-making pathways; a highly hierarchical pathway in 
nursing, and a more autonomous pathway in medicine; and interprofessional communication 
barriers between nursing and medicine when deciding to make and actually making a RRS call.  
Participants also characterized the RRS as a work-around tool that is utilized when health 
professionals encounter problematic interprofessional communication. The results can be 
conceptualised as a form of collective incompetence that has important implications for the 
design and implementation of interprofessional patient safety initiatives, such as the RRS. 
 
Keywords: Rapid-response system; interprofessional collaboration; collective competence; 
socio-cultural factors; case study; focus groups  
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Introduction 
The rapid response system (RRS) is a patient safety initiative (DeVita et al., 2011; De Meester, 
Verspuy, Monsieurs, Van Bogaert, 2013; Winters et al., 2013) that purportedly allows health 
care professionals to promptly access help when a patient’s health status deteriorates.  The two 
founding principles of this system are early recognition and rapid response (Winters et al., 2013).  
Upon activation the rapid response team (RRT), which primarily consists of medical and nursing 
staff, organizes to stabilize the patient’s vital signs.  Once activated, the RRS is meant to bypass 
“traditional unit-based, hierarchical, and stepwise less-to-more-skilled approaches to care” 
(Jones, DeVita, & Bellemo, 2011, p. 142).  This system was first instituted in the early 1990s to 
reduce the incidence of and mortality from cardiac arrests and other severe conditions in 
hospitals (Lee, Bishop, Hillman, & Daffurn, 1995).  Several subsequent studies have found 
conflicting evidence to support the effectiveness of the system in reducing cardiac arrests (e.g. 
DeVita et al., 2004; Hillman et al., 2005; Chan, Jain, Nallmothu, Berg, & Sasson, 2010; Al-
Qahtani et al., 2013).  However, many studies have also associated RRSs with decreased hospital 
mortality and intensive care unit (ICU) admissions (e.g. Shah et al., 2011; Al-Qahtani et al., 
2013; Kwak et al., 2014).  Marshall and colleagues (2011) suggest the difficulty in establishing 
the effectiveness of the RRS is partially due to the failure of clinical staff to call for help early in 
all circumstances. However, compliance rates do tend to differ by profession. A recent study 
found that delayed calls amongst physicians were significantly higher than amongst nurses 
(Boniatti et al., 2014).  Despite patients meeting formal criteria, up to one-third of the RRS cases 
that should be activated are not actually called (Hillman et al, 2005), constituting a ‘missed call’.  
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Lee and colleagues (1995) describe a missed RRS call as a situation that occurs when a patient 
meets RRS criteria, but the RRS call is made outside of the critical timeframe. Previous studies 
have identified incidence of failure of clinical staff to activate the RRS (e.g. Schein, Hazday, 
Pena, Ruben, & Sprung, 1990; Tortolani, Risucci, Rosati, & Dixon, 1990; Bedell, Deitz, 
Leemanm & Delbanco, 1991; Jones et al., 2006).  Benzin and colleagues (2012) detail the 
positive and negative impacts of a teaching hospital RRT on staff morale and teamwork, 
education, workload, patient care and hospital administration.  Their study recommends that 
further qualitative examination of the implementation of a RRT might provide insight into 
incidence of RRS failure (Benzin et al., 2012).  Improving clinician identification of risk through 
situational awareness has also been explored as a means of facilitating a clear escalation plan 
(Brady, & Goldenhar, 2014).!!Few studies, however, have explored the barriers to effective 
implementation of a RRS system.  DeVita and colleagues (2004) propose five potential barriers 
affecting the successful implementation of the RRS, two of which are of interest here: 1) failure 
to view errors as a product of the RRS rather than individual mistakes; 2) issues of professional 
control.  This qualitative study examines participants’ experiences of the RRS in addition to 
exploring social and cultural factors that mediate the usage of the RRS.  
 
Theorising the context of RRS non-activation: collective competence and interprofessionalism 
The concept of collective competence originates in educational theory (Ohlsson, 1996) and 
posits ‘a mutually constitutive relationship between collective and individual competence 
[where] the latter must be defined in terms of culture and process’ (Boreham, 2004, p.15). 
Collective competence is comprised of three elements: 1) making collective sense of events in 
the workplace, 2) developing and using a collective knowledge base and 3) developing a sense of 
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interdependency. These core constitutive elements have clear relationships to the notion of 
interprofessional collaboration. 
 
Zwarenstein & Reeves (2006) define interprofessional collaboration as “an active relationship 
between two or more health or social care professions who work together to solve problems or 
provide services.” (p. 48).  Reeves & Lewin (2004) characterize interprofessional collaboration 
in the healthcare context as “a process of ‘knotworking’, in which individuals constantly tie, 
untie and retie separate threads of activity during their brief interactions” (p. 219).  
Interprofessional collaboration is affected by factors including limited time for teambuilding, 
confused team roles, the effects of professional socialization, differences in professional 
authority and vertical management of professionals (Engestrom, Engestrom, & Vahaaho, 1999; 
Reeves & Lewin 2004; Baxter 2008).  Much of the literature on these issues stems from core 
concepts within the sociology of professions, such as clinical autonomy, which serve to explain 
the way in which the division of labour within healthcare has been created and operates through 
a set of complex historical, cultural and structural processes (Friedson, 1970; Willis, 1983). 
These processes in turn shape the conditions of possibility for interprofessional interactions to 
occur. 
 
In the RRS literature, collaboration and communication have been referred to as important social 
factors when health care professionals are determining whether to activate the RRS (Winters et 
al., 2013).  Nurse-physician communication in particular has been cited as a potential barrier 
contributing to serious adverse events in patients.  This issue was the focus of a recent study by 
De Meester and colleagues (2013) who introduced a standardized communication intervention 
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called SBAR (situation, background, assessment and recommendation).  The study, which also 
included training in critical thinking skills, resulted in increased communication amongst nurses 
and between nurses and physicians, and a decrease in unexpected patient deaths (De Meester, 
Verspuy, Monsieurs, & Van Bogaert, 2013). However, a focused and theoretically informed 
investigation of the affect that these sociocultural factors have on activating the RRS, has up 
until now, been absent. 
 
In this paper, we posit that the distinct socio-cultural factors that shape medicine and nursing 
intraprofessional and interprofessional decision making pathways, that results in a kind of 
collective (in)competence in relation to the activation of RRS. These issues are examined from a 
collective competence and interprofessional conceptual framework using a qualitative dataset of 
medical and nursing staff members’ experiences of the RRS within Monash Health, an 
Australian hospital system. 
 
Methods  
This study utilizes a multiple case study framing, which according to Robert Yin (2009) is an 
exploratory case study method that allows for the investigation of “a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18).  This paper presents on the results from a larger 
study that examined how the RRS was being utilised through a multi-hospital point prevalence 
design (Marshall et al., 2011).  The focus of this paper is to explore the reasons why staff 
members do not activate the RRS.  A multiple case study analysis allowed us to explore this 
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phenomenon across four hospitals of differing size and caseload within Monash Health, 
Australia and incorporate a diversity of contexts (Stake, 2006). . 
 
Data collection 
Focus groups were employed to examine participants’ experiences of the RRS in addition to 
exploring the social, cultural and professional factors that mediate the usage of the RRS.  These 
factors were particularly important to gain insight into given the professional and institutional 
context in which RRS’ operate.  
 
Ten focus groups were conducted across four hospitals using criterion and maximum variation 
sampling (Flick, 2009).  At the time of data collection in 2009, these four hospitals comprised 
the majority of acute care institutions of a health network with over 12,000 staff members, 2,100 
beds and 180,000 hospital admissions.  Included in our study are a suburban 520 bed acute 
hospital, a small 120 bed elective surgical and oncology centre, a large metropolitan teaching 
hospital, and a suburban community hospital, attributed in the results section as Site 1-4, 
respectively (Marshall et al., 2011). 
 
Sampling 
Participants were sampled by profession and institution and stratified by level of experience 
within the nursing and medical professions and institutional location.  For the purpose of this 
paper, participants’ quotations are identified by their profession and level of experience, but not 
by their institution.  Senior nurses and junior medical staff were recruited individually.  Junior 
nurses were recruited through snowball sampling (Flick, 2009) using senior nurses as the key 
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informants.  Senior medical staff members were recruited via email sent to program heads to 
nominate participants.  A total of twenty-seven doctors and sixty-two nurses participated in the 
focus groups. 
 
Data Analysis 
Directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) was employed to explore participants’ 
experiences with the RRS in addition to the social, professional and cultural factors that mediate 
the usage of the RRS.  Conventional content analysis and complementary directed content 
analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) were used to formulate and investigate major themes in the 
data.  Conventional content analysis was initially conducted through an open coding process 
whereby the first half of the focus group transcripts were coded inductively to identify key 
themes.  The remaining transcripts were then coded using the developed themes as a coding 
frame.  Complementary directed content analysis applied codes guided by the literature review 
on barriers to RRS activation in combination with theoretical constructs from the 
interprofessional practice (Reeves & Lewin, 2004; Reeves, Lewin, Espin, Zwarenstein, 2010) 
and the sociology of professions (Freidson, 1970; Abbott, 1988; Witz, 1992) literature. The 
concept of collective competence was then applied to an analysis of the dominant themes that 
emerged from the initial conventional and directed thematic analytical processes. 
 
Ethical considerations 
The Research and Ethics Committee of the health network exempted this study from requiring 
ethics approval as it complied with the NHMRC criteria for a quality assurance project (Shearer 
et al., 2012). 
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Results  
The results of this study are presented in this section beginning with focus group participants’ 
characterization of the RRS, followed by a description of what constitutes a missed RRS call.  
Then we describe two distinct professionally situated ways of activating the RRS; a highly 
hierarchical pathway in nursing, and a more autonomous pathway in medicine.  Lastly, we 
present an analysis of the RRS as a work-around tool that is utilized when health professionals 
encounter problematic interprofessional communication. 
 
What is a RRS activation?   
The participants viewed the RRS as a preventative process whereby health professionals can 
access greater support and management if a patient under their care deteriorates or meets the 
formal RRS criteria, and before the patient becomes critically ill.  The participants heard of and 
learned about the RRS through various channels such as during their university training, through 
ward rotations, or when they began working at their current institution.  There were mixed 
impressions regarding the types of training given to nurses and doctors on how to use the RRS.   
 
The formal RRS criteria were purportedly standardized across the wards and hospitals of 
Monash Health.  Although participants claimed they understood what the criteria were, they 
struggled to give a more detailed description of the criteria.  Additionally, participants declared 
that hospital wards do have specific informal criteria and protocols for use of the RRS, which 
can make using the system challenging when working across different wards.  Moreover, doctors 
have the authority to change the criteria based on a particular patient.  These informal 
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sociocultural nuances that mediate the usage of the RRS will be explored in the following 
sections.   
 
Missed RRS Calls  
Focus group participants detailed instances where the missed RRS calls should not be considered 
missed because healthcare professionals accessed the local support they needed to care for the 
patient without activating the system. In effect, although the system is not activated, participants’ 
perceived that the patient receives the appropriate care:  
“[if] it was missed through neglect, it’s a bad thing but it’s a choice not to make a [RRS] 
call based on your observation and the history of the patient, then it’s not a bad thing” 
(Junior Nursing, Site 2) 
 
Alternatively, participants reported that missed RRS calls also occur when a healthcare 
professional chooses not to activate the RRS because of perceived repercussions or because of a 
breakdown in communication or collaboration resulting in the patient not receiving adequate 
care.  
“If you’re getting missed [RRS] calls, there are two reasons for that. One is 
communication” (Registrar, Site 3) 
 
These missed RRS calls are viewed as individual mistakes and not viewed as emanating from the 
system itself.  Junior doctors and nurses are described as being intimidated by activating the RRS 
and many participants had stories about coworkers being reprimanded for activating the RRS.   
“I’ve had nursing staff and medical staff feel quite bad about calling what they thought 
was a legitimate decision to call a [RRS] call” (Registrar, Site 3) 
 
There are potential negative social sanctions by more powerful members of the RRT towards 
junior staff or less powerful health professionals who may have been perceived to have made an 
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‘incorrect’ call. In essence, some missed RRS calls may be the unintended consequences of the 
negative aspects of socio-cultural context surrounding the RRS.   
  
Intraprofessional Factors 
Participants referred to the importance of using clinical judgment in tandem with the RRS 
criteria to guide their assessment and decision making processes when deliberating whether or 
not to activate the RRS. Two very different professional decision-making pathways were 
described: a highly hierarchical and protocol-based approach in nursing, juxtaposed to a more 
autonomous process in medicine based on clinical judgment.  The focus group participants 
clearly delineated between how doctors and nurses should engage and do engage with the RRS 
system.  The following quotation from a registrar illustrates this profession-specific difference: 
“A lot of the reason why a doctor would call a [RRS] criteria is they’re worrying about 
the patient, rather than their heart rate being 105 when it’s meant to be 100.  They’re 
looking at the patient thinking, gee I’m not a hundred percent sure about where this 
patient’s going, I need intensive care and I think I need them sooner rather than later. 
Whereas, a lot of the nursing staff will probably say, right this patient now meets [RRS] 
criteria, I’m going to call.” (Registrar, Site 3) 
 
Nurses were perceived by the medical staff to activate the RRS as a reaction to a patient’s status 
deteriorating according to the criteria:  
“You’ve got nursing initiated [RRS] calls and doctor initiated [RRS] calls, and that 
comes down to the nurses knowing what the [RRS] criteria are, and having the ability to- 
obviously to call that” (Registrar, Site 3)  
 
The implications of the intra-professionally situated ways of calling RRS activation resulted in a 
perception that:  
“The nurses may over call, but the junior doctors will under call…” (Registrar, Site 3) 
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Although RRS calls are understood to be in the best interest for patients, there was a perception 
that they may de-skill the younger medical staff by taking away learning opportunities for junior 
medical students to make difficult decisions through historically 'proven' apprentice style 
experiential ways of learning.  In these instances, medical focus group participants framed 
patient care and educational moments as being in direct tension. It was characterised as an: 
“..issue of [RRS] calls de-skilling for junior doctors, and maybe, [we] just accept that if 
it’s in the best interest of patients.  But there’s loads of stuff that, when I was an intern, 
we would have looked after … [RRS] take that decision making process further away” 
(Registrar, Site 3) 
 
These concerns were raised by senior medical staff, in relation to the quality of the training 
opportunities for junior medical students, as decision-making opportunities were potentially 
taken out of the hands of the junior staff through by the implementation of the criterion-based 
RRS. This was a particular concern to participants as their teaching hospital work context was 
driven by a mandate to educate competent health professionals.  
 
Interprofessional Factors 
Collaboration and communication were put forward as important social factors when health care 
professionals were determining whether to activate the RRS.  Participants described how 
collaboration occurred horizontally across professional boundaries and vertically through the 
hierarchical structure of a profession:  
“A junior staff member wouldn’t be calling a [RRS] call by themselves, they would, 
hopefully, let their nurse in charge know…” (Senior Nursing, Site 3) 
 
“Generally if you’re starting to get concerned about a patient earlier you’re already 
talking to more senior staff members anyway” (Junior Nursing, Site 1) 
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During moments of ‘knotworking’, doctors and nurses constantly tried to negotiate the place and 
utility of the RRS in their praxis.  Doctors and nurses both agreed that any staff member should 
feel comfortable in making a RRS call. At the same time, doctors and nurses expressed 
frustration at the current state where both professions are often intimidated to activate the RRS 
through fear of negative repercussions occurring if they are perceived to have activated the RSS 
‘incorrectly’: 
“That’s what makes me angry in that no one should ever be told off for calling a met 
because it’ll be the one case where that person doesn’t call that that person ends up 
dying”  (Junior Nursing, Site 1)  
 
“And I’ve had nursing staff and medical staff feel quite bad about calling what they 
thought was a legitimate decision to call a [RRS] call” (Registrar, Site 3) 
 
“[Senior doctors] should get in trouble for being angry when you call them” (Junior 
Medical, Site 3) 
 
Junior medical staff, in particular had experienced angry encounters with senior medical staff 
after activating the RRS, which was a factor in making future decisions to call: 
“We've had a patient who was discharged from ICU way too early and an hour later... 
called [the RRS] and the ICU registrar was really angry that we'd called them back … so 
I think it [decision to make a RRS] depends on how you're treated.” (Junior Medical, Site 
3) 
 
Alternatively, junior nurses reported using senior nursing colleagues as a source of experiential 
knowledge and guidance as to whether or not they should activate the RRS:   
“You tell the people around you.  You use the resources around you.  You use the nurses 
on the ward first...”  (Junior Nursing, Site 2) 
 
Doctors and nurses are often placed in a complex clinical situation in which they must negotiate 
their personal and professional position in relation to the perceived clinical needs of the patient 
and with the formal criterion-based structure of the RRS.  This decision-making context resulted 
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in some interesting interprofessional tensions and unintended uses of the RRS as illustrated in the 
following section. 
 
Formal ‘Work-around’ 
Nursing focus group participants indicated that when communication does not occur or when 
collaboration breaks down the RRS can be used as a system of checks and balances to assure 
patient care.  This care ethos underpinned a 'work-around' approach to using the RRS - working 
around medical staff members who were not perceived to be taking care of the patient: 
“We used to actually use them as a way of getting round a resident or whoever who really 
wasn’t doing what you know you needed for your patient.” (Junior Nursing, Site 2) 
 
In particular, senior nurses were comfortable using the RRS when they could not reach a doctor 
or when they disagreed with a doctor’s clinical decision:     
“If [the patient] meets the criteria and or you’re not happy with the medical decision 
that’s being made, and you’d like, in effect a second opinion … we’ll call a call just to 
get some quick decisions made by ICU.” (Senior Nursing, Site 3) 
 
Junior nurses reported feeling empowered by being able to use the RRS when they could not 
gain access to a doctor through informal channels or the paging system.  The RRS is utilized here 
to initiate communication and collaboration:   
“It’s sort of a formal way of making the doctors come. They can’t not come.” (Junior 
Nursing, Site 4) 
 
The RSS system is viewed as a “formal” way to get the additional support and assistance needed 
to appropriately care for a patient.  In effect, the system can be used as tool among nurses and 
junior staff to ensure that collaboration and communication occurs.  
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Discussion 
The RRS represents the formal rules that attempt to shape the behaviour of healthcare 
professions. In this sense, the RRS can be seen as an intervention to stabilize collaboration and 
social interactions that occur in the workplace when a patient’s status is becoming critical.  
DeVita (2014) suggests that the RRS is unlike traditional hierarchical approaches to most 
emergencies because it convenes immediate and correct expertise and skill for the patients’ level 
of illness without unintentional system level delays.  Theoretically, this is the goal of the RRS. 
However, in practice, the intra and inter-professional context in which the RRS is deployed 
results in what we term collective incompetence; the three elements of which are juxtaposed with 
collective competence in the following table. These three elements all appear in the shaping of 
the results of this study and are used to frame the subsequent discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking a collective competence approach informed by the interprofessional literature, we were 
not surprised that this study did find that the RRS was understood and used unevenly used by 
different health professions and according to different levels of experience.  This was true of 
both nursing and medicine, whose clinical decision making pathways are shaped by profession 
Table 1.  COLLECTIVE COMPETENCE AND INCOMPETENCE  
Collective Competence  Collective Incompetence  
1. Making collective sense of events in the 
workplace. 
1. The existence of multiple profession-based 
understandings of events in the workplace that 
drive clinical behaviour(s). 
2. Developing and using a collective knowledge 
base. 
2. The practice of multiple profession-based 
development and usage of knowledge. 
3. Developing a sense of interdependency. 3. A prevailing sense of profession-based 
intradependency. 
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specific sociocultural factors.  This finding is consistent with previous studies examining delayed 
RRS calls.  Boniatti and colleagues (2014) report in their study that the prevalence of delayed 
RRS calls from physicians was significantly higher (110 of 377, 29.2%) when compared with 
nurses (136 of 771, 17.6%).  In our study, decision-making in terms of activating the RRS 
manifested itself in two distinct clinical pathways: a highly hierarchical one in nursing and a 
more autonomous one in medicine.  Smith and DeVita (2013) have put forward that different 
RRT compositions impact team goals and patient outcomes, particularly between nurse- or 
physician-led teams within university hospitals.  Our data supports the notion that nurses and 
physicians have particular intraprofessional approaches to the RRS that lead to differing decision 
making processes for activating the system.  Exploring these two separate intraprofessional 
decision-making and activation pathways is important to understanding the production of 
interprofessional interactions prior to, during and after RRS activation.  
Nurses in our study reportedly engaged with the RRS in a hierarchical manner, presenting their 
primary concern as being the needs of the patient.  There was some indication that junior nurses 
felt empowered by, and senior nurses were comfortable with, their ability to activate the RRS as 
a patient management tool.  Benzin and colleagues (2012) found that the option to activate the 
RRS had a positive impact for nurses as it allows for accessing additional help without 
necessarily seeking permission.  Junior nurses in our study however, also noted that their first 
course of action when concerned about a patient was to draw on the resources and expertise of 
senior nurses and that activating the RRS rarely occurred without some kind of nursing 
consensus.  This reliance on more senior staff may help to lessen junior nurses’ concern over 
clinical inexperience and uncertainty associated with recognizing a deteriorating patient 
(Massey, Chaboyer, & Aitken, 2013). Nurses described their intimate clinical knowledge of 
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patient needs, by virtue of their time spent at the bedside, as an important factor in deciding to 
activate the RRS.  This perception of patient specific expertise held by nurses is consistent with 
other studies of interprofessional interactions during medical crises (Piquette, Reeves, & 
Leblanc, 2009). Interestingly though, there was a perception that nurses tend to overcall the RRS.  
 
In comparison, junior doctors reportedly underused the RRS, the key reason postulated as 
relating to being seen as competent.  As students become enculturated into the medical 
profession they are expected to take on symbolic behaviour that creates an “imagery of 
competence” and distinguishes them from other professions and those they serve (Hass & 
Shaffir, 1987, p. 71).  The socialization of doctors is built upon an experiential learning style 
where clinical judgement, a key component of the autonomous culture of medicine, guides 
medical staff assessment (Freidson, 1970; Willis, 1983).  Furthermore, during periods of medical 
crisis, physicians are typically assumed the leaders in the interprofessional team whose expertise 
is heavily depended upon (Piquette, Reeves, & Leblanc, 2009).  For the junior medical doctor, 
this assumption can place pressure on them to perform and to be seen to be performing in a 
clinical competent manner. It is not unreasonable to infer that this is a mediating influence on the 
decision-making processes junior medical staff members go through when deliberating whether 
or not to activate the RRS.   
 
To compound this problem, focus group participants declared that when the RRS should be used, 
certain health care professionals, particularly junior medical staff, did not feel they can activate 
the RRS when necessary without negative sanctions.  The sociocultural and structural context of 
the RRS is characterised by a direct tension between patient care and the experiential learning 
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process at the core of the traditional apprenticeship model in medicine. Activating the RRS not 
only requires making the decision to do so, but also places further clinical judgement regarding 
the care of the patient in the hands of more experienced clinicians (the RRT) and away from the 
medical learner (Benzin et al., 2012). For the nursing, the RRS was used to meet patient needs; 
for medicine it was more complex. The use of a RRS was potentially a show of incompetence by 
junior medical staff and from a senior medical staff member’s point of view, also took away 
essential learning opportunities.  But what is of real significance here are the insights that this 
analytical excerpt provides into interprofessional collaboration and the concept of collective 
competence. We suggest, that this highlights the negative parallel of collective competency, in 
that the data from this RRS study demonstrates an instance of where concerns over individual 
incompetency directly constitute and drive the performance of collective incompetency. It is a 
instance of the connection between how socioculturally mediated RRS decision making results in 
concrete clinical practice being situated in a collective incompetence framework which would 
otherwise by characterised as ‘individual error’. 
 
We argue that the implementation of the formal RRS into a hospital structure and clinical 
processes is a technical solution to a problem that actually requires socio-cultural considerations 
(Bosk, 2009; Kitto, 2010). This ‘technical fix’ approach is not uncommon in healthcare such as 
the electronic medical record (Berg, 1997) and the surgical safety checklist (Kitto, 2010).  
Technical fixes are where a workplace tool driving clinical practice can have unintended 
consequences produced by top-down implementation approaches that do not take into 
consideration local socio-cultural work practices. Ironically, this approach can create a situation 
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of reinforcing traditional asymmetrical power relationships amongst and between health care 
professionals (Kitto, 2010) resulting in suboptimal clinical practices (Kitto & Grant, 2014).   
 
Our findings indicate that the RRS is not only activated according to patients meeting formal 
criteria, but also when collaboration between professionals breaks down.  This use of the RRS 
occurs particularly when nurses cannot communicate with doctors via other pathways of 
communication such as paging, but also when there are disagreements on medical decisions 
affecting patient care.  In this sense, this interprofessional system can be seen as acting as a 
governing technique (Kitto et. al. 2011) to ensure the collaboration and accountability of more 
senior health care professionals and doctors in particular in unintended ways.  The nursing 
‘work-around’ approach identified in this study that purportedly occurs in response to the 
breakdown of interprofessional practices, is consistent with previous literature on nurse-doctor 
interprofessional workings (Benzin et al., 2012; Miller & Kontos, 2012).  Drawing on literature 
from the sociology of technology, we can further unpack the notion of ‘work-arounds’ as it 
relates to the implementation of the RRS.  Kitto and Higgins (2009) present the notion of a work-
around as “a way of conceptualizing the strategies employed by users to negotiate and shape 
artifacts according to their particular needs or existing practices” (p. 30).  According to the 
formative work by Gasser (1986), work-arounds often conflict with the prescribed ideology of 
organisational use and actors play an important role in resisting, modifying and selectively 
adopting formal technologies. In other words, the use of the RRS is mediated by the history of, 
and pre-existing culture and structure in which it is deployed. 
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Ideally, the RRS can be seen as a way to flatten the hierarchies (DeVita, 2014). However, in 
practice it also facilitates the imposition of asymmetrical power differences amongst health 
professionals, and ironically, acts as a tool for nurses to negotiate professional dominance 
(Freidson, 1970; Starr, 1982; Willis, 1983) embedded within healthcare practice settings.  This 
complex and ambivalent function demonstrates how users are instrumental shapers of 
technologies (RRS and criteria) and not merely shaped by technology (Pollock, 2005).  Rather 
than relying simply on the technical implementation of a formal tool such as the RRS, an 
understanding of the interrelationship of the formal tool with the informal work practices of 
healthcare professionals is needed, at the design and implementation stage.  In this study, it 
would seem that the RRS and criteria have been implemented into a healthcare structure and 
processes without consideration of the sociocultural factors that shape the relationships between 
the health care professions. The result is the potential for the further fostering of a kind of pre-
existing collective clinical incompetence that the system was purportedly designed to eradicate.  
 
In terms of study limitations, focus groups are useful for giving insight into the context of user-
groups, to whom the user group is accountable, and the political climate surrounding the user 
group (Kidd & Parshall, 2000).  By using an experienced facilitator and stratifying our focus 
groups according to profession and level of experience, our study attempted to create an 
environment where participants could articulate their experience with the RRS.  However, we 
recognize that individual and intraprofessional tensions may influence what participants felt they 
could and could not say, which are also partly constituted by the dynamic relationships within 
the clinical context. Additionally, little is known about why hospital staff do not activate the 
rapid response system outside of the Australian context.  To the authors’ knowledge, a research 
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focus on the sociocultural factors mediating the usage of the RRS on other continents has not 
been carried out.  The next in this field would be to test the conceptual generalizability and 
transferability of the concept collective (in)competence to further the goal of designing effective 
interprofessional interventions in acute healthcare settings. 
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Abstract'
Objective:'To'determine'if'a'cultural'change'of'care'at'the'general'ward'would'improve'utilization'
of'the'RRS'and'if'such'a'cultural'change'altered'the'attitude'of'the'ward'clinical'staff'to'patient'safety.'
'''''''''''Design:' A' two' stage' methodology.' First,' determination' of' the' ward' cultural' interventions,' by'
engagement,'with' the' actual' users' of' the'RRS.' Second,'measurement' of' the' incidence'of'missed'RRS'
calls,' RRS' calls,' cardiac' arrests' and' unplanned' intensive' care' unit' admission' both' prior' to' the'
intervention'and'12'months'post'implementation.'The'change'in'patient'safety'attitude'was'measured'
using'the'the'Agency'for'Healthcare'Research'and'Quality'(AHRQ)'Hospital'Survey.''
'
Setting:'Monash'Health' is' a' comprehensive' healthcare' network'with' 570' adult' inTpatient' beds'
across'four'metropolitan'teaching'hospitals'in'the'southTeastern'sector'of'Melbourne.'
'
Results:' The' cultural' interventions' selected' for' intervention'were,' a'ward' based' agreement' on'
how' to' best' locally' optimize' management' of' the' deteriorating' patient,' an' improved' communication'
protocol,' and' a' revision' of' the' education' program' for' staff.' Post' intervention' the' aggregate' rate' of'
missed' RRS' calls' reduced' across' all' wards' (1.05' to' 0.34' per' 1000' bed' days,' p=0.038).' This' occurred'
without'a'change'in'the'rate'of'RRS'activation'(7.98'per'1000'bed'days'preTintervention'versus'7.85'bed'
days'postTintervention).'The'incidence'of'cardiac'arrests'or'unplanned'interventions'did'not'change'post'
intervention.'The'only'change'detected'by'the'patient'safety'attitude'survey'was'an'improvement'in'the'
perceived' reporting' of' events' (mean' scores' 3.68' preTintervention' versus' 3.87' postTintervention,'
F=7.693,'p=0.006).''
Conclusions:' Engagement'of' the'users'of'a' system' like' the'RRS'activation'protocol' can' improve'
compliance'rates'with'protocols'when'the'users'have'ownership'of'the'process.'
'
'
'
Introduction'
Regardless'of'the'debate'over'the'efficacy'of'the'RRS,'they'have'been'widely'
adopted'(1).'However'for'the'RRS'to'be'effective'it'needs'to'be'utilized'
appropriately'(2,3).'In'2007'the'Quality'and'Safety'unit'in'our'organization'
identified'eleven'sentinel'cases'where'significant'patient'harm'occurred'in'
association'with'the'failure'of'bedside'staff'to'activate'the'RRS.'Attempts'to'
rationalize'and'pattern'match'the'underlying'features'of'our'incidents'using'
clinical'reviews'and'root'cause'analyses'were'unsuccessful.'There'appeared'to'be'
no'obvious'cause'in'terms'of'poor'staff'training,'lack'of'motivation'or'
understanding'of'the'patients’'clinical'states;'the'usual'factors'noted'in'the'
literature'(4T9).''
To'better'understand'this'problem'we'previously'undertook'a'study'to'
determine'the'incidence'and'factors'behind'the'phenomenon'of'not'activating'
the'RRS'(10,11).'In'the'point'prevalence'part'of'this'study,'undertaken'over'a'24'
hour'period,'in'our'health'care'system,'we'found'an'incidence'of'failure'to'
activate'the'RRS'despite'the'patients'fulfilling'the'activation'criteria'of'42%.'The'
reasons'we'found'for'failure'to'activate'the'RRS'were'predominantly'socioT
cultural'factors'amongst'the'bedside'ward'clinical'staff;'namely'a'sense'that'the'
clinical'situation'was'under'control,'that'the'critical'care'team'had'already'
reviewed'the'patient,'and'that'the'bedside'treating'team'had'enough'experience'
to'manage'the'situation.'We'concluded'that,'the'failure'to'activate'the'RRS'was'
not'because'of'failure'to'appropriately'recognize'and'manage,'a'deteriorating'
patient,'but'rather'there'was'a'face'validity'problem'with'activation'of'the'RRS;'
apart'from'one'ICU'admission'all'the'patients'who'did'not'appropriately'get'a'RRS'
call'did'in'fact'not'need'any'significant'clinical'intervention.'However,'that'one'
patient'that'subsequently'had'an'ICU'admission'needed'prolonged'support'and'
multiple'reoperations.'What'we'found'is'that'ward'clinical'staff'interpret'the'RRS'
activation'criteria'against'the'clinical'context'and'their'own'clinical'ward'or'unit'
socio'cultural'practice'beliefs.'From'that'study'we'could'see'that'most'of'the'time'
the'ward'clinical'staff'were'correct'in'their'assumptions'about'the'trajectory'of'
the'patient'outcomes;'but'on'the'one'occasion'that'they'erred'there'was'
significant'cost'to'both'the'patient'and'the'organization.'In'essence,'both'the'
sensitivity'and'specificity'of'commonly'utilized'RRS'activation'criteria'are'too'low'
to'significantly'change'ward'staff'beliefs'about'the'RRS'(12T15).''
'
To'improve'the'management'and'outcome'of'deteriorating'patients'in'our'
organization'we'decided'to'try'a'different'approach'to'our'traditional'top'down'
policy'and'procedure'for'mandatory'RRS'activation.'Instead,'we'developed'a'
socioTcultural'intervention'with'the'staff'in'the'general'wards.'The'aim'of'this'
study'was'to'determine'the'effectiveness'of'that'intervention'to'improve'the'
utilization'of'RRS'to'prevent'such'sentinel'events.'In'essence'what'we'wanted'was'
the'right'patient'getting'the'RRS'activation'and'also'not'having'the'RRS'attend'
calls'on'patients'where'no'interventions'were'required.'To'do'this'we'wanted'to'
blend'the'organizations'mandatory'RRS'activation'policy'with'some'of'those'
unwritten'ward'socio'cultural'beliefs'in'an'effort'to'get'the'right'response'for'
each'patient.'
'
'
Methodology'
Ethics'approval'
The'Monash'Health'research'and'ethics'committee'exempted'this'study'
from'requiring'ethics'approval'as'it'fulfilled'the'NHMRC'criteria'for'a'quality'
assurance'project'
Setting'
Monash'Health'is'a'comprehensive'university'tertiary'health'care'provider'
for'the'southTeastern'suburbs'of'Melbourne.'Over'13,000'staff'service'a'
catchment'population'of'880,000'and'provide'acute'health'services'at'four'
hospital'sites;'all'acute'services'are'provided'with'the'exception'of'burns,'spinal'
injury,'and'major'organ'transplantation.'Monash'Health'was'an'early'and'
enthusiastic'adopter'of'the'RRS'with'establishment'of'the'Medical'Emergency'
Team'(MET)'in'one'of'our'hospitals'in'1996.'This'resulted'in'substantial'and'
significant'improvements'in'patient'outcome'within'our'hospitals'(16,17)'and'this'
system'of'care'was'standardized'throughout'the'organization'by'2006.'
Additionally'our'organization'committed'to'training'all'junior'members'of'clinical'
staff'and'MET'responders'in'the'purpose'built'simulation'centre'(18).'
Intervention'Wards'
Six'sample'wards'were'selected'(Table1)'that'represented'a'mix'of'surgical'
and'medical'patients,'and'wards'where'from'our'previous'study'the'incidence'of'
end'points'(cardiac'arrest,'ICU/HDU'admission,'and'unexpected'death)'were'in'
the'middle'range.'
Study'Design'
There'were'two'parts'to'this'study;'(a)'the'process'to'determine'the'cultural'
intervention'and'then'(b)'testing'of'those'interventions'in'the'6'intervention'
wards.'
(a) Selection'of'interventions'
TwentyTfour'participants'were'selected'that'represented'users'of'the'RRS.'
These'included'junior'and'senior'clinicians'that'may'activate'the'RRS'in'the'clinical'
areas'and'staff'attending'as'part'of'the'RRS'such'as'ICU'nurses.'These'participants'
attended'a'workshop'on'the'17th'August'2009'with'the'aim'of'selecting'up'to'
three'interventions'to'trial'in'the'six'study'wards.'This'selection'process'was'
facilitated'by'the'presentation'of'results'from'our'previous'work'that'
documented'failure'of'RRS'activation.'To'assist'with'the'selection'of'the'
interventions'participants'were'asked'to'focus'on'four'issues'with'the'current'
RRS.'
'
'
'
 
 
 
 
Box'1.'Current'RRS'issues/questions'
1. How'can'RRS'calls'be'sensitive'to'all'the'different'clinical'areas?'
2. How'can'we'prevent'prolonged'delays'in'RRS'activation?'
3. How'can'we'make'RRS'activation'criteria'more'visible'to'staff?'
4. How'can'we'make'sure'that'the'treating'(parent)'clinical'team'
continue'to'have'responsibility'for'the'patient'
(b) Intervention'testing'on'the'six'wards'
This'was'undertaken'using'a'before'and'after'analysis'of'the'incidence'of'all'
RRS'calls,'missed'RRS'calls,'and'cardiac'arrest'calls'on'each'of'the'six'wards.'The'
primary'endpoint'for'this'study'was'the'incidence'of'missed'RRS'calls.'The'
definition'of'a'missed'RRS'call'was'that'the'patient,'in'the'24'hours'prior'to'either,'
a'RRS'call,'cardiac'arrest'call,'or'admission'to'the'critical'care'unit'fulfilled'the'RRS'
activation'criteria'and'the'call'was'not'actually'made'at'that'time.'The'other'
variables'were'secondary'endpoints.'
'
Additionally'the'staff'on'each'of'the'six'pilot'wards'completed'a'safety'
culture'survey'before'and'after'the'implementation'(19).'Post'implementation'
data'was'collected'at'one'year.'For'each'period,'the'incidence'of'the'various'
endpoints'was'determined'over'a'10'week'period,'simultaneously'across'the'six'
intervention'wards'by'daily'examination'of'the'cardiac'arrest,'and'RRS'team'
activation'databases'and'review'of'the'previous'24'hours'admissions'to'the'
critical'care'unit.'The'number'of'bed'days'for'each'ward'was'obtained'for'each'
ward'from'a'centralized'database.'
'
Statistical'analysis'
Statistical'analyses'were'performed'using'SPSS'statistics'version'20'(IBM).'
PreT'and'PostTintervention'data'on'the'rates'of'RRS'calls,'Missed'RRS'calls,'Cardiac'
arrest'calls'and'Unplanned'Intensive'Care'Unit'(ICU)'admissions'were'compared'
using'a'multivariate'chiTsquared'model.'The'number'of'bed'days'on'each'of'the'
six'pilot'wards'was'taken'as'the'denominator.'A'oneTway'ANOVA'was'performed'
to'determine'the'difference'between'the'pre'and'postTintervention'safety'culture'
survey'scores.'A'level'of'p<0.05'was'taken'as'statistically'significant.'
'
Results'
(a) Selection'of'interventions'
From'the'socioTcultural'intervention'workshop'day,'the'24'users'of'the'RRS'
put'60'proposals'forward'about'how'the'process'could'be'improved.'Suggestions'
that'were'duplicated'or'clearly'unworkable'due'to'extreme'cost'were'excluded.'
The'authors'then'rated'the'remaining'14'proposals'using'5'criteria'(effectiveness,'
acceptability,'feasibility,'cost'and'sustainability).'After'this,'a'further'two'
proposals'were'excluded.'The'first'being'the'use'of'colour'coded'charts'on'the'
basis'of'proposed'national'implementation'by'the'Australian'Commission'on'
Quality'and'Safety'(20).'The'second'was'the'simulationTbased'education'program'
for'nurses'and'doctors'about'the'RRS'in'our'organization'as'this'was'a'suggestion'
that'had'been'implemented'already.'
At'the'conclusion'of'this'process'the'following'three'proposals'were'adopted'
for'intervention;'
'(1)'Individual'ward'based'agreements'for'the'activation'of'the'RRS'(figure'1).'
The'idea'of'individual'agreements'was'born'out'of'the'realization'that'health'
professionals'in'specialized'clinical'areas'often'considered'themselves'experts'in'a'
particular'mode'of'deterioration.'For'example,'an'abnormal'heart'rate'may'be'
more'appropriately'managed'in'an'area'of'predominantly'cardiology'patients'
than'on'a'neurology'ward.'The'staff,'on'each'unit'were'given'clear'boundaries,'of'
clinical'freedom'to'work'within'depending'on'their'individualized'agreement.'
'
'(2)'Clear'communication'protocols'were'introduced'about'how'the'paging'
system'should'be'used.'These'ensured'details'were'given'about'the'patient’s'
identity,'what'was'required'and'how'urgent'the'request'was.'The'model'used'was'
based'on'the'ISBAR'(Identify,'Situation,'Background,'Assessment,'Request)'
situational'briefing'tool'(21,22).''
(3)'A'revision'of'the'education'process'for'new'staff'occurred'in'parallel'with'
these'other'two'interventions.'An'interTprofessional'induction'program'was'
developed'that'specifically'addressed'the'care'of'the'deteriorating'patient'(23).'
'
(b) Intervention'testing'on'the'six'wards'
Rates'of'clinical'incidents'
The'rates'of'Missed'RRS,'Cardiac'arrest'and'unplanned'ICU'admission'per'
100'bed'days'all'decreased'following'the'intervention'(Table'2).'However,'
because'of'the'low'incidence,'only'the'aggregate'rate'of'Missed'RRS'calls'across'
all'wards'reached'clinical'significance'with'a'drop'of'over'twoTthirds'(1.05'to'0.34'
per'1000'bed'days,'p=0.038).'There'was'a'decrease'was'in'the'rate'of'RRS'
activation'(7.98'per'1000'bed'days'preTintervention'versus'7.85'bed'days'postT
intervention).'
'
Culture'surveys'
A'total'of'408'surveys'were'completed'(227'preTintervention'and'181'postT
intervention).'Expected'differences'were'found'between'the'safety'climates'of'
individual'clinical'areas.'There'was'a'statistically'significant'increase'in'the'post'
intervention'surveys'compared'to'the'pre'intervention'of'the'perceived'reporting'
of'events'(mean'scores'3.68'preTintervention'versus'3.87'postTintervention,'
F=7.693,'p=0.006).'There'were'no'differences'between'the'pre'and'post'
intervention'in'any'of'the'other'13'items'of'the'culture'survey'(Table'3).''
'
Discussion'
Main'findings'
'''''''''''''''This'study'found'that'the'use'of'a'ward'initiated'multiTfaceted'cultural'
intervention'sustainably'reduced'the'incidence'of'missed'RRS'team'activations'
that'result'in'either'unplanned'ICU'admission'or'cardiac'arrest.'This'was'done'
without'an'increase'in'the'number'of'RRS'calls.'Taken'together'these'two'findings'
would'suggest'(although'not'an'aim'of'this'study)'that'the'bedside'clinical'staff'
can'improve'the'utilization'of'the'RRS.'To'some'extent,'this'suggestion'is'
supported'by'our'finding'of'an'improved'reporting'culture,'from'the'patient'
safety'culture'survey'that'we'undertook.'''
'
''''''''''''Study'limitations'''''''''''''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''
''''''''''''There'are'several'significant'limitations'to'this'study.'The'most'
important'limitation'of'this'study'is'the'definition'of'the'term'“missed'RRS'call.”'
Technically'a'missed'RRS'call'should'include'all'patient'events'where'the'
activation'criteria'are'broached'and'no'RRS'call'is'made'at'that'time.'However,'to'
accurately'determine'this'there'would'need'to'be'either'intense'manual'
observation'of'all'written'observation'and'clinical'criteria'or'an'automated'
electronic'observation'capture'system'in'place.'In'the'first'scenario'intense'
manual'observation'is'likely'to'lead'to'skewing'of'findings'by'Hawthorne'effect'
and'in'the'second'scenario'observation'surveillance'by'electronic'observation'
capture'systems'are'as'yet'not'widely'utilised'in'the'general'ward'setting.'Our'
previous'study'found'using'a'snap'shot'methodology'that'42%'of'all'potential'RRS'
activations'were'in'fact'not'made'(10,11).'However,'the'importance'of'this'is'
unclear,'when'the'positive'and'negative'predictive'value'of'the'various'activation'
criteria,'are'so'low'(12T15,24).'However,'from'a'more'practical'standpoint,'our'
organisation'was'principally'concerned'with'the'missed'RRS'call'that'was'
associated'with'patient'harm'to'such'a'degree'that'either'intensive'care'
admission'was'required'or'worse'that'a'cardiac'arrest'occurred.'As'such,'what'
mattered'to'us'was'not'so'much'that'every'RRS'call'was'made,'but'that'a'culture'
existed'on'the'wards'to'positively'encourage'RRS'activation'when'the'patients'
were'clearly'deteriorating.''
Other'limitations'to'this'study'were'first,'that'this'was'a'small'study'
undertaken'only'in'six'wards'in'a'single'organization.'The'ability'to'generalize'
these'findings'across'our'organization'and'in'other'organizations'has'not'been'
tested.'Second,'we'do'not'know'if'these'changes'in'culture'will'be'sustained'over'
time.'We'only'did'an'analysis'of'effectiveness'twelve'months'after'the'
intervention'had'been'implemented.'Third,'the'incidence'of'missed'RRS'both'pre'
and'post'implementation'was'less'that'we'documented'in'our'baseline'point'
prevalence'study.'This'was'due'to'the'different'definitions'of'''“missed'RRS'call”'
that'were'used'and'the'different'methodology'for'collecting'this'data.'Never'the'
less'this'may'suggest'that'other'factors,'cultural'or'otherwise'in'our'organization'
may'have'brought'about'this'effect.'This'point'leads'on'to'the'last'limitation'that'
despite'what'we'considered'to'be'significant'cultural'intervention,'we'could'not'
demonstrate'such'with'the'use'of'the'hospital'culture'patient'safety'survey'that'
we'employed.'The'lack'of'an'observed'change'in'safety'climate'could'be'due'to'
other'factors'on'the'wards,'the'slow'nature'of'change'in'culture'or'a'lack'of'
power'in'the'size'of'the'study.'
'
Study'significance'
'
'
'''''''''''''''
The'fundamental'construct'of'the'RRS'is'that'there'needs'to'be'a'set'of'rules'
based'on'physiological'values'that'determine'the'activation'and'response'to'
certain'predefined'criteria.'These'rules'have'been'determined'by'expert'opinion'
and'have'not'been'validated'(12).'Attempts'to'validate'such'rules'have'
demonstrated'that'on'the'whole'the'activation'criteria'have'reasonable'negative'
predictive'value.'However,'the'adherence'to'rules,'invariably'has'a'poor'positive'
predictive'value'generally'due'to'low'sensitivity'of'the'criteria'(12T15).'For'the'
clinician'faced'with'using'the'RRS'this'translates'to'a'set'of'rules'that'mean'the'
RRS'must'be'called,'but'the'net'result'of'that'is'that'there'is'minimal'to'no'
intervention'and'the'patient'does'just'fine'sitting'there'in'their'ward'bed'(24).'
Junior'clinicians'repeatedly'observe'this'system'with'a'low'‘signal'to'noise’'ratio'
leading'to'reluctance'to'activate'the'RRS'and'perception'that'they'can'manage'
these'situations.'This'contrasts'to'the'perspective'of'the'RRS'teams,'the'intensive'
care'teams'and'units'and'the'hospital'administrators.'For'these'groups'each'
missed'RRS,'regardless'of'incidence,'that'results'in'patient'harm,'is'a'major'
catastrophe.'There'is'a'perception'from'these'groups'that'the'junior'staff'
members'were'unaware'of'the'seriousness'of'the'patient’s'condition'or'did'not'
adequately'record'the'clinical'observations.'The'usual'response'from'
administration'to'these'situations'is'to'develop'more'policy'and'procedure'to'be'
handed'down'to'the'workers'in'the'real'world'of'hospital'medicine'at'the'bedside'
(25).'Additional'policy'and'procedures'that'conflict'with'the'workflow'and'reduce'
efficiency'of'the'bedside'clinical'staff'are'most'likely'to'be'ignored,'or'at'best,'are'
followed'inconsistently'(25).'This'is'reflected'in'our'experience,'with'a'small'but'
significant'incidence'of'patients'that'experienced'harm'as'a'result'of'missed'RRS'
calls'remaining'persistent.'In'our'view'this'approach'has'the'risk'of'reinforcing'
beliefs'amongst'bedside'health'care'clinicians'that'they'are'perceived'as'
incapable'and'can’t'manage'their'patients.'Invariably'the'staff'do'understand'
what'is'happening'with'their'patients'that'are'clinically'deteriorating.'We'found'in'
that'study'that'it'was'other'cultural'factors'that'were'at'play'that'prevented'
appropriate'and'timely'clinical'interventions'for'such'patients.'By'taking'the'
problem'to'the'actual'staff'on'the'ground'to'get'them'to'solve'their'own'
problems'with'their'own'resources,'we'succeeded'in'our'aim'of'the'ward'teams'
taking'ownership'of'the'problem'of'deteriorating'patients.'
'
Conclusion'
We'have'described'and'demonstrated'the'benefits'of'a'bottom'up'cultural'
intervention'approach'to'a'significant'patient'problem'in'our'organization.''The'
use'of'this'innovative'way'to'harness'clinical'expertise'at'the'ward'bedside'level'
within'certain'predefined'boundaries'has'in'our'view'improved'the'development'
of'resilience'in'these'frontline'bedside'clinical'health'care'professionals'(26).'
'
'
'
'''
'
'
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Table'1.'Clinical'and'Demographic'characteristics'of'the'pilot'wards'(n=6)'
Ward' Hospital' Surgical'or'Medical' Elective'or'
Acute'
Number'of'
beds'
Average'
occupancy'
1'(34N)' Monash'
Medical'Centre'
Surgery'(Renal'and'
Vascular)'
Both' 26' 91%'
2'(44S)' Monash'
Medical'Centre'
Medical'(General'
Medicine)'
Acute' 28' 92%'
3'(Ward'A)' Casey'Hospital' Both'(General'
Medicine'and'
Surgery)'
Both' 27' 54%'
4'(Surgical'Unit'
1)'
Dandenong'
Hospital'
Both'
(Gastroenterology'
and'general'surgery'
Acute' 28' 96%'
5'(West'4)' Dandenong'
Hospital'
Medical'
(Respiratory'
Medicine)'
Both' 36' 99%'
6'(Ward'3)' Moorabbin'
Hospital'
Surgery'(ENT,'
Urology'and'
Orthopaedics'
Elective' 25' 74%'
'
'
''
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
Table'2.'Rates'of'clinical'incidents'preT'and'postT'intervention'
'
' Ward'1' Ward'2' Ward'3' Ward'4' Ward'5' Ward'6' Total'
Bed'days'
PreTintervention'
PostTintervention'
'
1226'
1321'
'
2033'
1831'
'
1021'
1101'
'
3720'
3100'
'
2166'
2415'
'
1235'
2079'
'
11401'
11847'
RRS'activations''
(per'1000'bed'
days)'
PreTintervention'
'
PostTintervention'
'
'
'
16'
(13.10)'
18'
(13.63)'
(p=0.899)'
'
'
'
14'(6.89)'
'
19'(10.38)'
(p=0.239)'
'
'
'
3'(2.94)'
'
6'(5.45)'
(p=0.510)'
'
'
'
33'(8.87)'
'
22'(7.10)'
(p=0.415)'
'
'
'
17'(7.85)'
'
20'(8.28)'
(p=0.870)'
'
'
'
8'(6.48)'
'
8'(3.85)'
(p=0.291)'
'
'
'
91'(7.98)'
'
93'(7.85)'
(p=0.910)'
Cardiac'Arrests'
'(per'1000'bed'
days)'
PreTintervention'
PostTintervention'
'
'
'
3'(2.45)'
2'(1.51)'
(p=0.676)'
'
'
'
2'(0.98)'
5'(2.73)'
(p=0.267)'
'
'
'
0'(0)'
0'(0)'
T'
'
'
'
4'(1.08)'
0'(0)'
(p=0.131)'
'
'
'
1'(0.46)'
0'(0)'
(p=0.473)'
'
'
'
0'(0)'
0'(0)'
T'
'
'
'
10'(0.88)'
7'(0.59)'
(p=0.420)'
Missed'RRS' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
activations''
(per'1000'bed'
days)'
PreTintervention'
PostTintervention'
'
'
'
3'(2.45)'
1'(0.76)'
(p=0.357)'
'
'
'
2'(0.98)'
0'(0)'
(p=0.501)'
'
'
'
0'(0)'
0'(0)'
T'
'
'
'
4'(1.08)'
1'(0.32)'
(p=0.385)'
'
'
'
3'(1.39)'
1'(0.41)'
(p=0.350)'
'
'
'
0'(0)'
1'(0.48)'
(p=1.00)'
'
'
'
12'(1.05)'
4'(0.34)'
(p=0.038)*'
Unplanned'ICU'
admissions'(per'
1000'bed'days)'
PreTintervention'
PostTintervention'
'
'
'
6'(4.89)'
5'(3.79)'
(p=0.767)'
'
'
'
5'(2.46)'
2'(1.09)'
(p=0.457)'
'
'
'
T'
T'
T'
'
'
'
T'
5'(1.61)'
T'
'
'
'
T'
7'(2.90)'
T'
'
'
'
1'(0.81)'
0'(0)'
(p=1.00)'
'
'
'
12'(2.67)'
19'(1.77)'
(p=0.321)'
'
'
Table'3.'Change'in'Patient'Safety'Culture'postJintervention'as'measured'by'the'Agency'for'Healthcare'
Research'and'Quality'(AHRQ)''Hospital'Survey.''
Dimension' Mean'(SD)''
PreTintervention'(n=227)'
Mean'(SD)'
PostTintervention'
(n=181)'
F'value' p'value'
Outcome'measures' ' ' ' '
Perception'of'event'reports' 3.676'(0.866)' 3.916'(0.825)' 7.693' 0.006*'
Overall'perceptions'of'safety' 3.586'(0.629)' 3.760'(1.816)' 1.777' 0.183'
Patient'safety'grade'(of'the'unit)' 2.097'(0.666)' 2.034'(0.732)' 0.818' 0.366'
Number'of'events'reported' 2.269'(1.074)' 2.404'(1.082)' 1.507' 0.220'
Safety'culture' ' ' ' '
Manager'expectations'and'actions'
promoting'safety'
3.986'(0.652)' 3.960'(0.723)' 0.142' 0.706'
Organisational'learning'–'continuous'
improvement'
3.127'(0.350)' 3.106'(0.398)' 0.341' 0.559'
Teamwork'within'units' 4.097'(0.581)' 4.067'(0.622)' 0.248' 0.619'
Communication'openness' 3.179'(0.435)' 3.224'(0.455)' 0.988' 0.321'
Feedback'and'communication'about'
error'
3.709'(0.723)' 3.801'(0.699)' 1.642' 0.201'
NonTpunitive'response'to'error' 3.417'(0.705)' 3.406'(0.782)' 0.019' 0.890'
Staffing' 3.359'(0.656)' 3.335'(0.705)' 0.003' 0.954'
HospitalTbased'aspects' ' ' ' '
Hospital'management'support'for'
patient'safety'
3.540'(0.723)' 3.630'(0.675)' 1.629' 0.203'
Teamwork'across'hospital'units' 3.432'(0.646)' 3.504'(0.555)' 1.393' 0.239'
Hospital'handoffs'and'transitions' 3.221'(1.733)' 3.362'(1.904)' 0.595' 0.441'
'
'
